Latest news with #Kissinger
Spectator
6 hours ago
- Politics
- Spectator
The mixed legacy of Zbigniew Brzezinski, strategist of the Cold War
In the autumn of 1938, within nine weeks of each other, two boys arrived in New York, fleeing the gathering storm: a 15-year-old Jewish German and a ten-year-old Catholic from Poland. Both would repay the mortal debt they owed by dedicating their lives to the Land of the Free. The older boy was, of course, Henry Kissinger, later Grand High Poobah to Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. The younger was Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's national security adviser from 1977 to 1981 and the subject of a magisterial biography bythe Financial Times'sWashingtonsupremo, Edward Luce. From the first, Zbigniew Brzezinski (pronounced 'ZbigNieff BreshinSki', as Carter helpfully informed his team) sat in Kissinger's shadow, always a step or two behind the great Bavarian. Their first encounter was at Harvard in 1950 when Zbig's first-year lecturer handed the reins to his protégé, described by Zbig as a 'youngish, somewhat rotund… scholar with a strong German accent'. The Pole disliked the sub's penchant for 'Germanic philosophers'. 'Not my meat,' he recalled. 'I rather impolitely rose and left.' The two circled one another for decades. Alternately respectful, cordial, even playful, they also briefed against each other with the spite only arrogant, erudite rivals can exhibit. To Kissinger, Zbig was a 'total whore who has been on every side of every argument'. Brzezinski saw in his senior 'an unprincipled politician, and a political chameleon who only cares about staying visible in US public life and returning to power'. As Harry S. Truman once said: 'If you want a friend in Washington, get a dog.' That Kissinger is more remembered is partly due to his being an 'Olympic gold medal-winning flatterer', according to Luce. 'Even with me he would say things I knew to be patently untrue about how he always read my column first thing every morning.' For his part, Zbig favoured abrasive argument. He would 'specialise in decapitating people he thought were fools'. And he chose to leave the greater part of his story to be told by Luce, who has had unrestricted access to a voluminous corpus of diaries, letters and papers. The result of this bequest is a landmark study unlikely to be equalled. This is a high-definition account of one of the great – and most neglected – postwar statesmen and strategists, who helped to shape the end of the Soviet Union. From 1950 on, when he was a mere Masters student, Zbig could see that the simmering nationalisms within the USSR were its Achilles' heel. As a proud Pole, he knew only too well that non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union retained deep national feelings that would not tolerate Moscow's imperialism indefinitely. His rivals and colleagues, Kissinger included, pursued détente, thinking the Reds would inevitably catch up and overtake the US. But Zbig saw clearly how the massive Soviet hulk was vulnerable to degeneration. His 'systematic bent of mind' pushed Carter to weaponise human rights against the USSR, normalise relations with the Chinese – leading to the opening of listening posts on the Sino-Russian border – and to provide support to Afghan rebel groups following the 1979 Soviet invasion, leaving the Russians bogged down in an unwinnable war. But nowhere was his historic calling more apparent than in Polish affairs. Zbig saw the profound potential of Lech Walesa's Solidarity trade union and used American might to protect and nurture it. In this he was aided by a countryman, one Karol Jozef Wojtyla (aka Pope John Paul II), who became a lifelong ally (Brzezinski had 'P' for 'Pope' added to his White House phone). So it was that in 1980, with the Soviets poised to invade Poland, the two powerful Poles conspired to defend the homeland: Zbig by having Carter issue public and private threats to Leonid Brezhnev; John Paul II by quietly beseeching Solidarity to avoid any action that might give the Soviets an excuse to advance. Years later, the CIA director Robert Gates would conclude that it had been the 'fragile seeds' sowed by Brzezinski that had done for the USSR. If Zbig was responsible for Carter's greatest foreign policy legacy, he was also central to its greatest failure. Having mistaken the Iranian Ayatollah for a 'non-violent Shiite version of Mohandas Gandhi', he advocated successfully for the US to admit the ailing and displaced Shah. It was a decision which precipitated the storming of the US embassy in Tehran and an awful hostage crisis which ultimately destroyed the credibility of Carter's administration. That there have been such very long tails to the Carter presidency's calculations and miscalculations – in eastern Europe, Iran and Afghanistan – speaks loudly of a time when big brains played big dice on the Cold War Risk board of the world. Luce's exceptional study vividly revives the memory, strategies, tactics and foibles of one of the greatest players of that lethal game.
The Hill
14-07-2025
- Politics
- The Hill
Trump's ‘non-security council' is another ticking time bomb
The U.S. faces yet another clear and apparent danger. Since Jan. 20, the Trump administration has eviscerated what should be the president's most important decision-making body: the National Security Council. Indeed, today's National Security Council should be renamed the 'non-security council.' Established by the National Security Act of 1947, along with an independent U.S. Air Force and the CIA, President Harry Truman opposed it believing the limits on presidential foreign policy authorities were excessive. The National Security Council consisted of the administration's relevant national security appointees. On balance, the National Security Council has served the nation well, from dealing with the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, breakthroughs to China and an arms agreement with the Soviet Union under Richard Nixon, the historic peace agreement between Egypt and Israel under President Jimmy Carter and President George H. W. Bush's establishment of the international coalition that smashed Saddam Hussein's army, driving it out of Kuwait. Of course the National Security Council was not always successful. Under President George W. Bush, the U.S. lunged into Afghanistan and then invaded Iraq. Both were profound strategic blunders. Yet the National Security Council remains vital to successful decision-making if properly utilized. In President Trump's first term, the National Security Council barely functioned. Two national security advisers were fired. And John Bolton, the third and final survivor, could not have been more critical of Trump's lack of any formal decision-making process. What has Trump done in his second term with the National Security Council? He fired his first national security adviser, former Rep. Mike Waltz (R-Fla.), after less than four months in that job — an improvement over Trump's first term when his then national security adviser, Mike Flynn, lasted 24 days. A number of Waltz' key personnel on the National Security Council staff were removed or fired. And Secretary of State Marco Rubio was named the new national security adviser. This is only the second time a secretary of State has also held the national security adviser slot. The first was Henry Kissinger. Whatever his merits, no one would consider Rubio a Kissinger or a Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser. And Kissinger's deputy, the formidable General Brent Scowcroft, was at the National Security Council until President Gerald Ford named him the national security adviser. Can anyone name Rubio's deputy national security advisers? The Trump National Security Council has been 'restructured.' Given the span of control, no one, not even a Kissinger can conduct both assignments simultaneously. The reason is obvious: Who can be in two places at once? The national security adviser must be in proximity to the president almost constantly. Secretaries of State, by definition, cannot only remain in Washington. As a result, Trump's National Security Council process has become dysfunctional to the point of uselessness. The war in Ukraine is a case in point. Last week, there were reports that U.S. military aid to Ukraine was being withheld. Despite the headlines, there was no evidence that the National Security Council had reviewed or staffed this decision. Several stories concluded that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth unilaterally ordered the cutback in aid for defensive missiles and artillery rounds Kyiv desperately needed and did not inform the White House. This makes no sense unless Hegseth was directed by or misunderstood what the president wanted after a Jan. 30 White House meeting, had a death wish or ventured into a realm for which he was uniquely unqualified. Although anything is possible in this administration. Another explanation is a variant to the first. Someone close to Trump in the White House knew that the president was tilting heavily towards Russian President Vladimir Putin as he believed a deal with Russia over Ukraine could be achieved. On this basis, that person advised the Department of Defense to cut back arms to Kyiv, signaling Putin of U.S. intent. Whether Hegseth or his deputy Steve Feinberg were part of this decision, responsibility for execution shifted to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby. Then, the president had his last, disastrous phone conversation with Putin. Trump was furious, expressing his anger in the Cabinet room. Magically, holds on certain weapons for Ukraine were lifted. Colby was immediately accused of going rogue by carrying out his designs for moving military capability to Asia and a Chinese contingency. But could the Pentagon's number three have accomplished this on his own? Asked about the arms holdup, Trump pleaded ignorance. Regardless of whomever was responsible for this incompetence, the non-security-council process was abandoned for the president's ad hoc, idiosyncratic and often whimsical approach to decision-making. Next time, this could be catastrophic. And Rubio's deputies, by the way, are Andy Baker and Stephen Gabriel. Harlan Ullman, Ph.D., is UPI's Arnaud deBorchgrave Distinguished Columnist, a senior advisor at Washington, D.C.'s Atlantic Council, the chairman of two private companies and the principal author of the doctrine of shock and awe. He and David Richards are authors of a forthcoming book on preventing strategic catastrophe.
AllAfrica
27-06-2025
- Business
- AllAfrica
‘Special relationship': preparing Britain and America for new era
The Council on Geostrategy has just launched 'The 'special relationship': preparing Britain and America for a new era' at a roundtable hosted by the US Embassy in London. This paper focuses on the alliance in a time of immense change and we tasked ourselves with providing an honest, non-emotive read out of the state of the alliance, focusing on converging or diverging interests – and not values. Here are our big three take-aways. 1. We still have many convergences: the US and UK broadly agree that the economic trading order has hurt their economies and led to de-industrialization, but they are unclear as to the future direction. Is a Bretton Woods II needed or a G7/D-10 that creates a group of like-minded economic powers as occurred during the Cold War? Certainly, the US has decided on its trajectory and is moving out on that trajectory, but the UK remains uncertain… 2. We have a long-term divergence in terms of theatre priority, the shift of US focus to the Indo-Pacific has been taking place since 2011, when the Pivot was first announced. The UK should not be surprised. This divergence is, we feel, manageable through the framework that the two theatres are 'interconnected' and that what China and Russia each do in those separate theatres impacts both. This is already true in Ukraine and may become true in other areas. 3. We are more concerned about a divergence in threat priority. For many years, the UK has 'muddled through' on China and though the Strategic Defense Review, National Security Strategy, and China Audit all point to a shift in approach, there are strong indicators that this government – like those preceding it – is being careful to manage relations with Beijing carefully as it is seen as a driver for growth. The US shift on Moscow is also of concern to London, which is skeptical of an attempt at a 'reverse Kissinger' in which the US, to counter China, aligns with Russia. We have made a series of recommendations for both sides – particularly on defense industrial cooperation where we see great potential. You may download the full report here. The executive summary follows: Context: While historical foundations and ties have helped to reinforce the 'special relationship' between the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US), it was common geopolitical interests which bound the two nations together. Chief among these has been to prevent others from dominating the most industrialised and productive regions of Eurasia. As a result, both countries have co-constructed the prevailing international order. Their strength, determination and foresight after the Second World War created alliances and institutions which saw the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the enlargement of that order and the offshoring of manufacturing have empowered adversaries while weakening UK and US strategic industries. Geopolitical changes, especially growing Russian and Chinese aggression, as well as political and strategic changes in Britain and America, have led to fresh questions being asked about the future of the special relationship. Questions this report addresses: What were the fundamental interests which brought the UK and US together, and do they remain cogent? How can the two reinforce convergent interests while simultaneously managing divergent interests? How can policymakers within the two countries redefine the alliance for a new era of geopolitics and revision of the international order? Key findings: In the 2020s, areas of converging interests include: Accepting limits on globalization: This convergence is currently implicit rather than explicit, though both countries recognise the need to rectify the negative impacts which globalisation has had on their own economies and societies. Rising to the geopolitical challenge: Both countries express aspirations of leadership and have shown the will to address systemic challenges, although to differing degrees in their respective theatres. Rebuilding the defense industrial base: Both nations have identified an urgent need to rebuild production capacity and invest in future technologies. Areas of diverging interests include: Theater priority: For the first time in decades, there is a strong possibility that the UK and US will prioritise different regions, with Britain focused primarily on the Euro-Atlantic and America on the Indo-Pacific, though both also retain an interest in the Middle East. Threat precedence: The UK's stance towards the People's Republic of China (PRC) frustrates Washington, while London worries about a softer US approach towards Russia. Cooperation preference: The two countries are somewhat divided on their approach to multilateral institutions, including on climate change and trade arrangements. These areas of divergence notwithstanding, Britain and America have made similar diagnoses of the geopolitical problems they face, even if they are starting to focus on them from different directions. The two nations also share clarity of purpose in many areas: they require closer and continued strategic dialogue to realign growing divergences. One problem, particularly for the UK, is that while US power has surged ahead, the UK, like many other allies, has fallen behind. Britain has a special interest in strengthening itself – economically, diplomatically and militarily – otherwise its voice will weaken in Washington. However, each country is likely to remain the other's most powerful ally well into the 21st century. This necessitates closer cooperation. While the US has other important allies and partners, none of these look set to be more powerful than the UK by the early 2030s, especially if British naval and deterrence capabilities are regenerated. Recommendations: To repurpose the special relationship, the UK and US should: Create a new vision of the future of the international order: Britain and America largely agree on the damage done to their economies and industrial bases by neoliberal economic policies. But they lack a vision and strategy to respond. To chart a way forward with the support of a wider group of key allies, they should: Review the level of rival co-option occurring in existing geoeconomic organisations in order to create new ones where necessary, to deal with trade abuses and to coordinate sanctions more effectively; Explore ways of establishing a new geoeconomic order, designed to reinforce the prosperity and resilience of free and open countries, which seeks to limit the ability of adversaries to compete at the geoeconomic level; Strengthen the alignments between the UK and US scientific and technological bases to generate collaboration on regulations for emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Quantum technologies, behind which like-minded partners can follow. Britain and America largely agree on the damage done to their economies and industrial bases by neoliberal economic policies. But they lack a vision and strategy to respond. To chart a way forward with the support of a wider group of key allies, they should: Plan for a modulated multi-theatre posture: There have been signs from American officials that the US will be far less focused on European security. To mitigate the impact of an American reprioritisation away from Britain's primary theatre, the two governments should: Work together – and within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – to create a clear timeline for the move of key US assets from Europe to the Indo-Pacific theatre over the next five to ten years. The aim should be to allow the UK and other allies to replace those assets in an orderly manner, rather than during a geopolitical emergency in the future; Prepare for the UK to provide leadership and enhanced deterrence in Europe; Reinforce UK support for US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in the Indo-Pacific; Develop strategic dialogues on the most pressing issues to foster alignment on key national priorities; Forge a better understanding of how and where both nations could contribute to a simultaneous multi-front crisis if one were to materialise. There have been signs from American officials that the US will be far less focused on European security. To mitigate the impact of an American reprioritisation away from Britain's primary theatre, the two governments should: Coordinate military production: There is consensus in both countries that greater defence industrial capacity is needed to deter and contain aggressors. The realisation that adversaries are now fielding Chinese technologies will help shape priorities. The UK and US should: Commit to spend at least 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence by 2030, with 3.5% on military capabilities and 1.5% on strategic infrastructure, as per the recommendation of Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO; Ensure that there is clear direction and prioritisation for transatlantic defence industrial collaboration; Prioritise rare earth metal supply chain cooperation; continued PRC control over this vital supply chain is simply not sustainable for future UK-US military industrial expansion and operations; Support efforts which contribute to leadership in critical technologies; Build up the production and co-production of munitions at the bilateral, minilateral and multilateral levels; Cooperate more on co-sustainment, particularly to enable British shipyards to support the US Navy. There is consensus in both countries that greater defence industrial capacity is needed to deter and contain aggressors. The realisation that adversaries are now fielding Chinese technologies will help shape priorities. The UK and US should: William Freer is a research fellow in national security at the Council on Geostrategy in London. John Hemmings, PhD, is deputy director (geopolitics) at the Council on Geostrategy. James Rogers is co-founder (research) at the Council on Geostrategy.
India.com
23-06-2025
- Politics
- India.com
Pakistan would have completely destroyed in 10 days, US asked Iran and China's help in war against India, the plan was...
(File) US President Donald Trump has claimed that 'monumental damage' was inflicted upon nuclear sites in Iran and stressed that 'obliteration is an accurate term'. He cited satellite images released of the nuclear sites to mention the damage caused to a statement shared on his social media platform Truth Social, Trump stated, 'Monumental Damage was done to all Nuclear sites in Iran, as shown by satellite images. Obliteration is an accurate term! The white structure shown is deeply imbedded into the rock, with even its roof well below ground level, and completely shielded from flame. The biggest damage took place far below ground level. Bullseye!!!' remarks come a day after the US launched Operation Midnight Hammer and conducted 'precision strikes' at three of Iran's key nuclear facilities, including Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Going by the media reports, there was a time when the United States and Iran were allies, particularly during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. As reported by The Indian Express, recently declassified U.S. State Department documents indicate that on December 9, 1971, the high-level meeting chaired by then-National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger took place in Washington. At that time, India was launching heavy airstrikes against Pakistan's Karachi port, destroying West Pakistan's fuel and vital supplies, which had a significant impact on the performance of the Pakistani military. At the meeting, CIA Director Richard Helms announced that 12 to 13 strikes had been conducted on Karachi's oil storage tanks, which destroyed 80% of Pakistan's fuel supply leaving Pakistan with fuel for only two weeks. Kissinger wanted to know if fuel could be moved from Tehran. Kissinger and U.S. government officials also talked about possible plans to move fuel from Iran, send Iranian fighter jets and pilots to Pakistan, and getting China to move troops on the Indian border as a means of threatening India militarily. On December 8, 1971, U.S. officials met with Iran's Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and asked for his support for Pakistan. The Shah made it clear that he would not support Pakistan due to the Indo-Soviet treaty because that would lead to a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. He had a second option, Johnson suggested by way of precluding, that Jordan could fly F-104s to Pakistan and in exchange Iran would fly its aircraft in Jordanian airspace as air cover for Jordan. But that idea also failed because of the prohibition of the U.S. law. U.S. defense officials thought Pakistani forces in East Pakistan were totally cut off and could be completely wiped out within 10 to 15 days. The situation in West Pakistan was also extremely tenuous. Had India delayed the war, Pakistan's military and economy may have completely collapsed. To apply pressure to India, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger's first focus was to attempt to entice the Chinese to do something militarily near the Indian border. The second option was to deploy the U.S. Navy 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal. Nixon even noted that Chinese forces moving to the Indian border would scare Indian soldiers.
Indian Express
22-06-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
When US wanted Iran and China to help Pakistan in war against India
The United States has bombed Iran using its strategic bomber aircraft fleet. This is an opportune time to recall the past friendship of the US with Iran and how at one point in the India-Pakistan war in December 1971, it wanted Iran to help Pakistan with urgent fuel supplies and also fighter aircraft to save the country from decimation at India's hands. Declassified US State Department documents include minutes of a meeting held in Washington on December 9, 1971, which was chaired by Henry Kissinger, then national security advisor to US President Richard Nixon. In this meeting, the US officials worried about the lack of fuel reserves in West Pakistan and the fact that the Pakistani military would soon come to a standstill because its major fuel reserves had been destroyed by Indian attacks on the Karachi port. Kissinger asked the officials if fuel supplies could be rushed from Tehran to Pakistan so that West Pakistan could be saved from being captured by India after the successful conquest of East Pakistan. In the same meeting, discussions were also held on supplying Pakistan with fighter aircraft from Iran and asking China to make threatening mocks on the border with India. CIA Director Richard Helms informed the participants that in the last few hours, he had received a report from Karachi that the oil tanks there had been hit again, in the 12th or 13th air raid, and that six or eight of them had been burning. 'An ESSO representative has indicated that this means the loss of 50% of Karachi's oil reserves, which amounts to over 80% of the POL [petrol, oil, lubricants] for all of Pakistan. He estimates that they are left with a two-week supply, possibly less at the rate at which POL is now being consumed,' he said. Kissinger asked the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H Moorer for his estimate of the military situation. Moorer stated that in East Pakistan, in the absence of a ceasefire, it was just a matter of time until the Pakistan Army would be essentially ineffective. 'Their supplies are cut off and they have no air left. Any serious fighting could be over in ten days or two weeks, depending on whether the Paks continue to fight to the last man or whether they begin to surrender in large numbers, which does not seem to be in the cards now,' he said. The admiral added that in West Pakistan, the Pakistanis are trying to occupy enough of Kashmir to give them a bargaining chip if and when there is a ceasefire. 'They are trying to block the main lines of communication. South of the Kashmir area, the Indians outnumber the Paks two-to-one, and they may plan to move south to Lahore, although there is no indication of that now. The best Pakistan can do is to gain as much control of Kashmir as possible,' he said. Moorer added that the Pakistanis can operate for about three weeks or so. 'However, if there is a period of attrition, with no ceasefire, the Indians can hold out longer and the Paks have had it. Mrs. Gandhi has stated that her objective is to destroy the Pak military forces,' he said. Kissenger asked whether in that case in a prolonged war, even if Pakistan got Kashmir, it would be unable to hold it and it would lead to the destruction of the Pakistan Army. 'Exactly. When East Pakistan is gone, the Indians will transfer their divisions to West-possibly four of the six divisions now in the East. This will take one to three weeks, depending on how much air they use. If the war continues to the end, the outcome for Pakistan is inevitable,' said Admiral Moorer. At this point, John N Irwin, the undersecretary of state, mentioned a CIA paper, Implications of an Indian Victory Over Pakistan, that predicts the possible acceleration of the breakup tendencies in West Pakistan— possibly into as many as four separate states. The admiral pointed out that the Indian objective was to take out the Pakistani tanks and planes. 'If they run out of POL and can't move, they'll be sitting ducks,' he said. The meeting then discussed the possibility of trucking POL from Tehran. 'There is one road. We have one report that indicates that Chinese trucks are coming in but we don't know what they are carrying. Iran is the logical source of POL. I talked to the Turkish Chief of Staff at NATO and asked him how much assistance he thought Iran was prepared to give to Pakistan. He said he thought the Shah wanted to be helpful, but had one eye cocked on Iraq. In the end, he didn't believe the Shah would give significant assistance,' said the Admiral. The documents also reveal that on instructions from Washington, a senior embassy official met the Shah of Iran in Tehran on December 8, 1971, to discuss the possibility of Iranian military support for Pakistan. The Shah stated that he had informed the Pakistani ambassador in Tehran that, in light of the treaty of friendship signed by India and the Soviet Union, he could not send Iranian aircraft and pilots to Pakistan. He was not prepared to risk a confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Shah proposed an alternative way to support the hard-pressed Pakistani Air Force. He suggested that the United States urge King Hussein to send Jordanian F-104 fighters to Pakistan. The Shah in turn would send two squadrons of Iranian aircraft to Jordan to defend Jordan while Jordanian planes and pilots were in Pakistan engaged in support of fellow Muslims. 'The Embassy official indicated that, because of legal constraints regarding the use of military equipment provided by the United States, it would be difficult for officials in Washington to give permission for the transfer of the F-104s from Jordan to Pakistan, or to overlook their absence in Jordan. The Shah said that the United States could not hope to achieve the objective of bolstering Pakistan while maintaining that it was not involved in the effort,' the document says. President Nixon, Attorney General John N Mitchell, and Henry Kissinger had earlier met on the afternoon of December 8, 1971, for an extended discussion of the crisis in South Asia. Turning to the situation in East Pakistan, Kissinger warned that 'the Indian plan is now clear. They are going to move their forces from East Pakistan to the west. They will then smash the Pakistan land forces and air forces.' He added that India planned to 'annex the part of Kashmir that is in Pakistan.' Kissinger went on to attribute to the Gandhi government the goal of balkanising West Pakistan into units such as Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province. West Pakistan would become a state akin to Afghanistan and East Pakistan would equate with Bhutan. Nixon said that he had given Prime Minister Indira Gandhi a warning during his dinner in Washington with her. 'I told her that any war would be very, very unacceptable.' Kissinger observed that any such warning obviously fell on deaf ears. 'She was determined to go.' 'As I look at this thing, the Chinese have got to move to that damn border. The Indians have got to get a little scared,' said Nixon. He instructed Kissinger to get a message to that effect to the Chinese. Kissinger suggested that another pressure move would be to move a US aircraft carrier force into the Bay of Bengal. Summarising the decisions they were considering, Kissinger said, 'We should get a note to the Chinese, we should move the carrier to the Bay of Bengal.' Nixon interjected, 'I agree.' Kissinger also pointed to the threat to West Pakistan, 'At this stage, we have to prevent an Indian attack on West Pakistan.' Nixon agreed. Kissinger continued, 'We have to maintain the position of withdrawal from all of Pakistan.' He stated that by introducing its military power into the equation, in the form of a carrier and other units from the Seventh Fleet, the US was seeking to prevent 'a Soviet stooge, supported by Soviet arms' from overrunning an ally. Nixon returned to his conviction that China could exercise a decisive restraining influence on India. 'The Chinese thing I still think is a card in the hole there. I tell you a movement of even some Chinese toward that border could scare those goddamn Indians to death.' Kissinger agreed, 'As soon as we have made the decision here, we can then talk to the Chinese.' Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger engaged in conversation outside the Oval Office. Source: US National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials Project Photo Collection)
