UAE holidays 2025: Is there another long weekend in September? Expected dates revealed
To mark the birthday of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), the occasion – known as Mawlid al-Nabi – is observed on 12 Rabi al-Awwal in the Islamic calendar.
In 2025, this is expected to fall on Thursday evening, September 4, subject to the sighting of the moon.
If confirmed, this would result in a three-day weekend, starting Friday, September 5.
The UAE Cabinet previously announced that both public and private sector employees would receive the same number of official holidays, in line with the unified holiday calendar.
Official confirmation of the holiday will come closer to the date, based on lunar observations.
The final decision rests with the Federal Authority for Government Human Resources and the relevant local authorities.
Earlier in the year, residents in the UAE had several public holidays, including Eid Al Fitr and Eid Al Adha, which provided extended weekends.
The remaining public holidays for 2025 include Commemoration Day and National Day on December 1 and 2.
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