The Need for a Financial, Banking, and Medical Hub
A Proposal for an Intermediate Free Zone
Every government leaves a mark—an attempt at economic development that is credited to it if successful. And even if it does not succeed, it is still acknowledged for having made a serious and creative effort to find practical solutions.
Summary of the Proposal
The core idea is to establish a free zone that acts as an intermediary financial and banking hub, combined with medical tourism, resorts, and entertainment facilities. This zone would address a pressing regional need to regulate the flow of capital from politically unstable neighboring areas toward international markets and reconstruction zones. It would also facilitate the reverse flow of service-based products such as computing, quality control, management, technology, healthcare, and education.
History is a gateway to understanding the present. As political, social, and economic life cycles repeat themselves—albeit with different tools and methods—I present this proposal grounded in an intellectual understanding of our regional realities.
Our region has always needed hubs—financial, political, social, and commercial. Lebanon served as such a hub from the 1960s through the early 2000s. During that period, the region saw an accumulation of capital that required safe access to global markets and, at times, a secure and discreet haven. Lebanon also served as a reverse-direction hub—a refuge for the wealthy, intellectuals, and dreamers—offering discreet leisure options to an elite that preferred to remain outside the scrutiny of its surrounding environment.
Lebanon lost this unique position due to political instability and the dominance of a particular sect. While other hubs have emerged, they have only partially filled the vacuum left behind.
The Arab world and its surrounding region are still in search of a trustworthy, discreet, and secure financial center that is also internationally acceptable. Although Jordan possesses many of these attributes, the surrounding social fabric, norms, systems, and mentalities limit the ability to fully leverage them.
In my view, establishing a free zone governed by special laws could fulfill this regional need. I have previously discussed the necessity of a special free zone for medical tourism. It might now be more appropriate to combine both ideas into one. The government could provide the infrastructure, while domestic and foreign private sectors compete in building financial and medical centers, resorts, and hotels. This would create a new hybrid model—something like a 'Jordanian Lebanon'—located at a reasonable distance from major population centers and supported by water sources sufficient not only for basic needs but also for the creation of artificial lakes.
What remains most critical is the legal framework—one that offers this zone a degree of autonomy and freedom to attract investment, while also ensuring returns to the state through land leasing, service fees, and job creation based on merit and competitiveness.
If successful, this concept could pave the way for further innovations—such as a land-based commercial free zone in the northeastern region, linking Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria. This could serve as a 'land-based Dubai' in that area.
This proposal may seem like a theoretical dream, but many of today's major achievements began as bold, out-of-the-box ideas followed by small-scale pilot trials. If these trials proved useful, momentum built naturally.
A special-law free zone designed to facilitate the flow of capital and service-based goods in a region that will inevitably require reconstruction—and where capital is seeking viable investment opportunities—would open up vast job opportunities in currently stagnant fields. These include administration, quality management, accounting, economics, finance, banking, tourism, real estate development, medical specializations, computing, cybersecurity, and more.
Moreover, such a zone would relieve governments of the pressure of fluctuating social moods influenced by emotional, regional, and political considerations.
The initial financial input should go toward studies and site selection—perhaps 30–40 square kilometers of state-owned land. A limited portion of this could be developed with infrastructure and basic facilities. The zone would then be marketed, allowing the private sector to lease the land from the government under long-term contracts, with clear terms requiring investment within a defined time frame.
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