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‘Special relationship': preparing Britain and America for new era

‘Special relationship': preparing Britain and America for new era

AllAfrica2 days ago

The Council on Geostrategy has just launched 'The 'special relationship': preparing Britain and America for a new era' at a roundtable hosted by the US Embassy in London. This paper focuses on the alliance in a time of immense change and we tasked ourselves with providing an honest, non-emotive read out of the state of the alliance, focusing on converging or diverging interests – and not values. Here are our big three take-aways.
1. We still have many convergences: the US and UK broadly agree that the economic trading order has hurt their economies and led to de-industrialization, but they are unclear as to the future direction. Is a Bretton Woods II needed or a G7/D-10 that creates a group of like-minded economic powers as occurred during the Cold War? Certainly, the US has decided on its trajectory and is moving out on that trajectory, but the UK remains uncertain…
2. We have a long-term divergence in terms of theatre priority, the shift of US focus to the Indo-Pacific has been taking place since 2011, when the Pivot was first announced. The UK should not be surprised. This divergence is, we feel, manageable through the framework that the two theatres are 'interconnected' and that what China and Russia each do in those separate theatres impacts both. This is already true in Ukraine and may become true in other areas.
3. We are more concerned about a divergence in threat priority. For many years, the UK has 'muddled through' on China and though the Strategic Defense Review, National Security Strategy, and China Audit all point to a shift in approach, there are strong indicators that this government – like those preceding it – is being careful to manage relations with Beijing carefully as it is seen as a driver for growth. The US shift on Moscow is also of concern to London, which is skeptical of an attempt at a 'reverse Kissinger' in which the US, to counter China, aligns with Russia.
We have made a series of recommendations for both sides – particularly on defense industrial cooperation where we see great potential. You may download the full report here. The executive summary follows:
Context:
While historical foundations and ties have helped to reinforce the 'special relationship' between the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US), it was common geopolitical interests which bound the two nations together. Chief among these has been to prevent others from dominating the most industrialised and productive regions of Eurasia.
As a result, both countries have co-constructed the prevailing international order. Their strength, determination and foresight after the Second World War created alliances and institutions which saw the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the enlargement of that order and the offshoring of manufacturing have empowered adversaries while weakening UK and US strategic industries.
Geopolitical changes, especially growing Russian and Chinese aggression, as well as political and strategic changes in Britain and America, have led to fresh questions being asked about the future of the special relationship.
Questions this report addresses:
What were the fundamental interests which brought the UK and US together, and do they remain cogent?
How can the two reinforce convergent interests while simultaneously managing divergent interests?
How can policymakers within the two countries redefine the alliance for a new era of geopolitics and revision of the international order?
Key findings:
In the 2020s, areas of converging interests include: Accepting limits on globalization: This convergence is currently implicit rather than explicit, though both countries recognise the need to rectify the negative impacts which globalisation has had on their own economies and societies. Rising to the geopolitical challenge: Both countries express aspirations of leadership and have shown the will to address systemic challenges, although to differing degrees in their respective theatres. Rebuilding the defense industrial base: Both nations have identified an urgent need to rebuild production capacity and invest in future technologies.
Areas of diverging interests include: Theater priority: For the first time in decades, there is a strong possibility that the UK and US will prioritise different regions, with Britain focused primarily on the Euro-Atlantic and America on the Indo-Pacific, though both also retain an interest in the Middle East. Threat precedence: The UK's stance towards the People's Republic of China (PRC) frustrates Washington, while London worries about a softer US approach towards Russia. Cooperation preference: The two countries are somewhat divided on their approach to multilateral institutions, including on climate change and trade arrangements.
These areas of divergence notwithstanding, Britain and America have made similar diagnoses of the geopolitical problems they face, even if they are starting to focus on them from different directions. The two nations also share clarity of purpose in many areas: they require closer and continued strategic dialogue to realign growing divergences.
One problem, particularly for the UK, is that while US power has surged ahead, the UK, like many other allies, has fallen behind. Britain has a special interest in strengthening itself – economically, diplomatically and militarily – otherwise its voice will weaken in Washington.
However, each country is likely to remain the other's most powerful ally well into the 21st century. This necessitates closer cooperation. While the US has other important allies and partners, none of these look set to be more powerful than the UK by the early 2030s, especially if British naval and deterrence capabilities are regenerated.
Recommendations:
To repurpose the special relationship, the UK and US should:
Create a new vision of the future of the international order: Britain and America largely agree on the damage done to their economies and industrial bases by neoliberal economic policies. But they lack a vision and strategy to respond. To chart a way forward with the support of a wider group of key allies, they should: Review the level of rival co-option occurring in existing geoeconomic organisations in order to create new ones where necessary, to deal with trade abuses and to coordinate sanctions more effectively; Explore ways of establishing a new geoeconomic order, designed to reinforce the prosperity and resilience of free and open countries, which seeks to limit the ability of adversaries to compete at the geoeconomic level; Strengthen the alignments between the UK and US scientific and technological bases to generate collaboration on regulations for emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Quantum technologies, behind which like-minded partners can follow.
Britain and America largely agree on the damage done to their economies and industrial bases by neoliberal economic policies. But they lack a vision and strategy to respond. To chart a way forward with the support of a wider group of key allies, they should: Plan for a modulated multi-theatre posture: There have been signs from American officials that the US will be far less focused on European security. To mitigate the impact of an American reprioritisation away from Britain's primary theatre, the two governments should: Work together – and within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – to create a clear timeline for the move of key US assets from Europe to the Indo-Pacific theatre over the next five to ten years. The aim should be to allow the UK and other allies to replace those assets in an orderly manner, rather than during a geopolitical emergency in the future; Prepare for the UK to provide leadership and enhanced deterrence in Europe; Reinforce UK support for US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in the Indo-Pacific; Develop strategic dialogues on the most pressing issues to foster alignment on key national priorities; Forge a better understanding of how and where both nations could contribute to a simultaneous multi-front crisis if one were to materialise.
There have been signs from American officials that the US will be far less focused on European security. To mitigate the impact of an American reprioritisation away from Britain's primary theatre, the two governments should: Coordinate military production: There is consensus in both countries that greater defence industrial capacity is needed to deter and contain aggressors. The realisation that adversaries are now fielding Chinese technologies will help shape priorities. The UK and US should: Commit to spend at least 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence by 2030, with 3.5% on military capabilities and 1.5% on strategic infrastructure, as per the recommendation of Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO; Ensure that there is clear direction and prioritisation for transatlantic defence industrial collaboration; Prioritise rare earth metal supply chain cooperation; continued PRC control over this vital supply chain is simply not sustainable for future UK-US military industrial expansion and operations; Support efforts which contribute to leadership in critical technologies; Build up the production and co-production of munitions at the bilateral, minilateral and multilateral levels; Cooperate more on co-sustainment, particularly to enable British shipyards to support the US Navy.
There is consensus in both countries that greater defence industrial capacity is needed to deter and contain aggressors. The realisation that adversaries are now fielding Chinese technologies will help shape priorities. The UK and US should:
William Freer is a research fellow in national security at the Council on Geostrategy in London. John Hemmings, PhD, is deputy director (geopolitics) at the Council on Geostrategy. James Rogers is co-founder (research) at the Council on Geostrategy.

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‘Special relationship': preparing Britain and America for new era
‘Special relationship': preparing Britain and America for new era

AllAfrica

time2 days ago

  • AllAfrica

‘Special relationship': preparing Britain and America for new era

The Council on Geostrategy has just launched 'The 'special relationship': preparing Britain and America for a new era' at a roundtable hosted by the US Embassy in London. This paper focuses on the alliance in a time of immense change and we tasked ourselves with providing an honest, non-emotive read out of the state of the alliance, focusing on converging or diverging interests – and not values. Here are our big three take-aways. 1. We still have many convergences: the US and UK broadly agree that the economic trading order has hurt their economies and led to de-industrialization, but they are unclear as to the future direction. Is a Bretton Woods II needed or a G7/D-10 that creates a group of like-minded economic powers as occurred during the Cold War? Certainly, the US has decided on its trajectory and is moving out on that trajectory, but the UK remains uncertain… 2. We have a long-term divergence in terms of theatre priority, the shift of US focus to the Indo-Pacific has been taking place since 2011, when the Pivot was first announced. The UK should not be surprised. This divergence is, we feel, manageable through the framework that the two theatres are 'interconnected' and that what China and Russia each do in those separate theatres impacts both. This is already true in Ukraine and may become true in other areas. 3. We are more concerned about a divergence in threat priority. For many years, the UK has 'muddled through' on China and though the Strategic Defense Review, National Security Strategy, and China Audit all point to a shift in approach, there are strong indicators that this government – like those preceding it – is being careful to manage relations with Beijing carefully as it is seen as a driver for growth. The US shift on Moscow is also of concern to London, which is skeptical of an attempt at a 'reverse Kissinger' in which the US, to counter China, aligns with Russia. We have made a series of recommendations for both sides – particularly on defense industrial cooperation where we see great potential. You may download the full report here. The executive summary follows: Context: While historical foundations and ties have helped to reinforce the 'special relationship' between the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US), it was common geopolitical interests which bound the two nations together. Chief among these has been to prevent others from dominating the most industrialised and productive regions of Eurasia. As a result, both countries have co-constructed the prevailing international order. Their strength, determination and foresight after the Second World War created alliances and institutions which saw the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the enlargement of that order and the offshoring of manufacturing have empowered adversaries while weakening UK and US strategic industries. Geopolitical changes, especially growing Russian and Chinese aggression, as well as political and strategic changes in Britain and America, have led to fresh questions being asked about the future of the special relationship. Questions this report addresses: What were the fundamental interests which brought the UK and US together, and do they remain cogent? How can the two reinforce convergent interests while simultaneously managing divergent interests? How can policymakers within the two countries redefine the alliance for a new era of geopolitics and revision of the international order? Key findings: In the 2020s, areas of converging interests include: Accepting limits on globalization: This convergence is currently implicit rather than explicit, though both countries recognise the need to rectify the negative impacts which globalisation has had on their own economies and societies. Rising to the geopolitical challenge: Both countries express aspirations of leadership and have shown the will to address systemic challenges, although to differing degrees in their respective theatres. Rebuilding the defense industrial base: Both nations have identified an urgent need to rebuild production capacity and invest in future technologies. Areas of diverging interests include: Theater priority: For the first time in decades, there is a strong possibility that the UK and US will prioritise different regions, with Britain focused primarily on the Euro-Atlantic and America on the Indo-Pacific, though both also retain an interest in the Middle East. Threat precedence: The UK's stance towards the People's Republic of China (PRC) frustrates Washington, while London worries about a softer US approach towards Russia. Cooperation preference: The two countries are somewhat divided on their approach to multilateral institutions, including on climate change and trade arrangements. These areas of divergence notwithstanding, Britain and America have made similar diagnoses of the geopolitical problems they face, even if they are starting to focus on them from different directions. The two nations also share clarity of purpose in many areas: they require closer and continued strategic dialogue to realign growing divergences. One problem, particularly for the UK, is that while US power has surged ahead, the UK, like many other allies, has fallen behind. Britain has a special interest in strengthening itself – economically, diplomatically and militarily – otherwise its voice will weaken in Washington. However, each country is likely to remain the other's most powerful ally well into the 21st century. This necessitates closer cooperation. While the US has other important allies and partners, none of these look set to be more powerful than the UK by the early 2030s, especially if British naval and deterrence capabilities are regenerated. Recommendations: To repurpose the special relationship, the UK and US should: Create a new vision of the future of the international order: Britain and America largely agree on the damage done to their economies and industrial bases by neoliberal economic policies. But they lack a vision and strategy to respond. To chart a way forward with the support of a wider group of key allies, they should: Review the level of rival co-option occurring in existing geoeconomic organisations in order to create new ones where necessary, to deal with trade abuses and to coordinate sanctions more effectively; Explore ways of establishing a new geoeconomic order, designed to reinforce the prosperity and resilience of free and open countries, which seeks to limit the ability of adversaries to compete at the geoeconomic level; Strengthen the alignments between the UK and US scientific and technological bases to generate collaboration on regulations for emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Quantum technologies, behind which like-minded partners can follow. Britain and America largely agree on the damage done to their economies and industrial bases by neoliberal economic policies. But they lack a vision and strategy to respond. To chart a way forward with the support of a wider group of key allies, they should: Plan for a modulated multi-theatre posture: There have been signs from American officials that the US will be far less focused on European security. To mitigate the impact of an American reprioritisation away from Britain's primary theatre, the two governments should: Work together – and within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – to create a clear timeline for the move of key US assets from Europe to the Indo-Pacific theatre over the next five to ten years. The aim should be to allow the UK and other allies to replace those assets in an orderly manner, rather than during a geopolitical emergency in the future; Prepare for the UK to provide leadership and enhanced deterrence in Europe; Reinforce UK support for US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in the Indo-Pacific; Develop strategic dialogues on the most pressing issues to foster alignment on key national priorities; Forge a better understanding of how and where both nations could contribute to a simultaneous multi-front crisis if one were to materialise. There have been signs from American officials that the US will be far less focused on European security. To mitigate the impact of an American reprioritisation away from Britain's primary theatre, the two governments should: Coordinate military production: There is consensus in both countries that greater defence industrial capacity is needed to deter and contain aggressors. The realisation that adversaries are now fielding Chinese technologies will help shape priorities. The UK and US should: Commit to spend at least 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence by 2030, with 3.5% on military capabilities and 1.5% on strategic infrastructure, as per the recommendation of Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO; Ensure that there is clear direction and prioritisation for transatlantic defence industrial collaboration; Prioritise rare earth metal supply chain cooperation; continued PRC control over this vital supply chain is simply not sustainable for future UK-US military industrial expansion and operations; Support efforts which contribute to leadership in critical technologies; Build up the production and co-production of munitions at the bilateral, minilateral and multilateral levels; Cooperate more on co-sustainment, particularly to enable British shipyards to support the US Navy. There is consensus in both countries that greater defence industrial capacity is needed to deter and contain aggressors. The realisation that adversaries are now fielding Chinese technologies will help shape priorities. The UK and US should: William Freer is a research fellow in national security at the Council on Geostrategy in London. John Hemmings, PhD, is deputy director (geopolitics) at the Council on Geostrategy. James Rogers is co-founder (research) at the Council on Geostrategy.

NATO summit shows Europe and US no longer have a common enemy
NATO summit shows Europe and US no longer have a common enemy

AllAfrica

time3 days ago

  • AllAfrica

NATO summit shows Europe and US no longer have a common enemy

Mark Rutte had an unenviable task at the Hague summit this week. The NATO secretary-general had to work with diverging American and European views of current security threats. After Rutte made extraordinary efforts at highly deferential, overt flattery of Donald Trump to secure crucial outcomes for the alliance, he seems to have succeeded for now. But what this meeting and the run-up have made increasingly clear is that the US and Europe no longer perceive themselves as having a single common enemy. NATO was established in 1949 as a defensive alliance against the acknowledged threat from the USSR. This defined the alliance through the Cold War until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea in 2014, NATO has focused on Moscow as the major threat to international peace. But the increasingly bellicose China is demanding more attention from the US. There are some symbolic moves that signal how things are changing. 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Meanwhile, European allies have sought to fund and support Ukraine's defensive efforts, increasing aid and military support, and continuing to ramp up sanctions. Another sign of the differing priorities of Europe and Canada versus the US was the decision by Pete Hegseth, US Secretary of Defense, to step back from leadership of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, an ad-hoc coalition of states worldwide providing military support to Ukraine. Hegseth also symbolically failed to attend the group's pre-summit meeting in June. Trump has long been adamant that NATO members should meet their 2014 commitment to spend 2% of their GDP on defense, and Rutte recognized that. In 2018, Trump suggested that this should be increased to 4 or 5% but this was dismissed as unreasonable. Now, in a decision which indicates increasing concern about both Russia as a threat and US support, NATO members (except for Spain) have agreed to increase spending to 5% of GDP on defense over the next 10 years. NATO's Article 3 requires states to maintain and develop their capacity to resist attack. However, since 2022, it has become increasingly apparent that many NATO members are unprepared for any major military engagement. At the same time, they are increasingly feeling that Russia is more of a threat on their doorsteps. There has been recognition, particularly among the Baltic states, Germany, France and the UK, that they need to increase their military spending and preparedness. For the US to focus more on China, US forces will shift a greater percentage of the US Navy to the Pacific. It will also assign its most capable new ships and aircraft to the region and increase general presence operations, training and developmental exercises, and engagement and cooperation with allied and other navies in the western Pacific. To do this US forces will need to reduce commitments in Europe, and European allies must replace those capabilities in order to sustain deterrence against Russia. The bedrock of the NATO treaty, Article 5, is commonly paraphrased as 'an attack on one is an attack on all.' On his way to the Hague summit, Trump seemed unsure about the US commitment to NATO. Asked to clarify this at the summit, he stated: 'I stand with it [Article 5]. That's why I'm here. If I didn't stand with it, I wouldn't be here.' Lord Ismay, the first secretary-general of NATO, famously (if apocryphally) suggested that the purpose of the alliance was to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down. Germany is now an integral part of NATO, and the Americans are in, if distracted. But there are cracks, and Rutte will have his hands full managing Trump's declining interest in protecting Europe if he is to keep the Russians at bay. Andrew Corbett is a senior lecturer in defense studies at King's College London. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Russia challenging US, China for strategic clout in Africa
Russia challenging US, China for strategic clout in Africa

AllAfrica

time4 days ago

  • AllAfrica

Russia challenging US, China for strategic clout in Africa

Russia has never had an African colony. It stayed out of the scramble for Africa, only engaging with African states in the 19th Century. In 1869, for instance, the Russians gave Ethiopia military support to threaten the position of the British in their quest to control the Suez Canal. Russia did this because Britain was one of its main European rivals. It wasn't until the Cold War started in 1947 that Russia began to develop diplomatic relations with several African countries. This was a way to counter the influence of its rivals such as the US. The Cold War dictated the former USSR's relations with many African countries for decades. This was followed by a period of relative inactivity. More recently, however, relations have become increasingly important for Russia as well asfor some African countries. The result is that some African countries no longer need to choose between the American and the Chinese way of development. Ostensibly, China has the most pragmatic engagement with Africa. Its policy is not to interfere with the internal workings of nation states or play geopolitics by pitting countries against each other. But it has become increasingly difficult for the country to resist using its military power to protect its economic interests. For its part, the US's ultimate aim is to tip the regional balance of power in its favor while also gaining access to Africa's resources. My research explores Russia's current relationship with the continent. The research examines Russian President Vladimir Putin's strategy to redress the global balance of power by countering America's influence in Africa and trying to match China's large economic footprint on the continent. I conclude that Russia's primary goal is political influence. This is achieved by gaining control of natural resources and providing military support and intelligence. Yet, despite making massive inroads, the Russian Federation is still less influential than the US and China on the continent. From the African point of view, Russia offers a strategic alternative to America's global hegemony, China's economic diplomacy and the lingering influence of Africa's former colonial masters. During the Cold War the Russians provided diplomatic, economic, military, and educational support for numerous African liberation movements. These included Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, Sao Tome & Principe and Tanzania. As a result many young Africans were educated in Moscow. Russia began to trade and interact with these states routinely. It sent in military intelligence officers to establish a strong presence and ensure that Africa was not purely influenced by the West. The Russians developed relations with Africa so intensely that for the 10 years between 1950 and 1960 it surpassed the influence of colonizing powers. That influence would remain more or less intact until the Boris Yeltsin era. Between 1990 and 1999 Russia's impact on the continent was spectacularly lowered. Nine embassies and three consulates were closed. The number of personnel subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was drastically reduced. Russian cultural institutions were closed, and economic relations were unilaterally terminated. Previously generous aid programs were scrapped. This all changed when Putin came to power in 1999. Under his leadership Russia has started to regain its economic and political clout in Africa. Putin has jumpstarted Russia's diplomatic, economic, and military ties with its former African allies. From my research, I can conclude that Russia's primary intent is to build political alliances by supporting nation states economically and militarily while remaining non-judgmental about their internal governance structures. Its long-term goal is to become a political, economic and military mediator that can stand behind Africa's global interests and count on the continent's support in return. Here are some of the areas where Russia are mainly active: Economic interests: Russia is now seeking to exploit conventional gas and oil fields in Africa and elsewhere. Part of its long-term energy strategy is to use Russian companies to create new streams of energy supply. For example, Russian companies have made significant investments in Algeria's oil and gas industries. They have also invested in Libya, Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast and Egypt. Russia is also expanding its African interests in minerals. Uranium, key to the nuclear power industry, is at the top of its list. In addition, Russian companies are producing aluminum in Nigeria and have constructed hydropower stations in Angola, Namibia, and Botswana. Russia is also on track to build nuclear plants in Egypt, Nigeria and Algeria. These investments are a means to becoming an integral part of Africa's energy sector. Russia has also improved its commercial relations with its African partners. In 2009, it established the Coordinating Committee for Economic Cooperation with sub-Saharan Africa to assist in promoting Russian business interests. Defense interests: Russia has traditionally been one of Africa's main arms suppliers. During the Cold War, many armed liberation organizations and African countries – among the latter Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Guinea –bought military equipment from Russia. More recently Russia has made significant arms deals with Angola and Algeria. Also, Egypt, Tanzania, Somalia, Mali, Sudan and Libya have bought arms from Russia. The Russians also provide military training and support. Aid: Under Putin, Russia has made sizeable aid donations to a variety of African countries, averaging about $400 million per year. Around 60% of Russian aid is delivered through international organizations; global humanitarian organizations, including the World Food Program and the UN refugee agency. The remaining 40% gets to Africa in a framework of bilateral cooperation. Moscow also makes donations to support education, healthcare, agriculture, the environment, and energy. A risk for Moscow is that the more progress it makes with African governments, the more likely it is that its interests will collide with those of either China or the US, or both. János Besenyő is an associate Professor at Óbuda University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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