The Arab Order in the Eye of the Storm

Morocco World

2 days ago

The nostalgics of an imaginary Arab golden age are stuck in a series of questions. Where is the Arab world heading? From crisis to crisis, the end of the tunnel sends the Arab system back to a déjà-vu stage. What are the root causes of the deadlock in which this system is stuck? Are the causes ancient? Are they new?
Are they the result of ill-reading the evolution of geopolitics in the world and in regional subsystems? What role can Arab countries play in order to create a Middle Eastern order in which they are not mere spectators or targets of the revolving changes?
So many questions that contain objective arguments and, above all, a lot of speculation. Precisely, the work of enlightened observers is to ensure that speculations do not overshadow the unbiased analysis that would allow decision-makers to make appropriate decisions. Thus, a situation assessment is a genuine step before providing a comprehensive analysis.
Order or Arab Disorder?
However, to get the picture as clear as possible, a number of concepts and sayings that are currently in vogue have to be assessed. First: what do we mean by 'Arab Order'? Would it be a well-structured sub-regional system or would it be a mind imagination?
Generally, political scientists associate regional order with the existence of regional organizations in which matters of common interest are debated—and possibly accompanied by the search for ways and means to resolve ongoing disputes or endemic interstate conflicts.
Within the Arab world, in addition to the League of Arab States (LAS) established in 1945, there are three sub-regional organizations, namely, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), established in 1981, the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) established in 1981, and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) established in 1989.
These organizations were established in geopolitical circumstances whose intelligibility is confusing. Indeed, the process of their emergence was the result of a series of complex negotiations. The confusion got deeper because of the political and academic interpretations it had unwillingly allowed.
Secondly, nature abhors a vacuum. In this regard, the absence of a genuine political will to help bring about an Arab order fully in control of its means has been the result of several factors.
One, the ascendancy of ideology over the reality on the ground. For at least four decades, the Arab world has been shaped in the light of the East-West conflict, the perception of the struggle between progressives and conservatives, and the hasty management of intranational demands.
Second, the independence of Arab countries that were under colonization saw the emergence of border conflicts, precisely to correct the anomalies and injustices caused by colonization. The notions of the inviolability of borders and acquired rights were valued to persuade some and deter others.
Three, for three decades (1950-1970), the pan-Arab discourse conditioned Arab public opinion. The means of communication being under the control of state apparatuses, only one bell was heard. Pan-Arabism was strengthened by Pan-Islamism in the aftermath of the al-Aqsa Mosque fire in 1969.
Four, a parenthesis was opened in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the initiation of a laborious process aiming at a multilateral solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This demonstrated that the bilateral process initiated and concluded between Egypt and Israel was incomplete. The Oslo processes of 1993 opened a breach that was quickly closed, following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the onset of the various intifadas.
Five, the Arab system ended up being hostage to its various alliances, particularly after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States.
Six, the experience of political Islam after the Arab Spring in 2011 helped to calm the intranational political chessboards. However, the various transnational allegiances produced such a cacophony that this experience was, with a few exceptions, a resounding failure.
Thirdly, paradigms that fill the end-of-day academic debates. One, the paradigm of the new generations of Arab leaders. In this regard, two groups have been distinguished: Group 1 (G1) between 1990 and 2012 and Group 2 from 2016 to the present. The 1991 Middle East peace conference marked a transition on the regional geopolitical chessboard, but it was also followed by the rise to power of new generations of Arab leaders in Jordan, Bahrain, Syria, and Morocco (G1).
The aftermath of the Arab Spring was marked by the rise to power in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia of leaders who remained in the shadows (G2), but had a significant impact on shaping the decision-making system.
Two, the paradigm of post-COVID political systems. It is a blurred vision and a confused visibility. The post-COVID period plunges decision-makers and observers into the embarrassment of being unable to anticipate future changes.
Three, the dilemma of triple belonging (Arab, African, and Islamic). This triple affiliation of most member countries of the League of Arab States is a source of contradiction in terms of foreign policy positions.
It goes without saying that the behavior of certain Arab countries borders on schizophrenia. This resulted in dichotomous positions on the same issue depending on the forum where it is debated: Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the African Union, or the United Nations.
For some observers, this is called the sovereign expression of rational choices or the mutation of pragmatic processes. For others, it is a diplomatic myopia that causes the Arab voice to be lost within international organizations.
Fourthly, the paradigm of security complexes. For decades, a theme has been widely debated within the League of Arab States: Arab national security. The Arab countries have been presented as having a single and unique security concern.
Running Against the Wind
However, no precise definition was provided. Because each country perceives national security from its own perspective. Arab national security has been associated with the notion of common Arab action. The two notions were drowned in debates about procedures and strategic priorities that no one, moreover, could help providing a convincing definition.
However, the two notions of Arab national security and Arab collective action fall within the framework of a broader perception concerning Arab security complexes. And that's where the problem lies.
The concept of the Arab security complex differs from the concept of common Arab defense. The latter is enshrined in the charter of the League of Arab States, while the former is framed within the context of regionally limited security arrangements or falling within the sphere of broader military alliances.
Thus, in 1975, a security complex project grouping the Gulf countries along with Iraq was conceived, while rejecting Iran's membership around which the idea was initially conceived. The same was true for the Arab Cooperation Council and the Gulf Cooperation Council (1981), minus Qatar and plus Egypt.
What is the current situation? Here too, reflection on certain paradigms would be enlightening. In this regard, it is necessary to distinguish between the paradigms that are favored in the West and the paradigms that are valued in the Arab periphery.
First: The regime change paradigm. In the consciousness of the Arab peoples from the Gulf to the Atlantic, there is a prevailing idea that the Western world has been fragmenting the Arab world since the end of the First World War (1914-1918) through the implementation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916). This agreement was a precursor to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the Soviet Empire.
One: The idea of the fragmentation of the Arab world was revived during the various Arab-Israeli wars and the tripartite intervention of France, Great Britain, and Israel against Egypt following the nationalization of the Suez Canal (1948-1956-1967); on the occasion of the war between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988) and the intervention of the international coalition led by the United States in Iraq in 1991 and 2003.
Two: The idea of fragmentation took on a new dimension during the Arab Spring (2011). But this time, the mission was entrusted to actors within the Arab and Islamic periphery. The outline of the fragmentation was through the distinction between regimes that have successfully achieved peaceful political transitions by the transmission of power in continuity (most G1 countries subscribe to this explanation) and countries that were forced to change their power holders without disrupting the structures of the regimes (the countries that experienced the rise of Islamists to power).
Secondly, the motivations of the Arabs and the West. Three paradigms collide. One: the paradigm of the Arab nation and the Islamic Ummah. For the Arabs, an association is enshrined between the Arab world and the Islamic Ummah.
It is believed that beyond the geostrategic interests related to the temptation to seize the wealth abundant in the Arab subsoil, there is a vengeful desire to humiliate the Ummah and an obstruction against the spread of Islam in the world.
Two: the paradigm of the clash of civilizations: For the West, it would involve introducing democracy, promoting the culture of human rights, and uplifting Arab peoples (Muslims and Africans) to be in line with modernity. It would therefore be a civilizational war as prophesied by Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama.
Three, the paradigm of economics as a means of resolving Arab conflicts. Some Arab political scientists and economists have advocated for resolving Arab conflicts through the necessity of working on the economic chessboard. A logical proposal on a theoretical level, but never seriously applied in practice. The resolutions taken by the Economic and Social Council of the Arab League face difficulties in being implemented.
The assessment of economic cooperation and inter-Arab trade exchanges is negative. Cooperation has been perceived as a kind of zakat from the wealthy Arab countries. It brought about two phenomena. On the one hand, the establishment of a hierarchy between major and minor actors. On the other hand, the intervention in each other's internal affairs.
New geopolitical configurations
This configuration is characterized by the rise and eclipse of major and minor actors. First, a new global configuration. One, the eclipse of Western Europe. Europe is on a downward slope. The European Union is about to lose its bet to be free from the American stranglehold and maintain normal relations with Russia.
The Franco-German couple does not speak the same language. Brexit demonstrated that Great Britain never really believed in the Maastricht Europe established in 1994. The juggling between the United States and China has weakened Europe. The puzzle of Central Europe and its vacillations between the EU, NATO, and the cold peace with Russia.
Two: the exhaustion of Russia. Russia was weakened by the Cold War. Its disintegration in 1990 is still heavily felt by the majority of Russians, regardless of their opinions on the central power in Moscow. Vladimir Putin's speech in Berlin in 2007 on security in Europe is eloquent enough to demonstrate how much Russia's imperial temptation is expressive of a revanchist temptation against a West that has not kept its promises made to Mikhail Gorbachev.
Three: China's caution. China does not want to be the leader of the world. She doesn't have the means for that. She sets the date of 2050 to think about it (this has been clearly stated in Barack Obama's memoirs, A Promised Land, 2020). She is waiting for her Belt and Road Initiative to be seriously set in motion before considering strategic parity with the United States.
Secondly, the Arab and Islamic world in anticipation. Unsolvable dichotomies that send shivers down your spine. Six forms of dichotomies have filled the political, diplomatic, and strategic chessboard in the Arab periphery.
One, choices of societal projects imbued with idealism and limited by the reality on the ground. Two, the monarchical system vs. the republican system. Three, the centrality of the Palestinian issue on paper and its neglect in reality. Four, new leaders in systems still governed by unchangeable traditions. Five, new leaders in systems straddling tradition and modernity. Six, the dilemma of democratic transitions.
These six vectors inevitably influence the position of the Arab periphery in configurations with economic, political, and diplomatic connotations.
One, the role of the Arab periphery in large-scale projects. On the economic front, two projects are capturing the attention of Arab decision-makers: the Silk Road and the Indian project. These two initiatives are ambitious. It was China that was the first to embark on this adventure (One Belt One Road, 2013). Countries from three continents have joined it. Naturally, each country interprets it in the geopolitical manner that suits them.
India launched a similar initiative in 2012, but with little enthusiasm from the countries New Delhi targeted, with ambitions confined to its immediate geographical space. In 2023, India relaunches the project by prioritizing the railway solution.
Looking more closely, one realizes that China and India, chosen as the world's factories, each in their respective fields, are doubling their efforts to erase the disappointment they caused during the COVID period (2019-2022). They were forced to prioritize their people when they were unable to meet global demand (as the world's big factories).
Two, the transnational alliances of intranational political sensitivities. Within Arab political systems, there is a phenomenon that catches the attention of observers. Two forms of transnational alliances are vying for supremacy.
On one hand, governments that identify as liberal or socialist, non-aligned or aligned, etc. However, their diplomatic behavior is a source of astonishment. Beyond the pragmatism or the rational choice they may put forward to explain their decision, there is above all a glaring ambivalence that calls into question the credibility of their ideological preferences.
On the other hand, there are political forces that prioritize their transnational alliances over their national affiliation. They sometimes make decisions that are detrimental to the national interest. This was very clearly observed in leftist movements during the 1960-1990 period and in Islamist currents during the 1990-2000 period.
The question of transnational alliances leads to reflection on the role of Arab civil society. An observation is immediately necessary. The rise of civil society in the face of mass manipulation. Arab public opinion can very easily be blurred. Thanks to (or because of) social media and satellite channels, it becomes a voracious consumer of sensationalist information.
On paper, this is very good for the democratization of the right to information. But the risk comes from the fact that civil society is a reflection of the ideas of conflicting movements and convictions. Diffuse currents roam there, and we no longer know who controls or works for whom.
Willingness, Unwillingness, No Way
Civil society operates thanks to NGOs. However, NGOs are sometimes accused of receiving foreign funding under the guise of ordinary assistance, which it is not. They also constitute a fertile ground for certain intranational political forces that use them for political purposes.
So, when would it be possible to get out of the deadlock and see the light at the end of the tunnel? Proposals have been made for several years. There are those that are reiterated at every cyclical meeting. I will add those that seem even more urgent to me.
First, the reform of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic regional organizations. One, the League of Arab States. Since its creation in the aftermath of the Second World War, the League of Arab States has gone through difficulties in terms of operation and efficiency. Since the 1960s, calls have been made to reform its charter. The call lasted until 2005. During the ordinary Arab Summit in Algiers, a draft reform was introduced.
Since then, nothing in particular. The tensions recorded since the 1960s have been documented in various forms. That being said, the League of Arab States is important to ensure at least the minimum. But a bold reform is necessary. It does not seem that Arab decision-makers are convinced of this in the current state of affairs.
Two, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The same observations are valid, but with a slight difference. Indeed, the charter reform was carried out in 2010-2011 to promote a certain vision of cooperation driven by Turkey. One of the objectives was to challenge the assignments and the presidency of the permanent committees. The objective was not achieved.
Another objective was to adopt flexible conditions for the admission of state entities or national liberation movements that are not recognized by the United Nations. This proved to be partially successful on paper but challenged in practice.
Secondly, the resolution of conflicts within regional organizations. The peaceful resolution of conflicts has been carried out in the form of mediations that aimed to plug the gaps, prevent military escalation, and keep the door open for future negotiations. But in practice, nothing was resolved. Conflicts and disputes resurface every time the balance of power or the dynamics of force change on the ground.
Thirdly, the resolution of conflicts within the United Nations? The result is even more disappointing. Arab countries use the UN's multiple structures to advance their own agenda. Collective concerns are referred to as a diversion.
Fourthly, does construction thanks to the economy? Nothing particular to report. Inter-Arab trade is insignificant, and free trade agreements are not working as desired.
Fifthly, challenge the fictitious hierarchies. Some Arab actors still ruminate on the perception of asymmetrical relations in the Arab periphery. The same beliefs recounted earlier are cultivated even as the world changes.
Sixthly, outline a gradual integration by adopting the spillover effect. Indeed, some scholars share the view that if the GCC members had been wise enough to integrate Yemen, many wars and misunderstandings would have been avoided.
Seventh, combat separatism and fight against transnational alliances that destroy social cohesion and national unity. Here also, cooperation lacks sincere and bold actions.
The recent staged war (as many observers have come to conclude) between Israel, Iran, and the United States of America has proven that the Arab and Islamic peripheries remain at the mercy of international dichotomous interests. There is no salient clue that the situation is going to evolve real soon.
The Arab and Islamic political institutions are almost in the state of clinical death. Yet, hope remains that after what has been witnessed lately, people will come to the conclusion that their problems could only be solved by themselves. Tags: Arab WorldIsrael warships