
Popularity does not equate to power or reform
In the complex and often chaotic theatre of Pakistani politics, few figures have inspired as much devotion and division as Imran Khan. Once hailed as the harbinger of 'Naya Pakistan', his first term in office ended in disappointment and political isolation. Now, from behind bars and under sustained political exclusion, he paradoxically stands as the most popular leader in the country.
But popularity does not equate to power, and even less so to reform. If he is to return to office — not just in name, but in effectiveness — Imran Khan must fundamentally rethink his approach. He must become what he wasn't in his first term: a pragmatic reformer grounded in strategy rather than idealism, and institution-building rather than rhetoric.
His first term (2018-2022) was filled with soaring ambitions but lacked the capacity and discipline to fulfil them. The anti-corruption crusade became tainted by selective accountability. His appointments — notably in Punjab — undermined governance. Economic management was erratic, swinging from populist subsidies to IMF dependency.
Above all, Khan failed to convert his mass appeal into a coherent policy framework capable of reforming Pakistan's entrenched institutions. This inability wasn't just about external conspiracies or establishment betrayals, as he often claimed. It reflected an internal contradiction between his transformative rhetoric and transactional politics.
Imran Khan's current position is more precarious yet also more historically charged than ever. He is no longer the preferred choice of the establishment, whose support was once indispensable to his political rise. The institutional machinery, including the judiciary and civil service, appears aligned against him.
PTI's organisational structure has been dismantled, its leaders jailed, silenced, or coerced into defection. Media coverage is restricted. And yet, his personal popularity continues to soar among a broad and disillusioned public, especially the youth. This paradox — of a leader loved by millions but isolated from the levers of power — raises a fundamental question: If given another chance, could Imran Khan actually lead the systemic change Pakistan desperately needs?
To do so, he would have to abandon some of the very impulses that defined his first term. The confrontational stance toward the establishment, while politically energising, proved unsustainable. If he returns with the same antagonistic posture, his second government may face the same fate as his first — resistance from powerful institutions and ultimate paralysis.
What he needs instead is not submission, but strategic coexistence. The military remains a stakeholder in Pakistan's statecraft. Rather than wage open war, a better approach would be to negotiate a redefined civil-military relationship within a constitutional framework. This would mean reviving bodies like the National Security Council to institutionalise dialogue and minimise backdoor manipulation, while reasserting parliamentary supremacy through consistent democratic performance, not just moral claims.
Equally important is a complete overhaul of his economic strategy. Khan's past economic governance was marred by indecision, mixed messaging, and policy U-turns. If he wants to stabilise Pakistan's battered economy, he must bring in an empowered, professional economic team with both vision and autonomy.
Reforming the Federal Board of Revenue to expand the tax base, especially targeting under-taxed sectors such as real estate and retail, must become a top priority. International negotiations with lenders like the IMF should be handled transparently and professionally, balancing fiscal discipline with social protection. Economic patriotism must replace elite capture — and that begins not with slogans, but with enforceable reforms.
One of Khan's signature failures was the politicisation of accountability. Institutions like the National Accountability Bureau became perceived tools of political vendetta rather than justice. In his second term, if there is to be one, Imran Khan must establish a credible, independent anti-corruption mechanism. That would require bipartisan legislation, full transparency in asset declarations across the board, and reforms in the judicial process to fast-track white-collar crime cases. Only when accountability is applied across political and institutional lines can it gain legitimacy in the public eye.
Education and social harmony, often overshadowed by political battles, must also be central to any reform agenda. Khan's attempt to introduce a Single National Curriculum was well-intentioned but shallow in execution. A truly unified national education system must foster critical thinking, civic values, and respect for diversity — not just uniformity of textbooks. Parallel efforts must target hate speech, sectarian networks, and violent extremism, which continue to corrode Pakistan's social fabric. A peaceful society cannot emerge without inclusive education and active de-radicalisation.
Yet all these reforms, however well-planned, cannot succeed without a complete transformation of leadership style. Khan must govern less like a charismatic crusader and more like a consensus-building statesman. That means empowering his team, tolerating dissent, and abandoning the politics of constant confrontation.
His combative attitude towards political rivals, the judiciary, and even the media during his first term created more enemies than allies. To implement real change, he will need a broad coalition — not of convenience, but of purpose. The art of governance lies not in defeating opponents, but in converting them into stakeholders.
The challenges are immense, but so is the potential. If Khan returns as the same leader who governed from 2018 to 2022, Pakistan may see a repeat of instability, isolation, and unfulfilled promises. But if he evolves — if he learns from failure, adapts to political realities, and builds bridges instead of burning them — he could still emerge as a transformative figure. Not because he is flawless, but because he may be uniquely positioned, given his popular mandate, to defy the inertia of Pakistan's status quo.
Imran Khan does not need to be a saviour. He needs to be a builder - of institutions, of trust, and of a democratic culture. That will require more than charisma. It will demand patience, humility, and strategy. The question is no longer whether he can return. It is whether, if he does, he can finally deliver.

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