Voices from the Arab press: Are we witnessing the fall of the Hezbollah state?

Yahoo

31-05-2025

A weekly selection of opinions and analyses from the Arab media around the world.
Nida Al Watan, Lebanon, May 23
The Hezbollah state represents the extended arm of Iran's Islamic regime in Lebanon. It has uprooted Lebanese Shi'ites from their own communities, erased their cultural and social history, and obstructed the establishment of national order by paralyzing institutional mechanisms and rendering the constitution ineffective. In its place, Hezbollah has constructed parallel regimes atop the carcass of the Lebanese state and its governing institutions.
What was once a 'Shi'ite question' has metastasized into something far greater: the transformation of Lebanon into a 'society without a state' – a landscape marked by bloodshed, ideological mobilization, a sanctions-driven economy, and a culture molded by command and control. These are the defining features of the Hezbollah state.
The proxy war, which exploited Lebanese Shi'ites as fodder for Iran's geopolitical ambitions, has now also precipitated Hezbollah's own deterioration. The movement has suffered staggering blows to its military and financial infrastructure, resulting in the unraveling of the very system upon which it built both its state-within-a-state and its ideological fervor.
Looking ahead to the post-Hezbollah period, there must emerge from within the Shi'ite community a political project capable of challenging the prevailing reality and a cultural movement that engages with the tenets of modernity while harmonizing them with Shi'ite jurisprudence. The aim is to resolve the 'Shi'ite question' and reclaim the Lebanese state, not to allow Hezbollah's ruin to be interpreted as a Shi'ite defeat.
Muhammad Hasan al-Amin, widely recognized for his moderate stance and his outspoken criticism of Hezbollah's dominance over the Shi'ite political landscape in Lebanon, once wrote with incisive clarity and conviction: 'The authority of divine right is a conspiracy against Shi'ism.' In this declaration, al-Amin articulated a visionary call for reforming Islamic religious thought, liberating it from the pursuit of political power.
He saw this renewal as contingent on a reconciliation with secularism – an idea long opposed by segments of the religious establishment – while recognizing that modernity has shaped the state as a functional institution overseeing societal life. The essential principles of modernity – secularism, the state, citizenship, and coexistence – find their rightful place as enduring concepts under this framework. In such a model, religion continues to hold meaning, not as a vehicle of domination, but as a personal and cultural expression within society.
Similarly, the prominent scholar Mohammad Mehdi Shamseddine made critical contributions to modern Shi'ite legal thought, advocating for a jurisprudence that could evolve into a cultural project mirroring modernity. He dismissed the doctrine of the jurist's general guardianship, instead asserting that guardianship belongs collectively to the nation. Ali al-Amin [relation to Hasan unclear – Ed.], another notable voice, emphasized the role of the state as the sole legitimate authority responsible for organizing society through its exclusive functions and mandates.
From these intellectual currents emerge the possibility of a jurisprudential framework that resonates with Western political thought regarding the state, both its philosophical underpinnings and practical governance. Such a foundation would reintegrate Lebanese Shi'ites into the broader national project, reframing the burdens of Hezbollah's dominion as lessons that could ultimately yield gains for both the Lebanese state and the Shi'ite community. – Ali Khalifa
Al-Ittihad, UAE, May 23
Will the Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, remain in power despite the deepening conflicts and internal turmoil it has faced since the Oct. 7 attacks? What viable alternatives exist, particularly in light of the widening rift between Netanyahu and US President [Donald] Trump, not only over the strategic direction of US policy but also over the real and mounting challenges Netanyahu must overcome to sustain his leadership?
The current Netanyahu government faces 10 major crises. The first and most prominent one is Netanyahu's trial, which continues to cast a shadow over his political future. He fears that any shifts within his fragile coalition could expedite legal proceedings against him, especially as the courts consider new charges. Netanyahu has persistently tried to tether his legal woes to the war in Gaza, suggesting that the state's survival must take precedence over stalled legal accountability.
Second, the judiciary remains a persistent threat, particularly in light of Netanyahu's success in pushing through a series of highly divisive laws. This suggests that the conflict has moved beyond partisan politics into a deeper institutional confrontation, one likely resolvable only through his exit from power. In a country with a clearly delineated separation of powers and a legal framework resistant to manipulation, the politicization of the judiciary now presents a genuine existential risk to the current administration.
Third, protest movements across Israel have grown in both size and influence, incorporating respected political, military, and academic voices. These groups are demanding an end to the Gaza war and a recalibration of the country's political and military institutions. Their growing presence at weekly demonstrations has become a persistent thorn in Netanyahu's side.
Fourth, the mounting discontent among the Israeli public suggests that opposition leaders like Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid could reclaim political momentum. While their policy differences with Netanyahu on Gaza are nuanced, Lapid's recent surge in popularity points to an increasingly credible alternative should the current crisis continue to spiral.
Fifth, there is growing dissatisfaction from within Israel's religious establishment over Netanyahu's handling of critical national affairs. This discontent has manifested in friction between coalition partners and civil and military leaders. Although many still believe the country is influenced heavily by its chief rabbis, even the religious leadership is now voicing unease, further exposing cracks in the coalition's foundation.
Sixth, members of Netanyahu's own ruling coalition have begun openly objecting to his decisions. Notably, figures like Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, along with National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, have issued veiled and explicit threats against the government's direction. Although the coalition remains intact for now, its survival appears contingent on suppressing tensions that could otherwise lead to its unraveling.
Seventh, influential power centers are beginning to assert themselves outside the traditional political structure. These include powerful economic elites and former security officials operating discreetly but strategically, with interests rooted in economic stability and national security. While they do not openly declare political allegiances, their ability to shape outcomes behind the scenes poses a formidable challenge to Netanyahu's continued rule.
Eighth, Israel's economy is under mounting pressure. Despite Netanyahu's public declarations that Israel can function without international economic support, domestic political forces have dismissed such claims as detached from reality. With the government initiating new wage policies and layered tax hikes, economic dissatisfaction is growing, especially as President Isaac Herzog has failed to broker a viable consensus to alleviate the crisis.
Ninth, the political reemergence of former prime minister Naftali Bennett presents yet another variable. Having formed a new party with plans to run in the next election, Bennett is being watched closely by Washington, which views him as a pragmatic and viable alternative. Once considered Netanyahu's Likud heir apparent before being drawn into the coalition, Bennett now commands considerable American support and could shift the political calculus significantly.
Finally, the perspective of President Trump may prove to be the most decisive factor shaping the Israeli political landscape. Despite there being no major ideological schism between the two leaders, the US administration views Netanyahu as a barrier to political stability and a source of continued volatility. With Washington increasingly concerned about the risks of internal collapse, pressure from the US may well catalyze the change that many within Israel's fractured society now deem inevitable. – Tarek Fahmy
Al-Masry Al-Youm, Egypt, May 24
When the Assad regime collapsed in Syria, the region was witnessing a new chapter in the long and volatile saga of change that had begun as early as mid-March 2011.
Personally, I refrained from participating, even with commentary, out of respect for the Syrian people's right to self-determination. Many rushed to analyze the personality of the new president, projecting expectations onto the emerging regime, while social media buzzed with sweeping judgments before the new experiment had even begun.
Yet it is only the Syrian people who hold the key to decoding a reality that has confounded even the most powerful global actors involved in the region. Only they know what is necessary and possible in the aftermath of a national fabric torn apart by foreign interventions and internal strife. Bashar al-Assad's regime was left clinging to lifelines from Iran and support from Russia, even as sanctions tightened and society bore the weight of mounting isolation.
I remain steadfast in my position. I have no desire to make premature predictions or offer grand visions for the country's future. Still, I recently traveled to the Beirut Arab International Book Fair, a visit that coincided with an invitation from the United Nations Development Program and the Syrian Ministry of Energy to attend the closing ceremony of the country's energy transition program – an initiative I have been involved with for more than two years, offering my expertise in finance and investment to help launch Syria's energy transition fund.
This invitation was different. The funding agency believed it was time to move operations into Syria itself, launching a new phase of the program from within the country rather than continuing to operate it from Cairo or Beirut. This decision followed President Trump's announcement of lifting sanctions on Syria.
Europe quickly got the message. No sooner had we completed our visit to Damascus than the European Union declared its intention to lift sanctions, and the World Bank issued a statement praising donors for settling their arrears, enabling Syria to qualify for its programs.
During our brief 48-hour visit, I captured images and impressions I now share with readers – observations that may challenge preconceived notions, though I offer them only as a visitor, not as a political analyst or a commentator on Syria's broader economic and security dynamics.
Reaching Damascus from Beirut by road typically takes about two hours under favorable conditions, though traffic can easily double that time. The journey begins in Beirut, heading east over the Lebanese mountains, through towns like Beit Mery, Broumana, and Bhamdoun. After the mountain pass, the road descends into the Bekaa Valley, cutting through towns such as Aley, Chtaura, and Zahlé before arriving at the Masnaa border crossing, the formal gateway between Lebanon and Syria.
On the Syrian side, the route continues through the countryside, passing Jdeidet Yabous, Al-Kiswah, and Qatana, eventually reaching the capital. Travelers cross the Anti-Lebanon mountain range, which forms the natural border between the two nations and includes prominent peaks like Mount Sannine.
The road is winding and narrow, often lacking dividers, yet experienced drivers navigate it with relative ease. The Lebanese side subjected travelers to slow, often arbitrary procedures, marred by needless hassles. In contrast, the Syrian side was surprisingly warm and efficient – officials greeted us with smiles that seemed out of place in a region recently marked by intense fighting and unrest. Whether driven by strategy or genuine hospitality, the effort to welcome was evident and effective.
Though Syrian roads haven't been maintained in nearly 20 years, they are remarkably solid, wide, and flanked by safety barriers. The hotel where I stayed seemed frozen in the 1990s, reminiscent of Baghdad's hotels, yet everything – from bedding and food to the furnishings – reflected Syrians' meticulous attention to cleanliness. Even the street food in Damascus, a staple I usually approach with caution, was impressive.
Initially, I planned to remain in the hotel throughout the trip, as all meetings were scheduled there. But familiar faces from various ministries and institutions, now visibly relieved by the country's shifting dynamics, encouraged me to venture out. The vibrant street life lured me into night walks, even close to midnight, near the Great Umayyad Mosque and the Al-Hamidiyeh Souq with its arched metal roof and centuries-old shops. The streets of the ancient city, lined with historical landmarks, felt alive again. What did unsettle me, though, was the visible poverty – too many beggars, not for their insistence but for the depth of their misery.
Perhaps the most striking transformation in Syria's public space is the near-total absence of Assad family portraits, once omnipresent. Even the 2,000-lira note still bears Bashar's image, though it now trades at around 10,000 liras to the dollar, meaning $100 in cash requires a small briefcase.
Energy remains Syria's most critical crisis, but the underlying infrastructure, combined with a readiness for solar and wind projects and the willingness of Western and Gulf investors, makes a swift, viable solution within reach. Syrians are enduring hardship with remarkable grace. The homes dotting Mount Qasioun are clad with solar panels in a unique energy system.
There is much more to say – about the energy transition program, the evolving role of the state, and the capacity of its institutions – but that must wait for another column. – Medhat Nafeh
Asharq Al-Awsat, London, May 24
US President Donald Trump's visit to the Gulf and his speech at the Riyadh Economic Forum marked a pivotal shift in American foreign policy toward the region, unveiling for the first time the contours of the Trump Doctrine – a doctrine that stands in stark contrast to the approaches of his predecessors, particularly George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden.
While Trump's speech was rooted in traditional elements of American strategic thought, it redefined those principles through a lens more attuned to the profound transformations underway in the Middle East. It reflected a recognition of the region's political and strategic maturity – one achieved not through foreign imposition or external aid, but forged by its own leaders, grounded in its own traditions, values, and lived experiences.
Trump made clear that this evolution was indigenous, not imported. He stated, 'This great transformation has not come from Western interventionists… giving you lectures on how to live or how to govern your own affairs. No, the gleaming marvels of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were not created by the so-called nation-builders, neocons, or liberal nonprofits, like those who spent trillions failing to develop Kabul and Baghdad, so many other cities.' In that line, Trump directly rebuked the legacy of president George W. Bush's interventionist agenda in Iraq.
More broadly, Trump's message in Riyadh amounted to a wholesale rejection of two decades of US policy in the region – policies many in the Arab world blame for destruction, instability, and political chaos. After 9/11, Bush launched what he called the freedom agenda, later labeled the Bush Doctrine, encapsulated in his second inaugural address: 'The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands.' This agenda justified military and political intervention in the region as a moral imperative.
Obama, in contrast, sought to reset relations through diplomacy, most notably in his 2009 Cairo speech, promising 'a new beginning' with the Arab and Islamic worlds based on mutual respect and shared interests. His eloquence moved many, acknowledging Arab grievances and offering the dignity of understanding. But his words never translated into meaningful action, especially on the Palestinian issue and regional anxieties over Iran's growing influence.
His administration's pursuit of the nuclear agreement with Tehran alienated key regional players, who viewed it as enabling Iran's expansionism rather than containing it. For all its rhetorical promise, Obama's strategy amounted to inertia – maintaining the status quo without confronting the difficult decisions needed to fulfill the partnership he envisioned.
Biden's doctrine, if one can call it that, has been defined less by proactive policy and more by absence. For more than a year and a half, Biden's administration stood by as over 50,000 Palestinians were killed and Gaza was reduced to rubble. It neither wielded its leverage to stop the bloodshed nor presented a viable path forward. The two-state solution lay in ruins, and the administration's approach to the region appeared to be one of passive disengagement.
In sharp contrast, President Trump entered his second term intent on reversing these legacies from day one. He presented himself as a peacemaker – 'not a fan of war,' as he said – but one who seeks peace through strength. His foreign policy vision was pragmatic, transactional, and grounded in strategic interests, not ideology.
In his Riyadh address, Trump told the region he did not believe in permanent enemies. In a stunning move, he announced from the Saudi capital the lifting of sanctions on Syria and held a meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa – a decision that stirred backlash in Washington, including from Israel, and triggered accusations within Congress that members of Trump's own administration were working to undermine the move.
Nonetheless, Trump proceeded, seeing the decision as a strategic necessity to preempt Iran and Russia from reasserting dominance in Syria, while also answering a request from a key ally, the Saudi crown prince, who views Syrian stability as essential to regional peace.
Staying consistent with his principle of flexibility in diplomacy, Trump addressed Iran with both a warning and an invitation. In a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei and again during his Riyadh speech, he expressed willingness to improve ties: 'If I can make a deal with Iran, I'll be very happy. We're going to make your region and the world a safer place.' But he issued a clear threat if Iran continued its aggressive behavior: The US would impose 'tremendous pressure' and drive Iranian oil exports to zero, as it had before.
Trump does not seek another war in the Middle East, nor does he want US troops permanently stationed there. But when he says Iran will not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons, he means it, unlike Obama's empty redlines in Syria or Biden's broken ceasefire promises in Gaza.
Trump's policy is to restore American deterrence, a concept many believe has eroded in recent years. His visit to the Gulf was designed as a signal of unwavering support for regional allies. As Reuters noted, it catalyzed the emergence of a new Sunni political order that counters the Iranian axis. It also sent a message to [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu: Unconditional backing from Washington could no longer be taken for granted.
As British historian Niall Ferguson has written, America has many of the attributes of an empire, but lacks the will to act like one, causing its global power to oscillate. There are cycles of strength followed by periods of retreat. Under President Trump, America is in a phase of renewed assertiveness, with a doctrine built on economic revitalization and peace through strength.
Will this new approach succeed where others have failed? The chapter Trump opened during his Gulf visit may yet redefine America's role in the Middle East – one rooted in mutual respect, equal partnership, and strategic clarity. But its success will depend on whether America can resist the temptations that have undone empires before: the lure of overreach, the loss of strategic discipline, and the mistaken belief that power is its own justification. – Amal Mudallali
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.