COAS credits national peace, liberty to armed forces' sacrifices
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Asim Munir on Thursday said that the peace and liberty enjoyed in Pakistan today are the outcome of the sacrifices made by the country's armed forces.
The army chief made these remarks during an investiture ceremony held at the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, according to a statement issued by the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR).
During the ceremony, General Asim Munir conferred military honours, including the Sitara-i-Imtiaz (Military) and Tamgha-i-Basalat, on officers and soldiers of the Pakistan Army.
The awards were given in recognition of exceptional bravery during operations and distinguished service to the nation. Medals awarded posthumously were received by the families of the martyrs.
A large number of senior military officials and families of the award recipients attended the event.
Paying tribute to the martyrs and veterans, COAS Munir stated, 'Shuhada (martyrs) and Ghazis (warriors) are our enduring pride. Their honour and reverence are a sacred trust upon every Pakistani.'
He acknowledged the sacrifices of the families of the fallen, expressing deep admiration for their resilience and courage.
The COAS also praised the Pakistan Army and law enforcement agencies for their continued efforts in combating terrorism, including the elimination of high-value terrorist targets during ongoing counterterrorism operations.
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