
Neither at war nor at peace in Singapore
The defense chief's words captured a deeper truth: Strategic ambiguity in the Indo-Pacific has become a structural reality amid the return of a multipolar security order.
As Singapore builds its fifth-generation Armed Forces – digitally networked, AI-integrated, and autonomous-capable – to address manpower constraints and enhance force multiplication, it must also contend with a more crowded Indo-Pacific theater comprised of old neighbors and distant new visitors.
In this context, three shifts warrant closer attention.
1. New Indo-Pacific military balance
Between May and June 2025, China deployed both its Liaoning and Shandong aircraft carrier groups beyond the First Island Chain, conducting more than 1,100 sorties over two weeks in the Philippine Sea.
These operations, supported by Type 055 destroyers and logistics vessels, confirmed the People's Liberation Army-Navy's rising ability to sustain carrier-based operations in the Western Pacific within the Second Island Chain.
The United Kingdom responded with its own signal. In mid-June, HMS Spey transited the Taiwan Strait en route to join Carrier Strike Group 25 (CSG25), whose flagship HMS Prince of Wales docked in Singapore days later.
London called the transit lawful and routine; Beijing condemned it as a provocation. On the day HMS Spey transited, the PLA sent 74 aircraft toward Taiwan, with 61 of them crossing the median line in what Taipei described as an unprecedented incursion.
Singapore welcomed HMS Prince of Wales with considerable fanfare. Photos and videos of the carrier docked at Marina Bay were widely shared, and officials highlighted the strength of bilateral defense ties.
But the symbolism ran deeper. CSG25 will join Exercise Bersama Lima this September under the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA), alongside Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore.
Originally established as a collective security arrangement for Malaysia and Singapore after Britain's East of Suez withdrawal, the FPDA's evolution could today be seen to reflect a broader rebalancing of China's presence in the region, thus complicating Singapore's fundamental interests of military non-entanglement with China.
2. Limits of defense diplomacy
Economic ties with China are deep and still growing. Singapore remains China's largest foreign investor and strategic partner in projects like the Suzhou Industrial Park and Chongqing Connectivity Initiative.
New areas of collaboration, including digital economy and green development, are also taking shape. Notably, SAF-PLA engagements have quietly expanded in recent years, adding nuance to the familiar framing that security ties are limited while economic ties flourish.
Yet, Singapore's troops continue to train in Taiwan under Project Starlight – an arrangement maintained for over 40 years, as former Deputy Prime Minister and Senior Minister S. Jayakumar reflected in his book 'Diplomacy: A Singapore Experience.' This has been a point of tension with China, despite Singapore's unequivocal 'one-China policy.'
Singapore remains the only Southeast Asian nation to acquire the American F-35 Joint Strike Fighter – unlike US treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines, which have opted to hedge with Sweden's Gripens and South Korea's FA-50s.
Coincidentally, the UK has also announced an expansion of its F-35 fleet. Unlike Britain's F-35s, which support its NATO nuclear deterrent posture, Singapore's fleet has no such role yet it underscores deep interoperability with US platform architecture.
Additionally, the SAF maintains rotational access agreements for US forces under the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding United States Use of Facilities in Singapore, the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement and the 2015 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.
While access is also extended to international navies, the scale and frequency of US deployments – especially during heightened South China Sea and Taiwan Strait tensions – raises the perception that Singapore is de facto aligned with the US, even when it is not. This perception risk is not trivial.
The precedent of Qatar is instructive. In June, Iran launched at least 14 ballistic missiles at the Al-Udeid air base, a US facility in Qatar, in retaliation for US strikes on Iran's Fordow nuclear facility.
The Qatari Prime Minister later said it 'scarred' the relationship. Qatar was targeted not for what it did, but for what it hosted. In a future US-China conflict, could the distinction between hosting and aligning of military assets and facilities similarly blur in the eyes of great-power rivals?
3. Diffusion as deterrence
As part of its 5G SAF evolution, Singapore's investments in AI-enabled platforms and unmanned systems go beyond addressing manpower constraints. They are designed to enhance the SAF's ability to project presence, monitor contested environments and sustain operations without unnecessarily placing personnel at risk.
Take, for example, the SAF's use of digital twins – computer-generated simulation environments that replicate high-threat theatres and allow units to rehearse complex operations virtually.
These simulations extend operational readiness across scenarios that may be too politically sensitive or physically hazardous to stage in real life. Paired with autonomous maritime patrols and remote sensing platforms, such tools are increasingly vital to maintaining forward situational awareness while minimizing exposure on the ground.
Geographic diffusion is another critical dimension. While longstanding overseas training partnerships remain foundational, new options merit exploration.
For instance, could Timor-Leste , soon to join ASEAN and cooperate with both Singapore and China under the Third Country Training Program, serve as neutral terrain for future SAF training, given its strategic proximity to Singapore and relatively low geopolitical baggage?
Similarly, could Oman's Port Salalah, situated near key chokepoints in the Indian Ocean, offer a viable platform for naval exercises or maritime logistics access beyond the operational reach of the First and Second Island Chains?
Deterrence through cohesion
Concentration of force has long been a cornerstone of military doctrine, famously championed by Carl von Clausewitz as the path to achieving a decisive advantage.
But in today's Indo-Pacific, where threats are more asymmetric, intentions more easily misread and escalation more automated than ever, the logic of strategic diffusion is gaining ground. For a point target like Singapore, diffusion buys time, creates space and preserves freedom of maneuver.
Yet diffusion does not replace concentration; it relies on it. The ability to disperse assets and operate with agility across domains only works when anchored by cohesion.
And for Singapore, that cohesion is Total Defense: The belief that an attack on one is met by all. On that basis, Singapore's ultimate deterrence rests on its people – mobilized psychologically, economically, socially and militarily.
We saw this vividly during the Covid-19 crisis. As global systems buckled, Singapore activated its entire nation. Under the direction of the Multi-ministry Taskforce, then-Trade and Industry Minister Chan Chun Sing and team diversified supply lines, secured vaccine cold-chains, and built and repurposed facilities overnight.
The SAF, public service and citizen-volunteers were mobilized into providing a single, unified response to the pandemic. It wasn't framed as Total Defense, but that's exactly what it was. And it worked.
This is why partisan politics must never breach the water's edge; why national institutions must remain trusted; why Singaporeans must never become vessels for foreign agendas, wittingly or otherwise; and why we must not import the ideological suspicions that plague the civil-military-technological discourse elsewhere.
This SAF Day, Singaporeans must remember: What truly matters is the will of a people who know what they stand for – and what gives them meaning. In a more crowded and contested Indo-Pacific, that shared sense of purpose remains the foundation of Singapore's defence posture, from which all else must flow.
Marcus Loh is chairman of the Public Affairs Group at the Public Relations and Communications Association (PRCA) Asia Pacific. An MA candidate of the War Studies Department in King's College London, Loh also serves on the Executive Committee of SGTech's Digital Transformation Chapter, contributing to national conversations on AI, data infrastructure, and digital policy.
A former president of the Institute of Public Relations of Singapore, he has played a longstanding role in shaping the relevance of strategic communication and public affairs in an evolving policy, technology and geoeconomic landscape.
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