Latest news with #CENTCOM
Newsweek
6 hours ago
- General
- Newsweek
New Satellite Image Shows U.S. Aircraft Carrier Deployed Near Iran
Based on facts, either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter, or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources. Newsweek AI is in beta. Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content. A new satellite image reveals the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier deployed in the Arabian Sea, near Iran. Newsweek has reached out to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Iran's Foreign Ministry for comment. Why It Matters The deployment demonstrates the continuing active U.S. naval presence in the region and preparedness for further conflict despite the ceasefire between Israel and Iran. The aircraft carrier has been operating within the CENTCOM's area of responsibility where it has been operating in April during the U.S. military campaign against Yemen's Houthi group and remained during Israel's war with Iran, in which the United States also conducted strikes against Iranian nuclear sites. Image captured by the European Space Agency's Sentinel-2 satellites on June 28 shows the USS Carl Vinson in the Arabian Sea. Copernicus/Sentinel Hub Image captured by the European Space Agency's Sentinel-2 satellites on June 28 shows the USS Carl Vinson in the Arabian Sea. Copernicus/Sentinel Hub Copernicus/Sentinel Hub What To Know The satellite image capturing the USS Carl Vinson near Iran was identified by open-source intelligence analyst MT Anderson on X, formerly Twitter. Two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers were accompanying the carrier, he added. The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) conducts operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. — U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) June 28, 2025 The U.S. Naval Institute's fleet and marine tracker update on Monday revealed the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier, along with Carrier Air Wing 2, conducting operations in the Arabian Sea. The ship was spotted six days after the U.S. hit three major Iranian nuclear facilities — Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan — with B-2 stealth bombers which took off overnight from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, flying over 13,000 miles in a 36-hour-long round trip, according to the Pentagon. On Saturday, the Pentagon announced a $961.6 billion defense budget request. For the U.S. Navy, it revealed plans to build 19 new ships and improve nuclear shipyards, maintaining an overall fleet of 287 ships in 2026. What People Are Saying Open-source intelligence analyst MT Anderson wrote on X: "After playing hide-and-seek since May 4, 2025, the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) and Carrier Strike Group 1 have finally popped back onto our radar. New satellite imagery from June 28, 2025, confirms their presence in the Northern Arabian Sea... It's a strong reminder that even when quiet, these global assets are always on mission. The reappearance of a full CSG highlights sustained readiness and strategic presence in a key region." U.S. Department of Defense on X, Monday: "Revitalizing the maritime industrial base in the United States ensures a robust naval presence and safeguards our interests at sea. @SECNAV emphasizes that shipbuilding is not just a matter of industry, it's vital for our national security." Iran's Armed Forces Spokesperson Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi, as quoted by Mehr News Agency: "The Islamic Republic of Iran has never considered the word 'cessation of conflict' as an option. The Zionist regime is never trustworthy, neither for anywhere in the world nor for Iran." What Happens Next The United States is sustaining naval readiness in the Middle East to ensure rapid response capabilities as tensions with Iran persist and there remains a high risk of a resumption of hostilities.
Yahoo
a day ago
- Politics
- Yahoo
US Navy warships picked up multiple new Iranian ballistic missile kills in the latest defense of Israel
The US Navy said its warships shot down multiple Iranian ballistic missiles earlier this month. The Navy had sent five destroyers to the eastern Mediterranean to provide air defense for Israel. The intercepts come as Navy leadership shares its concerns about its stockpiles of top missiles. US warships intercepted multiple Iranian ballistic missiles aimed at Israel this month, the Navy confirmed over the weekend, sharing new details from its third defense of Israel in a year and a half. Israel launched a new military operation against Iran on June 13, prompting Tehran to retaliate with waves of missile attacks. The US Navy moved five of its Arleigh Burke-class destroyers into the Eastern Mediterranean Sea for support if needed. The destroyers — USS Thomas Hudner, USS Arleigh Burke, USS The Sullivans, USS Oscar Austin, and USS Paul Ignatius — are equipped with high-end interceptors that are specifically designed for ballistic missile defense. Officials had previously confirmed that the US ships were providing air defense for Israel, but it was unclear if they scored any hits. However, in a statement on Sunday, the Navy revealed the destroyers intercepted "multiple" Iranian ballistic missiles since June 14. The Navy did not say which interceptors the destroyers used against the Iranian missiles and referred additional questions to US Central Command, which oversees Middle East operations. Business Insider reached out to CENTCOM for more information but did not receive a response. The disclosure comes as Navy leadership raises concerns that the sea service is burning through one of its top ballistic missile interceptors, the Standard Missile-3. Just last week, Adm. James Kilby, acting chief of naval operations, told lawmakers that American warships were using the SM-3 "at an alarming rate." Navy warships fired multiple SM-3 interceptors to defend Israel from large-scale Iranian missile attacks in April and October of last year. The SM-3 missile is an important element of the Navy's Aegis Combat System, equipped on Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and Ticonderoga-class cruisers. It uses a kinetic kill vehicle to destroy short- to intermediate-range missiles during the midcourse phase of their flight. The SM-3 is produced in multiple variants, which can cost as little as $10 million on the low end and nearly $30 million on the high end, according to the US Missile Defense Agency. Analysts have argued that the Navy is depleting its SM-3 stockpile in the Middle East without sufficient plans to replace it, which could be an issue in a Pacific conflict, where these interceptors would likely be needed in large quantities. China, a leading concern, has a large arsenal of ballistic missiles. And the SM-3 is not the only missile interceptor that the Navy is heavily expending in the Middle East. American warships have fired hundreds of SM-2s and SM-6s to defend against attacks by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. US military planners have said that one of the challenges of the Red Sea conflict is being forced to use expensive interceptors to defeat cheap Houthi drones. Trying to get on the right side of that cost curve — saving the higher-end missiles for more advanced threats — is an ongoing focus in training across NATO. Read the original article on Business Insider
Indian Express
3 days ago
- Politics
- Indian Express
Iran, US and the 400-kg enriched Uranium bargaining chip
Written by R Swaminathan In the aftermath of the US airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, the international community found unexpected relief in Tehran's restrained military response. Dubbed 'Besharat al-Fath', Iran's retaliatory strike targeted the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, CENTCOM's largest hub in the region. It was a carefully calibrated operation: No casualties, no infrastructure damage, and prior notification given to both Qatar and the United States. It was more restrained even compared to Iran's military response during Trump 1.0 following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the elite Quds Force, in 2020. Tehran opted for symbolism over escalation, signaling a strategic priority — regime survival. The most striking feature of Iran's response was not what it did, but what it deliberately avoided — it did not withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and refrained from activating its regional proxies or disrupting the Strait of Hormuz. Further, the Supreme National Security Council has not yet endorsed the decision of Iran's Parliament to suspend its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran's restraint, facilitated in part by Qatar's backchannel diplomacy, helped sustain a fragile ceasefire following President Donald Trump's forceful intervention with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Though tentative, the truce has held so far. As the guns fell silent, attention quickly pivoted to the damage inflicted on Iran's nuclear infrastructure and whether the mission was accomplished. A leaked Pentagon Initial Damage Assessment Report suggested the strikes might have set Iran's nuclear programme back by only a few months, a claim that infuriated President Trump and prompted swift rebuttals from the CIA and Pentagon. They insisted the facilities were 'obliterated' and maintained that Iran had not relocated its 400-kg stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 per cent. Israel's intelligence claimed that Iran's capabilities were degraded significantly, including a 50 per cent reduction in its missile launcher capacity and several years of delay to its nuclear programme. Yet, at the heart of the post-conflict ambiguity lies a far more critical and unresolved question: The whereabouts of the 400 kg of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) last verified by the IAEA before the Israeli strikes on June 13. The Fordow facility, Iran's primary centre for higher enrichment of uranium, was struck by GBU 57, the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) or the Bunker Buster bombs. Craters at the site confirmed deep penetration, but the IAEA has not been able to physically verify the damage so far. On June 13, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi informed IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi that Iran would 'adopt special measures to protect our nuclear equipment and materials'. Grossi responded the same day, reminding Tehran of its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement to declare any transfer of nuclear material. However, no formal declaration followed. Subsequent satellite imagery from June 19-20 revealed unusual movement of trucks and bulldozers around Fordow, suggesting that Iran may have relocated sensitive materials, including the HEU stockpile, before the US bombing on June 22. Although Tehran has issued no official confirmation of such a move, unnamed senior Iranian officials told Reuters on June 23 that a preemptive transfer of the uranium had taken place. This claim, however, remains unverifiable. The IAEA's post-strike assessments noted localised radioactive and chemical releases inside the damaged facilities, yet no off-site radiation levels were detected. This led observers to speculate that either Fordow's containment systems withstood the MOP bombardment, or the enriched uranium had indeed been moved. European intelligence reports suggest that Iran's HEU reserves were distributed across multiple, undisclosed facilities rather than being stored solely at Fordow. If true, this dispersal strategy not only safeguarded Iran's nuclear assets but also complicates verification efforts. It may take months for the IAEA to inspect the Fordow site, especially if structural integrity has been compromised. This uncertainty grants Tehran diplomatic leverage. By neither confirming nor denying the relocation of the uranium, Iran preserves ambiguity, which can be tactically used in future negotiations. This is particularly important as Trump, speaking at the NATO Summit in The Hague, signaled potential talks with Iran next week, albeit in his characteristic manner: 'We may sign an agreement. I don't know. To me, I don't think it's that necessary.' Meanwhile, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei delivered a fiery speech on June 26, reinforcing Iran's posture of defiance. He declared that Iran had delivered a 'hard slap' to the US by striking Al Udeid and warned of further retaliation if provoked. 'The nuclear facilities may be damaged, but our will and our capabilities are intact,' he said, dismissing any possibility of surrender. While military confrontation has paused for now, the geopolitical stakes remain high. Iran still retains a significant portion of its long-range missile arsenal, and airstrikes alone cannot permanently dismantle a nuclear programme. But Iran is under pressure to have a deal, as otherwise all the UN sanctions that were imposed on it from 2006 to 2010 and suspended under the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action endorsed by the UNSC in July 2015) will 'snap back'. As the ceasefire endures and oil prices stabilise, the immediate crisis appears contained. Yet, without a return to JCPOA-style negotiations, the world remains trapped in a cycle of brinkmanship. At the center of this unfolding drama is the still-unresolved mystery of the 400 kg of HEU. Whether hidden, destroyed, or dispersed, its status will shape the contours of diplomacy in the coming weeks. Until inspectors return to Fordow and other sites, this enriched uranium serves both as a potential flashpoint and a bargaining chip. The writer is a former Governor of India to the IAEA, Vienna, former Ambassador to Egypt, Austria, and Montenegro, and former Permanent Representative to the Arab League
Memri
4 days ago
- Politics
- Memri
The Qatar Weekly Update (QWU) – Part Of The Qatar Monitor Project (QMP) – No. 25, June 27, 2025
Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Aal Thani and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Tehran, from Khamenei's website, February 19, 2025. 1. MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 1852, Iran And Qatar Are Allies – And The Coordinated Bombing Of The CENTCOM Base In Qatar Proves It, June 24, 2025. 2. MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 12036, Media Figures In Qatar Condemn U.S. Attack On Iran's Nuclear Facilities, Vilify President Donald Trump: He Is A Brazen Liar Who Has Revealed His Ugly Face, June 22, 2025 3. Tucker Carlson Claims Qatar Doesn't Need U.S. Base; Carlson Also Argued Al Udeid "Exists To Protect Israel," Jewish Insider, June 23, 2025. 4. How About NOT Relying On Qatar As An Honest US-Iran Broker? New York Post, June 24, 2025. 5. Iran's Qatar "Missile Strike" Was A "Performative Attack" National Security Journal, June 23, 2025. 6. The [Al-Udeid] Base Is There For Qatar To Use As Leverage Against The U.S. While It Funds Terrorist Groups And Acts As Tehran's Bank, Michael P. Pregent on X, June 24, 2025 7. Muslim Brotherhood And Qatar Have Established Extensive Network Across Canada: Report, National Post, June 25, 2025. * Yigal Carmon is Founder and President of MEMRI.
Shafaq News
4 days ago
- Politics
- Shafaq News
ISIS remains contained: No sign of strategic revival in Iraq and Syria
Shafaq News Despite its territorial defeat in Iraq and later in Syria, ISIS continues to exploit security vacuums and volatile geographies to stage sporadic attacks, particularly across remote border regions and rugged terrains. While the organization no longer wields the influence it once held during its peak in 2014–2017, recent developments suggest it is actively repositioning itself for relevance rather than resurgence. Strategic Shift and Tactical Resurgence Compared to its peak in mid-2014—when ISIS captured large parts of Nineveh, Saladin, Al-Anbar, and portions of Diyala and Kirkuk—the group's current capabilities are considerably reduced. Iraq declared victory over ISIS in late 2017, reclaiming nearly one-third of its territory once held by the group. In Syria, the group's territorial hold collapsed in March 2019 after the fall of Baghouz Fawqani, following a prolonged battle with the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces. While territorial control may have ended, ISIS's threat has morphed into a covert, transnational challenge driven by decentralized cells and ideological offshoots. Over the past three years, ISIS has adjusted its tactics to capitalize on emerging regional shifts, particularly the political and military upheavals in Syria. A noticeable uptick in attacks has been recorded, underscored by the suicide bombing that targeted Mar Elias Church in Damascus's al-Dweila area. In 2024 alone, ISIS conducted 491 operations in Syria, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which noted that the group took advantage of persistent instability to regroup. The Soufan Center corroborated this trend, estimating that ISIS attacks tripled in 2024 compared to the previous year. Meanwhile, a statement from US Central Command (CENTCOM) in July confirmed ISIS had carried out 153 attacks across Iraq and Syria in the first half of 2024 alone, an alarming increase reflecting what CENTCOM described as the group's attempt to "reshape itself after years of diminished capability." As 2025 reaches its midpoint, ISIS is once again activating its sleeper cells along the porous Iraqi-Syrian border. However, this activity remains limited in scale and lacks the broader operational momentum necessary for a major comeback. According to multiple security studies, ISIS's operational core has shifted, with a greater focus on Africa and parts of Asia, rather than Iraq or Syria. Notably, Wilayat Khorasan, the ISIS branch based in Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan, has emerged as its most lethal wing. The group has been widely blamed for recent high-casualty attacks in Moscow and Kerman, Iran. In Africa, ISIS maintains five active branches in regions including the Lake Chad Basin, northern Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Iraq's Containment The containment of ISIS activity owes much to sustained counterterrorism efforts by Iraqi security forces, Kurdish Peshmerga units, and Global Coalition partners. In June alone, Iraqi and coalition forces conducted more than seven targeted operations—both aerial and ground-based—against ISIS cells in northern Iraq. Ali Neama al-Bandawi, a member of Iraq's Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee, told Shafaq News that ISIS 'no longer poses a systemic threat,' emphasizing that 'only scattered individuals and small cells remain.' He noted effective coordination between Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga in disputed areas as a key factor preventing any significant ISIS resurgence. Security expert Mukhlid Hazem al-Darib told Shafaq News that 'the Iraqi-Syrian border is secured by a three-layer surveillance system, including aerial monitoring and real-time tracking.' While acknowledging that 'no system is foolproof,' al-Darib expressed confidence in Iraq's ability to thwart infiltration attempts, citing both the physical security measures and 'societal rejection' of extremist actors. Political analyst Mujashaa al-Tamimi echoed this assessment. Speaking to Shafaq News, he stressed that 'Iraq today is not the same as during the previous phase of security collapse,' citing a more advanced intelligence infrastructure and 'real-time border control.' Al-Tamimi also pointed to the technical and intelligence support provided by the US-led coalition, which enables preemptive action against suspected ISIS movements. 'The environment now is far more resilient and responsive to emerging threats,' al-Tamimi concluded, making a wide-scale comeback by ISIS sleeper cells 'unlikely.' Internal Barriers to Revival Political analyst Mohammed Nanaa emphasized that ISIS today faces significant obstacles in rebuilding its networks inside Iraq. 'Unlike before, the group can no longer recruit locals easily,' he said, attributing this shift to the erosion of ISIS's social appeal and the improved awareness among communities previously targeted by its propaganda. Nanaa further argued that the broader regional context is increasingly hostile to any renewed insurgency. 'The prevailing climate across the region favors peace and investment, not conflict,' he noted, adding that both regional and international stakeholders are keen to prevent any resurgence of violence that could derail economic and geopolitical recalibrations underway. The group's lack of broad recruitment capabilities, improved counterterrorism coordination, and societal resistance, 'all suggest that Iraq is unlikely to return to the conditions that enabled ISIS's rise in 2014,' Nanaa concluded.
