China badmouths French Rafale to rewire Indo-Pacific arms deals
This month, the Associated Press (AP) reported that French intelligence officials have accused China of orchestrating a targeted disinformation campaign aimed at harming the reputation and sales of Dassault Aviation's Rafale fighter jet, particularly after its deployment in the India-Pakistan conflict in May.
The supposed initiative, led by Chinese defense attachés through foreign embassies, involved lobbying countries such as Indonesia to reconsider their procurement plans and choose Chinese-made alternatives. Online activity surged during the four-day conflict, with over 1,000 new accounts disseminating manipulated imagery, AI-generated content, and simulated combat depictions to portray Rafales as underperforming.
French Air Force General Jérôme Bellanger confirmed that India lost three aircraft: one Rafale, one Sukhoi, and one Mirage 2000. He also dismissed the claims of five Rafale shootdowns as disinformation. The first known Rafale combat loss has prompted global scrutiny among client states.
France's Defense Ministry described the campaign as an attack not only on a weapons platform but also on its strategic industrial reputation. With 323 jets exported, including 42 ordered by Indonesia, the Rafale remains central to France's Indo-Pacific outreach.
China's defense ministry rejected the allegations as 'groundless rumors.' Observers believe China aims to weaken Western defense ties in Asia. AP reviewed intelligence shared on condition of anonymity.
Explaining China's possible disinformation strategy, Dexter Roberts, in a December 2020 Atlantic Council report, outlined how Beijing employs disinformation as a strategic instrument to shape global narratives, undermine the credibility of rival powers, and enhance its 'discourse power' in critical domains like defense.
He explained that China utilizes state-controlled media, social platforms and covert actors to amplify propaganda and discredit adversaries' political systems, social cohesion and technological capabilities. These efforts, he noted, are aimed at advancing China's governance model and curbing Western influence in sensitive arenas by seeding doubt, stoking local grievances and exerting reputational and economic pressure on decision-makers
While China aspires to become a top-tier fighter jet exporter, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) notes that it has had only modest success, with just 57 combat aircraft on order or preselected for delivery after 2024 – far behind the US (996), France (214), and South Korea (140).
Explaining these weak sales, Richard Aboulafia argued in a February 2023 Citadel article that China's assertive foreign policy significantly undermines its arms export prospects. He noted that countries like India and Vietnam, which have territorial disputes with China, are ruled out as potential buyers, while others like Malaysia and Indonesia remain wary of Beijing's regional ambitions.
These concerns are reinforced by the nature of modern fighter jets, which demand constant technical, logistical, and maintenance support from their manufacturers to stay operational, creating long-term dependencies that can serve as levers of influence.
Such dependencies run counter to Indonesia's longstanding commitment to non-alignment and strategic autonomy. Ron Matthews and others argue in a July 2025 article in the peer-reviewed Asian Security journal that Indonesia's defense acquisition strategy reflects its 'free and active' foreign policy by deliberately diversifying suppliers across the US, Russia, China, South Korea and European countries to avoid being beholden to any single actor.
They emphasize that this approach is not just about building capability – it's a geopolitical maneuver that allows Jakarta to retain sovereignty over defense choices while navigating a multipolar Indo-Pacific without being pulled into great-power rivalries.
That calculus appears to be playing out in real time. While Reuters reported in June 2024 that China had offered J-10 jets, frigates, and other equipment to Indonesia, Defense Security Asia noted this month that Indonesia seeks to acquire 24 more Rafale jets, bringing its total order to 66. If finalized, this deal would replace Jakarta's aging fleet of US F-16s and Russian Su-27s and make Indonesia the largest non-European Rafale operator.
Indonesia's desire to maintain strategic autonomy may align well with France's Indo-Pacific strategy. Eric Frecon, in a February 2022 article for the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, said France's approach revitalizes 'Gaullo-Mitterrandism' – a diplomatic strategy that emphasizes French interests and values within a multilateral setting. Frecon argues that France's outreach to Indo-Pacific middle powers like Indonesia allows it to sidestep the binary China-US framing and support a more multipolar world order.
Coline Laroche echoes this in a May 2025 piece for the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), stating that France aims to act as a 'balancing power' promoting multilateralism, grounded in its national interests and permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Laroche notes that France seeks to offer a 'third voice' amid escalating tensions between China's assertiveness and US pressure.
While India and France are in damage control mode and Indonesia's Rafale deal appears stable despite the disinformation blitz, questions remain about how other Indo-Pacific nations will respond to Beijing's push.
A May 2025 article from The China Academy claims that the J-10 is gaining traction among countries seeking cost-effective alternatives to Western jets. It identifies Bangladesh as a potential buyer, citing national defense needs driven by India-centric concerns. It also names Thailand, which has a history of balanced procurement and non-confrontational diplomacy, and Myanmar, long reliant on Chinese systems and now seeking upgrades.
Still, skepticism persists. Rahman Yaacob writes in a January 2025 article for the Lowy Institute that Southeast Asian states increasingly prefer supplier diversity. He cites Russia's declining role, the high political costs of US equipment, and quality issues with Chinese gear as reasons for the shift. Yaacob contends that this dynamic is opening up opportunities for new players – France, Germany, and South Korea – to gain ground in a region that values flexibility over alignment.
As China ramps up its digital warfare tactics to corner Indo-Pacific arms markets, the real battle may not be over airframes but over influence, and whether buyers trust what they see, or what they're being shown.
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