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The Limits of Classical Deterrence

The Limits of Classical Deterrence

News1814-05-2025
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From the Kargil infiltration to the Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai carnage, and 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing, Pakistan has demonstrated that terrorism is not a deviation
Deterrence is not a static possession; it is a performance, an act of will repeatedly staged before an audience of adversaries who test its authenticity with every provocation. As Thomas Schelling argued, it is not brute force that deters, but the artful manipulation of risk and consequence. However, when the adversary is not a rational state pursuing defined interests, but a militarised theocracy masquerading as a republic, one that nurtures jihadist proxies as instruments of state policy, deterrence ceases to function in classical terms. It becomes unstable, reactive, and dangerously porous.
Robert Jervis long warned that deterrence depends less on capability than on perception, and misperceptions, especially when willful, can cause it to collapse altogether. Pakistan's deep state does not merely misunderstand signals; it distorts them, weaponises ambiguity, and thrives on the fog of war it helps create.
Pakistan's doctrine of 'death by a thousand cuts" is an institutional strategy cultivated over decades. First articulated in the wake of the 1971 war, and pursued with renewed intensity after the failures of conventional engagements, this doctrine reflects the Pakistani Army's conviction that it cannot match India in open battle, but can bleed it through relentless, low-intensity conflict. Its strategic depth lies not in geography, but in deniability, in a complex ecosystem of terror outfits, training camps, and ideological sanctuaries nurtured by the state and its intelligence agencies. From the Kargil infiltration of 1999, which was planned even as Pakistan feigned diplomacy, to the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai carnage, and the Pulwama suicide bombing in 2019, Pakistan has repeatedly demonstrated that terrorism is not a deviation.
These attacks are not the acts of rogue actors. They are systematically orchestrated by groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, entities headquartered in Pakistan, operating training facilities with impunity in Punjab and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
The cross-border incursions are not aberrations but rituals of strategic signalling, aimed at exhausting India's patience while leveraging nuclear deterrence to shield against conventional retaliation. In effect, Pakistan has treated its territory as both a sanctuary and a launchpad, outsourcing strategic confrontation to non-state actors while insulating itself from direct accountability.
This calibrated ambiguity, of plausible deniability wrapped in nuclear doctrine, has long boxed India into a corner, limiting its responses to dossiers and demarches. But the strategic calculus has shifted significantly post-Uri and Balakot, and now Operation Sindoor. India is beginning to articulate its own doctrine: one that recognizes that restraint without consequence is mistaken for weakness, and that strategic credibility must occasionally be demonstrated in fire, not words.
Traditional deterrence theory, developed during the Cold War by thinkers like Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, and Glenn Snyder, presupposed a set of strategic conditions: rational unitary actors, a clear hierarchy of command, and an ability to link action with consequence through reciprocal threat. But the rise of state-sponsored non-state actors—terrorist groups, proxies, and ideological militias—has ruptured this framework.
In such scenarios, the deterrer confronts what political theorist Martha Crenshaw termed 'strategic fragmentation"—where the actor initiating violence is insulated from punishment, while the state enabling that violence hides behind legal and diplomatic ambiguity. As Daniel Byman (2005) has argued, 'the state sponsor calculates the benefits of plausible deniability as outweighing the costs of global condemnation," turning the non-state actor into both weapon and shield. This renders classical deterrence largely ineffective, as the key requirement of attribution collapses.
India's evolving strategy represents a meaningful attempt to reimagine deterrence under these conditions. By holding the sponsor accountable for the surrogate's actions, New Delhi is reconfiguring the deterrence relationship from dyadic (State A vs State B) to triadic (State A vs State B + Proxy), targeting the violence ecosystem, not just the visible actor. Operation Sindoor further advances this framework by demonstrating that India will no longer distinguish between proximate actors and the strategic architecture that enables them. In doing so, India is operationalising a doctrine of hybrid deterrence, one that speaks to the moral hazard of outsourcing war and offers a doctrinal template for other democracies navigating grey-zone conflict, from Israel's campaign against Hamas and Hezbollah to the U.S. post-9/11 counter-terror posture.
Operation Sindoor was a paradigm shift towards creating deterrence for both state and non-state actors. With Operation Sindoor, India has made a few things very clear. First, it has established a template of predictable consequences. A pre-announced expectation that terrorism will trigger punishment. This reduces strategic ambiguity for both domestic and international audiences, but most importantly for Pakistan's deep state. It will shift the cost-benefit calculus in Rawalpindi, from viewing cross-border terrorism as a low-cost, high-deniability enterprise to one that carries an assured price.
Second, predictable retaliation may paradoxically enhance deterrence credibility, especially in the context of repeated provocations. As Robert Jervis warned, deterrence often fails not due to weakness but due to mismatched perceptions, where adversaries underestimate resolve because previous actions were one-off, reactive, or too surprising to set a precedent. Therefore, by creating a pattern of anticipated and delivered response, India is attempting to recalibrate Pakistan's perception of its threshold for retaliation.
Third, this predictability will also reduce the risk of miscalculation on India's side while transferring the burden of escalation onto Pakistan. Unlike surprise operations, which may spark panic or overreaction in a nuclear-armed state, a publicly telegraphed strike enables crisis management mechanisms to activate in advance. India retains escalation dominance by striking only terror infrastructure, thereby distinguishing between the Pakistani state and its proxies, while still raising the political cost of harbouring such proxies.
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Lastly, from the perspective of international diplomacy, this shift also aids legitimacy. When retaliation is signalled, proportional, and avoids civilian or military targets, it is harder to cast India as the aggressor. The pre-emptive communication of intent aligns with emerging doctrines of 'responsible retaliation" seen in counter-terror campaigns globally, particularly post-9/11 doctrines espoused by the US and Israel.
First Published:
May 14, 2025, 13:42 IST
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