North Korea overtakes Iran as Russia's partner of choice
This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that 25,000 North Korean workers are being sent to Russia's Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan to assist with the manufacturing of Shahed drones, part of a deal reportedly brokered during Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu's visit to Pyongyang.
Satellite imagery reveals new dormitory construction at the Alabuga site, indicating Russia's intention to increase drone production from 2,000 to 5,000 units per month.
Ukrainian intelligence chief Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov confirmed this development, citing the growing cooperation between Russia and North Korea and warning of the strategic implications for both Ukraine and South Korea. He added that some North Korean workers may be contracted into the Russian defense service.
The Alabuga plant, repeatedly targeted by Ukrainian strikes, remains a critical node in Russia's standoff strike capability, particularly amid high attrition from its war in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Russia is reportedly assisting North Korea in enhancing the accuracy of KN-23 missiles, long-range air-to-air munitions, and submarine-launched systems. The transfer of labor and technology underscores tightening bilateral military ties as both regimes confront isolation and intensifying global scrutiny.
Russia may be shifting its partnership of convenience from Iran to North Korea. As Iran falters under Israeli and US airstrikes and unfulfilled Russian arms deals, North Korea pulls ahead, embedding itself in Russia's war machine and Far Eastern strategy.
While Russia and Iran have a long history of distrust and conflict, their mutual disdain for the Western-dominated international order, autocratic governments and heavily sanctioned economies in the aftermath of the former's invasion of Ukraine has placed them in the same boat.
Iran has sought to make itself indispensable to Russia's war effort by supplying Shahed drones, tactical gear, and artillery in exchange for revenue and to avoid diplomatic isolation. It may have also sought Russian investment in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
Yet as Russia transitioned to a war economy and began producing Shahed drones locally, Iran's leverage may have declined, undercutting the latter's efforts to extract security guarantees or financial backing from the former.
Furthermore, while Iran has consistently requested advanced Russian equipment, such as Su-35 fighter jets, these deliveries have not yet materialized, as Russia may need those fighters more urgently in its conflict with Ukraine.
In October 2024, Israel destroyed Iran's prized S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers, leaving the latter exposed to current air attacks. While Iran has downplayed the need to purchase the more advanced S-400 from Russia, citing the superior capabilities of its domestic systems, this could be a cover-up for Russia's refusal to provide such systems for the same reason it has withheld Su-35 fighters.
However, Israeli strikes on Iran present mixed implications for Russia. For one, while such strikes may have undermined Russia as a credible partner, strikes on Iranian oil and gas infrastructure may have eliminated Iran as a competitor to Russian energy exports.
Yet, these gains may be short-lived. Israel admits that its strikes are not sufficient to destroy Iran's nuclear program and that the goal is to pressure Iran back into negotiations.
Furthermore, it is unknown how Iran would respond in the aftermath. A nuclear-armed Iran may ultimately undermine Russia's influence. Russia may have less leverage over a nuclear-armed Iran, potentially triggering a Middle East nuclear arms race, with Saudi Arabia stressing that it will develop nuclear weapons if Iran gets the bomb.
Despite that possible long-term setback, Israeli strikes may distract the US from Ukraine, drawing attention and resources away from confronting Russia. It also allows Russia to point out US 'double standards,' with the US distancing itself from Israeli combat operations in Gaza while supporting Israeli strikes on Iran that have caused civilian casualties.
As Iran buckles under sustained Israeli and now US strikes, North Korea is stepping into the breach, presenting an entirely different set of nuances.
North Korea and Russia share deep ties dating back to the Korean War, and the former's nuclear arsenal arguably makes it a safer long-term investment for the latter. North Korea has deepened its role in Russia's war effort, providing matériel and manpower while reaping combat insights, hard currency, and access to advanced systems.
North Korea's interest in supporting Russia in Ukraine may be to reduce its overdependence on China, its main political and economic lifeline, to maintain strategic autonomy and regime survival.
These aims may clash with China's goal of maintaining stability in the Korean Peninsula. Arguably, North Korean missile tests pose a threat to China just as much as they are to Japan and South Korea, prompting China to threaten to scale down political and economic ties with North Korea.
To those ends, North Korea is actively developing nuclear delivery systems with possible Russian assistance, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that could reach the US mainland and nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) that ensure a second-strike capability.
While a belligerent North Korea serves China and Russia's mutual interest of undermining the Western-dominated international order, it remains uncertain whether this wartime alignment will evolve into a lasting partnership once the guns fall silent in Ukraine.
Despite Russia being heavily sanctioned, it still seeks to resume trade with the US, raising doubts about the long-term growth of Russia-North Korea relations.
However, beyond the Russia-Ukraine War, Russia may use North Korea as leverage against China's growing presence, economic influence, and territorial ambitions in the Russian Far East, strengthening economic, political, and military ties to form a buffer state.
In turn, North Korea maintains its autonomy by balancing ties between Russia and China, with its nuclear arsenal providing a strategic backstop against regime change.
With Iran sidelined and China's shadow growing, North Korea is fast becoming Russia's most dangerous and dependable ally, fueling its war machine, fortifying its eastern flank, and tilting Eurasia's strategic balance in Russia's favor.
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