This Muslim nation imposes Taliban dress code; women banned from wearing shorts, leggings, sleeveless shirts in..., and then...
In yet another attempt at Taliban-esque moral policing by the Muhammad Yunus-led interim regime in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Bank issued a diktat barring female employees from donning 'provocative' western outfits like short dresses, sleeveless shirts and leggings in the office. What did the order say?
According to reports, the Bangladesh Bank, the country's central bank, had issued an order, directing women employees to wear 'decent and professional' clothing in the office, warning that the non-compliance with the office dress code would result in disciplinary action. 'Officials and employees at all levels should dress decently and professionally in accordance with the country's social norms,' the order read.
The now rescinded order asked male workers to wear long or half-sleeved formal shirts, formal pants and shoes, while jeans and fancy pyjamas were not allowed.
Similarly, it directed women employees to sarees, salwar-kameez, or any other 'simple, decent, professional attire' like a headscarf or hijab, but allowed formal sandals and shoes. The order also directed all departments to appoint an officer to monitor compliance with the dress code guidelines.
However, the bank's Talibani diktat sparked a social media storm, forcing the institution to withdraw the directive after just three days. How Bangladeshi netizens responded?
Taking to social media, netizens pointed out the hypocrisy reeking from bank's order, with one X user noting how daughter of the bank's governor could wear anything she wishes while employees were being forced to dress 'professionally' under the clandestine Islamic agenda which is being promoted in the country.
Several users compared the directive to those imposed by the Afghan Taliban regime. 'Rule of a vigilant dictator in the new Taliban era,' one user tweeted. Why Bangladesh Bank withdrew the order?
Following the backlash, Bangladesh Bank withdrew the order on Thursday. 'The circular is purely an advisory. No compulsion has been imposed regarding wearing hijab or burqa,' the bank's spokesperson Arif Hussain Khan, said in a statement.
Earlier, while speaking to the media, Fauzia Muslim, president of the Bangladesh Mahila Parishad, termed the move as 'unprecedented', alleging that 'a certain cultural environment is being shaped, and this directive reflects that effort.'
Meanwhile, the Muhammad Yunus regime passed another controversial ordinance on late Wednesday which proposes action against employees protesting against the government.
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