Argentina orders trial in absentia for suspects in AMIA bombing in '94
June 26 (UPI) -- Ten Iranian and Lebanese suspects will be tried in absentia for killing 85 and injuring more than 300 at the Argentine Mutual Israelite Association in Buenos Aires in 1994.
Argentine federal Judge Daniel Rafecas on Thursday applied the nation's new "trial in absentia" law to try the suspects for the terrorist bombing that is the deadliest terror attack in Argentina's history.
The families of truck-bombing victims Mario Averbuch and Luis Czyzewski recently petitioned Rafecas to apply the new law and end years of delays in the matter.
Officials in Argentina, the United States and Israel have accused Iran of ordering Hezbollah members to carry out the attack, The Times of Israel reported.
The attack was the largest against a Jewish community that is located outside of Israel since the Holocaust, but no arrests have been made.
Rafecas ordered 10 defendants to be tried, including current Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leader Ahmad Vahidi.
Other defendants to be tried in absentia include Ali Fallahijan, Ali Akbar Velayati, Mohsen Rezai, Hadi Soleimanpour and Mohsen Rabbani.
Also to be tried are Ahmad Reza Asghari, Salman Raouf Salman, Abdallah Salman and Hussein Mounir Mouzannar.
Argentine prosecutors in April also sought an arrest warrant for Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
A trial in absentia would help to "uncover the truth and reconstruct what happened" before and during the truck bombing attack, Rafecas said.
He said the trial is justified due to the nature of the crime and that the suspects are unlikely to ever be tried in person or otherwise be held accountable.
The named defendants are former Lebanese and Iranian diplomats and ministers, for whom Argentina has issued international warrants for their arrest.
Iranian officials have denied any involvement in the bombing and refuse to arrest and extradite the suspects to Argentina.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
UPI
26 minutes ago
- UPI
Kim Jong Un meets Russian culture minister amid growing ties
Russian Culture Minister Olga Lyubimova (2nd row 2-L) and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (2nd row C) attend a performance in Pyongyang on Sunday. Lyubimova is visiting on the first anniversary of the signing of a North Korea-Russia comprehensive partnership treaty, state-run media reported Monday. Photo by KCNA/EPA-EFE SEOUL. June 30 (UPI) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met with visiting Russian Culture Minister Olga Lyubimova in Pyongyang as the two countries continue to strengthen bilateral ties, the North's state-run media reported Monday. The meeting took place on Sunday at the headquarters of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea's Central Committee and was also attended by Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexandr Matsegora, the official Korean Central News Agency reported. Lyubimova led a ministry delegation to mark the first anniversary of the countries' comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, under which North Korea has sent troops and weapons to Moscow to aid in its war against Ukraine. Kim said that "extensive and profound exchanges and cooperation in all fields are further expanding and developing day by day" in the wake of the partnership, according to KCNA. "It is important for the cultural sector to guide the relations between the two countries," he said. "It is necessary to further expand the exchange and cooperation in the field of culture and art to know well about each other's excellent cultural traditions and learn more." Lyubimova said her visit came at a time when the "solidity and invincibility of the DPRK-Russia friendship and solidarity are being more clearly proved," KCNA reported. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the official name of North Korea. "Cooperation between the two countries in the cultural field has reached the highest level in history," she added. The two discussed future plans for cultural exchanges and attended a concert by North Korean musicians and a visiting troupe of Russian performers, the KCNA report said. Photos released by KCNA showed images of North Korean troops deployed to Russia used as a stage backdrop. North Korea has sent some 14,000 troops to help Russia recapture lost territory in Kursk Province from Ukrainian forces, according to a recent report from the 11-country Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team. Pyongyang acknowledged sending the troops for the first time in April. The cultural meeting came on the heels of a pair of visits by Russia's Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu this month. On June 18, Shoigu announced that North Korea would send 6,000 military workers and combat engineers to help rebuild the Kursk region. North Korea is likely to send additional troops to support Russia's war against Ukraine in July or August, South Korea's National Intelligence Service told lawmakers in a closed-door meeting on Thursday.
Yahoo
an hour ago
- Yahoo
As Ted Cruz calls for a regime change in Iran, other Texas Republicans are more cautious
WASHINGTON — U.S. Sen. Ted Cruz is pushing for military strikes and a possible regime change in Iran, a hardline stance few in the Texas delegation have yet to embrace. Texas' junior senator this week suggested the U.S. take a larger role in the conflict between Israel and Iran, something President Donald Trump is considering. Trump has, during the last decade, pushed Republicans toward an isolationist agenda, compared to the hawkish days of former President George W. Bush, who sent troops to both Afghanistan and Iraq. Trump has yet to announce a decision on military intervention. More specifically, he is debating, according to multiple news reports, whether to provide Israel with a 'bunker buster' bomb to destroy a nuclear enrichment site embedded within an Iranian mountainside. 'I may do it, I may not do it,' he told reporters outside the White House Wednesday. Cruz said on his podcast that an American attack on Fordow 'makes a lot of sense.' 'There is a reasonable possibility that the president will choose to authorize a targeted bombing strike on the Fordow nuclear weapons research facility,' he told reporters later at the Capitol on Wednesday afternoon. Cruz also said he has shared his opinions with Trump directly. Cruz also discussed the situation at length with conservative commentator Tucker Carlson. The combative interview between Carlson, an isolationist who does not support intervention, and Cruz, a self-described 'noninterventionist hawk,' has become a flashpoint inside Trump's MAGA movement. While Cruz said he does not currently support putting American troops on the ground, 'If the risk got severe enough, I would support that.' U.S. Rep. Pete Sessions, R-Waco, who is supportive of a military strike, told the Tribune that in conversations with members of Congress, he has found the 'vast majority' of them are supportive of military action. 'I do admit that there are those that do not support it,' he said in a Wednesday interview. The widest gap between Cruz and other Republicans is whether to seek a regime change. Such a change, Cruz argued on Monday, would 'enhance American security massively' given the animosity Iran has for the United States. 'I am advocating that we use maximum pressure and economic sanctions to pressure the regime in a way that might encourage this regime to fall,' he said. Texas' senior senator, John Cornyn, was more measured on the issue. 'I think that's up to the Iranian people,' he told the Tribune when asked about a regime change. 'Hopefully, they will take the opportunity that this may provide.' Cornyn appeared to be in support of limited military intervention, characterizing the use of larger U.S. munitions as 'a continuation of the current policy' toward Israel. On Fox News a few hours later, though, Cornyn stressed that the United States does not need 'to take the lead in this effort.' 'Israel has a variety of options, and they seem to be doing a very effective job on their own with our support,' he said. When pressed on whether Israel would be able to destroy the Fordow facility without American support, Cornyn said, 'I think they have multiple options,' including the deployment of Israeli ground troops. Other Texas Republicans have yet to take an explicit position on military strikes but say they stand with both Trump and Israel. 'We need to be ready to trust and support the President's decision,' Rep. Dan Crenshaw, a Houston Republican and former Navy SEAL, said on Tuesday. 'I stand with President Trump as we will continue to support our friend and ally, Israel, as it rightfully takes action to defend itself,' Rep. Chip Roy, R-Austin, said last week. Roy expressed support Tuesday for 'strategic limited support' for 'Israel's targeting & denial of Iranian nukes' but is in clear opposition of sending in 'ground troops, regime change, soccer fields, supplemental funding.' Sessions, who was first elected to the House in 1996, has been a player in national politics through several U.S. military operations in the Middle East. But he's not fearing a wide war if America intervenes to strike the nuclear facility. He praised Israel's response, but without American military power, he said, the country 'cannot necessarily finish the fight.' Rep. Ronny Jackson, R-Amarillo, appeared ripe for military confrontation. Responding to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's declaration 'the battle begins,' hours after Trump declared him an 'easy target,' Jackson said 'BRING IT.' Three Texas Democrats, along with a bipartisan group in the Capitol's lower chamber, are urging the president to resist joining the fray without congressional approval. Reps. Greg Casar, Lloyd Doggett and Veronica Escobar have signed onto a resolution that would ask Trump to seek congressional approval if he decides to commit U.S. armed forces to Iran. Big news: 20 more speakers join the TribFest lineup! New additions include Margaret Spellings, former U.S. secretary of education and CEO of the Bipartisan Policy Center; Michael Curry, former presiding bishop and primate of The Episcopal Church; Beto O'Rourke, former U.S. Representative, D-El Paso; Joe Lonsdale, entrepreneur, founder and managing partner at 8VC; and Katie Phang, journalist and trial lawyer. Get tickets. TribFest 2025 is presented by JPMorganChase.
CNN
an hour ago
- CNN
Iran-Israel Conflict: After the War, Enter the Diplomats
Following American airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities last week, and then the imposition of a ceasefire, it's time to step back and assess what has changed in the Middle East, and the chances of translating military success into lasting strategic gains. In a national security crisis, what does not happen can be as important as what does. That is particularly true regarding the recent conflict with Iran. For years, analysts predicted that an American strike into Iran would result in an all-out war in the Middle East, hundreds if not thousands of American casualties, and a ladder of escalation that Tehran might ultimately control through asymmetrical means — such as militias across the region with weapons capable of striking American personnel and positions. I had thought those claims were exaggerated and a product of Iranian propaganda as much as sound analysis. That's been especially true in this crisis, which unfolded after a nearly 18-month degradation of Iranian power by Israel in response to Tehran's fateful decision to join in a war against its rival shortly after Hamas' attack into Israel on October 7, 2023. Today, we have not just theories and predictions of Iran's response to an American attack — but lived experience. And so far, it turns out the pessimists were wrong. Iran responded feebly with a telegraphed and defeated missile attack against a US base in Qatar, which served only to unite the Gulf states in condemnation of Iran. Iran's militias — from Hezbollah in Lebanon, already degraded after losing its own conflict with Israel last year, to the Iraqi militias under the control of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps — stood down entirely. Further afield, nobody came to Iran's assistance. There is a theory in foreign policy circles that an alliance called 'CRINK' — China, Russia, Iran, North Korea — might band together in a crisis or conflict with the West. No doubt, this collection of states may form tactical and issue-specific partnerships such as North Korea and Iran supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine. But when push came to shove in the Middle East, with Iran suffering its greatest military setbacks since its 1979 revolution, these partners were nowhere to be found. China made clear that Iran should not think about shutting the Strait of Hormuz given its reliance on Gulf oil exports, and when Iran's foreign minister visited Russia amid the crisis, he left with only a benign statement from Moscow calling for de-escalation. Russia's assertive strategy in the Middle East, moreover, which began in 2015 with President Vladimir Putin's decision to decisively back the Assad regime in Syria, is in disarray. Putin made a decent bet that power matters above all in the Middle East, and that by coming to the assistance of Assad, he could translate such an assertion of military might into deeper ties throughout the region, including in Israel and the Gulf states. That plan did not work out. Today, Assad is gone (now living in Moscow having lost his regime in Damascus), and the Russians are barely hanging on to a presence in the Syrian port city of Tartus. Russia's fearsome air defense systems, known as S-300s, proved useless and easily destroyed by Israel's military systems, most of them provided by the United States. All of that — plus Russia's war in Ukraine, where it has suffered nearly 1 million military casualties and has never established air superiority over Ukrainian territory, something Israel achieved over Iranian territory in 24 hours — leaves Moscow both unwilling and unable to project power in the Middle East, let alone come to the tangible assistance of Iran. At bottom, what did not happen in this crisis demonstrates not only the weakness of Iran, but also the brittleness of an anti-Western alliance led by Russia and China. Shortly after Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, I was in the Oval Office during a phone call between President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. The Iranian-backed terrorist group Hezbollah had just opened a second front in the north, firing missiles and rockets into northern Israel. Netanyahu provided a blunt assessment of the emerging situation: In the Middle East, if you're perceived as weak, you're roadkill. Weakness breeds aggression, particularly for Israel, which for decades has had to deal with an Iran committed to its destruction. Iran has spent that time supporting terrorist militias like Hezbollah and Hamas to place what was known as a 'ring of fire' around Israel, with an aim to steadily pressure and strangle the country. Israel for years had managed and contained these emerging threats, until October 7, 2023. As I've written previously, the October 7 Hamas attack, with its mass slaughter of civilians and taking of hostages, forever changed Israel's national security doctrine. It will never again accept the presence of Iranian-backed terrorist groups on its borders and — after Tehran's direct attacks against Israel from Iranian territory in April and October of last year — it will also strike directly into Iran when necessary. This is an entirely new equation in the Middle East, and one that in my view is likely here to stay. Against that backdrop, what happened over the last two weeks in Iran was a foreseeable consequence of its decision to join in a multifront war against Israel after October 7. Not inevitable, however, was the significant military success of Israel's campaign. In a matter of 12 days, Israel eliminated the top echelon of Iran's military, its leading nuclear scientists, its missile production facilities, and most of its nuclear facilities and sites other than those deeply buried, such as the Fordow enrichment facility or the storage areas of Isfahan. This display of intelligence and military dominance will resonate throughout the Middle East for years to come. Israel is now the dominant military power in the region, a remarkable turn of events from only 20 months ago. America's assertion of military power may also carry global implications. The B-2 bombers that struck into Iran were launched from the continental United States and dropped guided munitions that no other country possesses with pinpoint accuracy, down three ventilator shafts — all without requiring a regional platform or base. Deterrence in global affairs lies through the unique combination of military capabilities together with a perceived will to use them. This assertion of force without then getting bogged down with expanding objectives and unclear aims will be noticed by other world leaders who might now think twice before testing the United States. Based on everything we know to date, Iran's nuclear program has been significantly set back. My former colleague Norman Roule, who served as the Iran mission manager for the US intelligence community, told CNN that he believed Tehran's nuclear program had suffered a 'catastrophic blow.' Unfortunately, as intelligence professionals work to comprehensively assess what is left of Iran's nuclear program, this question has become politicized, with many Republicans seeking to back up Trump's premature claim that the program was 'obliterated,' and many Democrats seeking to prove prematurely that Iran might still be able to quickly reconstitute its program. On a question like this, patience and caution matter, because even as assessments become more comprehensive, there may never be a 'final' or definitive call. Let me explain. There are generally three levels of battle damage assessments, or BDAs. The first comes shortly after an operation and is based primarily on imagery that might be available immediately or within about 24 hours. The second adds additional information, such as whether munitions performed as designed, and whether specific aim points were hit. This assessment might also more fully assess overall damage to a target — from light, to moderate, to severe. The third level is different, and incorporates all sources of information, including signals intelligence, partner assessments and perhaps human sources. That process can take weeks and incorporates the views of multiple departments and agencies. The situation is even more complicated when assessing a nuclear program, and what Iran might do in response. Compare this situation with a strike targeting a terrorist leader. The assessment in that BDA is ultimately binary: The target is alive, or not. Even a Level 2 BDA might be inconclusive, as destruction of a building or a vehicle cannot guarantee elimination of the target. In a Level 3 BDA, there might be imagery of a body being removed, or limping away, or preparations for a funeral, or reactions from the target's counterparts. Still, it's a binary conclusion — dead or alive. Assessing a nuclear program, what's left of it and what might happen next is far different, nonbinary and laden with assumptions. For example, even if, as has been reported, Iran might possess a stockpile of highly enriched uranium, does it still possess the high-power centrifuges required to spin that uranium to weapons grade? And let's presume it does, are we confident that Iran would make the risky decision to install a cascade of centrifuges and move the uranium as Israel still controls its airspace? Do we assume this could be done without Israel or the US knowing about it — and then taking further action to destroy the cascade, as President Donal Trump has suggested he'd be prepared to do? Or do we assume that Iran is in such disarray that it's unlikely to make such a decision, or at least not anytime soon? Or that it's unlikely to make such a decision under threat of further US and Israeli strikes? Even in that worst-case BDA assessment of highly enriched uranium combined with a cascade of advanced centrifuges (unlikely, but for sake of argument), there would be more questions: Does Iran still possess industrial equipment to mold uranium metal, necessary for producing a bomb, and if not, how long would that take to reconstitute? And could Iran do so without Israel or the United States noticing and acting against such a step? Such assessments would be made through a combination of nuclear experts in the intelligence community — such as the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration — and political analysts primarily at CIA who study and aim to predict Iranian decision-making, as well as the National Security Agency with its unique expertise in deciphering signals intelligence, which can often be misleading. For these reasons, when you hear that Iran might reconstitute its program in 'months' or 'years,' keep in mind that any such assessment is based on assumptions that may or may not be right, including secondary and tertiary assumptions that may or may not be right, and that the United States and Israel can influence Tehran's calculations. Inside the US government over the coming weeks and months, there should be a two-way conversation between the intelligence professionals and national security policymakers to determine what might be left of Iran's nuclear program, what can and cannot be easily reconstituted, and then what policies might be required to help ensure the most dangerous elements of the program — enrichment and uranium metal — do not resume. Bottom line: This is not the time for a victory lap, which in the Middle East often comes back to haunt presidents. It's time for focused and determined follow-through. The military operation has likely set Iran's nuclear ambitious back significantly, but turning those tactical military gains into a strategic success will require a diplomatic agreement. It might be as simple as Iran truly living up to its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which all of Iran's nuclear material and equipment must be declared and made subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Or it could mean a more comprehensive deal that forever prohibits Iran from enriching uranium, likely in exchange for some level of sanctions relief and international support for a peaceful nuclear energy program. The aim should be the latter, and as I explained in my last analysis, the diplomacy here has a built-in deadline timed to the 'snapback' of international sanctions, which both France and the UK say they are prepared to do in the event Iran rejects a deal. With the authority to snap back sanctions expiring in October, early September (around our Labor Day) is seen as a deadline for reinstalling the multilateral sanctions on Iran that the Obama-era nuclear deal removed, and that have remained removed until today. This is a card that Washington can effectively use in coordination with London and Paris to impose a deadline on diplomacy. The longer Iran delays returning to the table, the less time it will have to negotiate a deal to avoid a renewal of sanctions and the possibility of additional military strikes should it choose to reconstitute its enrichment program. Now is also the moment to secure a ceasefire in Gaza. An extensive backchannel is ongoing to secure a ceasefire in exchange for the release of at least half the hostages still held by Hamas. Hamas has rejected these offers to date, but with all that's happened, there is a new sense of optimism that these talks can succeed. Trump himself on Friday predicted a ceasefire within a week. That would be great news, and should be the aim, though I'd predict an outcome may take a bit longer as the dust settles in Iran. There is also renewed optimism for an expansion of the Abraham Accords as Arab countries take stock of new power equations and may seek to enjoy the fruits of economic and technological cooperation with Israel, which is now viewed as the most advanced and high-tech power in the region. Over time, such a trend is likely, in my view, but not until Gaza returns to a ceasefire phase and is ultimately resolved. Israel is unlikely able to have its cake and eat it too, as the Gaza conflict remains an acute concern for populations across the region and few Arab leaders would be prepared to take the step toward Israel until they can have confidence that it is winding down altogether. So, how will this all play out? There is always a chance that the Iranian regime, now desperate for survival, does all it can to cobble together what's left of its nuclear program and dash for a bomb. It's important to protect against such a possibility, but it seems implausible — both with respect to what Iran might be willing and able to do given its setbacks, together with what Israel and the United States might see and stop. There is also the bullish case, that the American operation sets back Iran's nuclear ambitions for good and the region is now on the cusp of dramatic and positive events to include expansion of the Abraham Accords, and even a potential unraveling of the theocratic regime in Tehran, a historic change in world affairs. This version of coming events is equally implausible, as spoilers abound in the Middle East, there are no signs yet of an Iranian regime coming undone, and the system in Tehran will seek over time to regroup and reestablish its control internally. In my view, however, it is now more likely than not that the United States keeps Iran from seeking to reconstitute its nuclear program, helps secure a ceasefire in Gaza, and opens the pathway for an expansion of the Abraham Accords over time (years, not months). A senior Middle East official who I've gotten to know and trust over many years described this recent period and the degradation of Iran's power as creating the conditions for a new Middle East: more stable, prosperous, integrated and secure. His question was whether the Trump administration is committed to follow through on what's been made possible, pursuing diplomacy with the same discipline and skill as seen in the military phase. We should all hope and encourage the answer to be yes.
