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Time of India
4 days ago
- Politics
- Time of India
How can a new regime in Iran be in India's interest? Yet Delhi said little: Bruno Maçães
Bruno Maçães A former secretary of state for European Affairs in Portugal, Bruno Maçães wears many hats — he advises global corporations on geopolitical and technological risk, is a member of the European Council on Foreign Relations , and has written books on the new world order as well as China's belt and road strategy. In an interview with Sunday Times , he argues that India must take a more proactive approach to securing its strategic interests. A truce has been called with the US, Israel and Iran all claiming victory. How do you assess these competing narratives? Israel was fundamentally interested in bringing the regime down. US president Trump showed considerable ability in how he avoided being dragged into a prolonged war most of his supporters were against. At the same time, no fundamental problem was addressed. Iran may even feel this is the right moment to pursue a nuclear weapon. The main obstacle in the past was political and may have been removed now that Ayatollah Khamenei has lost influence. He has consistently opposed a final decision on weaponising nuclear power. Regime change could lead to a military dictatorship in Iran and that would move it much closer to China. For India, this might well be a disaster and my conversations with friends in Delhi actually showed there was some awareness of the risk. But India needs to be more active in pursuing its strategic interests. In this multipolar world, India has had to do a balancing act with the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Middle East. How successful has this strategy been? India needs to develop a vision on what kind of principles and priorities it has and then apply those principles to ongoing crises. I consider India a civilization state but a civilization state needs to offer an organising theory of world order. How can it be in India's interest for Iran to be destroyed or for a new regime aligned with China and Pakistan to take root there? And yet we heard very little from Delhi in opposition to the wild adventures that were openly being discussed in Israel and Washington. On Russia's invasion of Ukraine, India, a country without territorial ambitions of its own, should be more critical of territorial invasions. I would have liked a stronger position and a stronger role against the return of the old European imperialism as represented by Russian president Putin . You have described the Israel attack on Iran as 'neoconservatism on steroids.' Can you explain? The old neoconservatism was about regime change. I think this is a more radical form of neoconservatism where the goal is regime destruction or collapse but there is no vision of what will replace it. Over the past two decades, Israel and the US have created a landscape of destruction in West Asia, all the way from Egypt to Pakistan. Syria is only now starting to recover, and a lot depends on whether it manages to get back on its feet and the wider region starts to recover. Unfortunately, Israel seems to believe the best future for itself is to become a fortified garrison amidst a landscape of destruction. There is no future in this vision, not even for Israel itself. I n your latest book 'World Builders', you argue that geopolitics is no longer about controlling territory but about technology. How do you see China's DeepSeek, and the fears in Europe that Trump could weaponise the tech dominance of the US? Europe has fallen behind. We need to realise technology is not above geopolitics. We are becoming more dependent on the US and that comes at the cost of our prosperity and independence. Regulation is not enough. In order to regulate technology, you first need to create it. We made a mistake 30 years ago to think it did not matter whether the main internet platforms in Europe were American or European. That was a tragic mistake. China did not make the same mistake, and now they have strong indigenous capabilities as shown by DeepSeek. Now, we find ourselves in a position of extreme dependency. Did you see how Nato's secretary general, who is European, referred to Europeans as 'they'? It reminded me of those nawabs in India who were so aligned with the East India Company that they referred to Indians as 'they'. In both cases, military dependence led to a kind of mental dependence. How do you think India will fare in this race for technology? Already, India is the only real rival to China in the race to control and deploy solar energy. Europe and America are out of this competition. I suspect in other areas too the contest for technological dominance will increasingly be between China and India. Right now, I think India is looking for a model. American-type financialisation will not work for India, but neither will the party leadership system of China. When you need to move fast in developing ideas and implementing them, the most important thing is a political model that fits your circumstances. Ultimately, India needs a political model that aligns with its culture and history which is the topic of my next book. A model is also necessary to organise discovery. What will be the technologies of the future? No one knows. But we know that it all starts with organised discovery. We already know that whoever masters solar energy and artificial intelligence will rule the world, but the details will decide everything. Can you tell us what your impressions were after your recent India visit, and what your next book will be focusing on? I spent two months this year visiting Ayodhya, the Mahakumbh and other places in India, as well as meeting many people and having intense discussions. My book will deal with the revival of Hindu civilization. I am spending a lot of hours reading the complete works of Vivekananda , Aurobindo, Coomaraswamy. These are writers of unmatched power but also complexity. I want to discuss the terms of this revival and also, what the Indian case can teach us about the fundamental political entity of the future: the civilization state, that is a state that is neither liberal nor national but based on a distinct civilization, a view about human life and society. I hope to be able to travel for several months across India next year to present these ideas.
Sydney Morning Herald
24-06-2025
- Politics
- Sydney Morning Herald
Once the West's great hero, Zelensky is now fighting to keep a divided world on his side
Notably, Zelensky ditched his trademark military fatigues for a black blazer and trousers – a subtle shift that reflected both the gravity of the moment and a calculated diplomatic posture. His visit came in the shadow of another devastating Russian assault on Ukraine. Overnight, Moscow had launched 352 drones and 16 missiles, killing at least 10 civilians – seven of them in Kyiv. Zelensky accused Russia of using North Korean-supplied missiles, warning that Moscow was now part of what he described as a 'coalition of murderers' alongside Iran and North Korea. Loading While political leaders continue to reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine – Starmer's office said he would 'reiterate our steadfast support' – public sentiment is growing more complex. In democracies where elections loom, support for military aid is increasingly filtered through domestic politics, particularly as right-wing populist movements gain traction. Among Trump-aligned voters around the world, scepticism of Zelensky is rising, as is sympathy, albeit marginal, for Putin. That change in public mood reflects a deeper strategic recalibration under way in Europe. A report from the European Council on Foreign Relations reveals that majorities across 12 surveyed European Union nations now believe the continent must prepare to defend itself, with or without the United States. In Denmark and Poland, 70 per cent of citizens support increased defence spending. In countries such as Germany, Portugal and even Spain, previously controversial ideas such as mandatory national service now enjoy majority or plurality support. The council report's authors, Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, argue that US President Donald Trump's re-emergence as the dominant force in Republican politics has accelerated Europe's reassessment of its own security posture. 'Trump's revolution has come to Europe,' Leonard writes. 'It is overturning not just military expectations, but also the internal political order. What was once dismissed as populist fringe thinking has found legitimacy in the rhetoric of the US president.' Krastev adds that a new ideological alignment is taking shape: 'To be pro-European today means to be sceptical of Trump's America. To be pro-American increasingly means to be critical of the EU.' Across NATO member states, support for the alliance remains high; a median of 66 per cent view it favourably, according to Pew. But belief in Europe's capacity to achieve military autonomy is more fragile. Only in Denmark and Portugal do majorities believe that goal is achievable within five years. In Italy and Hungary, more than half say it is 'practically impossible'. For Zelensky, the challenge is twofold. First, he must secure continued military and financial support in an increasingly fragmented West. Second, he must convince NATO allies to offer Ukraine a credible long-term security framework – possibly a path to eventual membership – despite signs of internal drift within the alliance. Loading Though Zelensky has been invited to attend the NATO summit, he is not expected to participate in the main discussions. His presence remains symbolically powerful, but increasingly peripheral to decision-making. That in itself speaks volumes about the changing dynamics at play. Where once the Ukrainian president rallied Western leaders with moral clarity, he now must navigate a landscape shaped by shifting alliances, electoral uncertainty and competing definitions of security. His image may still resonate, but it will land on a continent no longer unified in its assumptions – not only about Russia, but about America, NATO and the future of the liberal order.
The Age
24-06-2025
- Politics
- The Age
Once the West's great hero, Zelensky is now fighting to keep a divided world on his side
Notably, Zelensky ditched his trademark military fatigues for a black blazer and trousers – a subtle shift that reflected both the gravity of the moment and a calculated diplomatic posture. His visit came in the shadow of another devastating Russian assault on Ukraine. Overnight, Moscow had launched 352 drones and 16 missiles, killing at least 10 civilians – seven of them in Kyiv. Zelensky accused Russia of using North Korean-supplied missiles, warning that Moscow was now part of what he described as a 'coalition of murderers' alongside Iran and North Korea. Loading While political leaders continue to reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine – Starmer's office said he would 'reiterate our steadfast support' – public sentiment is growing more complex. In democracies where elections loom, support for military aid is increasingly filtered through domestic politics, particularly as right-wing populist movements gain traction. Among Trump-aligned voters around the world, scepticism of Zelensky is rising, as is sympathy, albeit marginal, for Putin. That change in public mood reflects a deeper strategic recalibration under way in Europe. A report from the European Council on Foreign Relations reveals that majorities across 12 surveyed European Union nations now believe the continent must prepare to defend itself, with or without the United States. In Denmark and Poland, 70 per cent of citizens support increased defence spending. In countries such as Germany, Portugal and even Spain, previously controversial ideas such as mandatory national service now enjoy majority or plurality support. The council report's authors, Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, argue that US President Donald Trump's re-emergence as the dominant force in Republican politics has accelerated Europe's reassessment of its own security posture. 'Trump's revolution has come to Europe,' Leonard writes. 'It is overturning not just military expectations, but also the internal political order. What was once dismissed as populist fringe thinking has found legitimacy in the rhetoric of the US president.' Krastev adds that a new ideological alignment is taking shape: 'To be pro-European today means to be sceptical of Trump's America. To be pro-American increasingly means to be critical of the EU.' Across NATO member states, support for the alliance remains high; a median of 66 per cent view it favourably, according to Pew. But belief in Europe's capacity to achieve military autonomy is more fragile. Only in Denmark and Portugal do majorities believe that goal is achievable within five years. In Italy and Hungary, more than half say it is 'practically impossible'. For Zelensky, the challenge is twofold. First, he must secure continued military and financial support in an increasingly fragmented West. Second, he must convince NATO allies to offer Ukraine a credible long-term security framework – possibly a path to eventual membership – despite signs of internal drift within the alliance. Loading Though Zelensky has been invited to attend the NATO summit, he is not expected to participate in the main discussions. His presence remains symbolically powerful, but increasingly peripheral to decision-making. That in itself speaks volumes about the changing dynamics at play. Where once the Ukrainian president rallied Western leaders with moral clarity, he now must navigate a landscape shaped by shifting alliances, electoral uncertainty and competing definitions of security. His image may still resonate, but it will land on a continent no longer unified in its assumptions – not only about Russia, but about America, NATO and the future of the liberal order.
France 24
23-06-2025
- Politics
- France 24
Will Russia benefit from the Israel-Iran war?
Hours after the US launched strikes on Iranian nuclear sites early Sunday morning, Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced that he would hold 'serious consultations' with key ally Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin on Monday. "In this new dangerous situation ... our consultations with Russia can certainly be of great importance," Russian state media reported Araghchi as saying after landing in the Moscow on Sunday night. As the two men met face to face, Putin condemned the "absolutely unprovoked aggression against Iran" from the US and said that Russia was "making efforts to provide assistance to the Iranian people". But even as the Kremlin denounces the attacks on its long-term strategic ally, a continued conflict brings potential opportunities for Russia. Iran announced on Sunday it would close the Strait of Hormuz, a water passage on Iran's south coast through which around one-fifth of the world oil trade passes. Doing so is likely to send global oil prices soaring, giving a boost to Moscow's sanctions-hit economy. But most importantly for Russia, while the US – and the world – has their eyes trained on Israel and Iran, Putin's war in Ukraine has slipped down the agenda. The United States becoming embroiled in a prolonged conflict could also have a material impact on Ukraine's future defence capabilities. US President Donald Trump has not clarified whether he intends to continue attacks on Iran. But supporting Israel in the long term may well mean that 'the US will have to provide Israel with missiles, air defence and interceptors ', said the International Crisis Group's senior Russia analyst, Oleg Ignatov. 'That means these will not go to Ukraine and, of course, that is in Russia's interest.' There are also the moral implications of the US joining an attack on Iran under the shaky legal pretext that it was a pre-emptive act of self-defence – the same justification that Western leaders have denounced Putin as using for invading Ukraine in 2022. In the longer term, if the US becomes involved in another 'unwinnable Middle East war, then that actually hastens America's decline that President Putin has now been predicting for years', said Kadri Liik, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and an expert on Russia. 'Performative diplomacy' The deputy chair of Russia's Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, on Sunday even hinted at an Iranian nuclear retaliation against the United States, backed by Russia. Trump had 'pushed the US into a new war' in which 'a number of countries' were ready to 'directly supply Iran with their own nuclear warheads', he wrote on social media. But such a step seems unlikely. While Iran has supported Russia's war in Ukraine by providing drones and other military equipment, so far the Kremlin has offered no military help to Iran – despite a sweeping strategic partnership agreement signed just months ago in which the two countries agreed to help each other counter common "security threats". As long as Russia's military resources are concentrated in Ukraine, Putin seems to have little appetite for conflict in Israel and Iran and has pitched himself as an informal peace broker – while rejecting the possibility of acting as an official mediator. "We are simply suggesting ideas … if they turn out to be attractive to both sides, we will only be happy," he said when discussing the conflict at an economic forum in Saint Petersburg on Friday. Realistically, the Russian leader holds little influence over outcomes in Israel or Iran. 'Russia is not strong enough to shape the new order emerging in the Middle East, and maybe not best positioned to gain from it,' said Liik. But that doesn't mean he won't try. 'Putin is very tactical, and he will try to make gains from the situation,' Ignatov said. One best-case scenario for Russia is a short-term conflict in which the Kremlin offers what limited military defence it can currently provide to Iran in exchange for a pledge from Tehran to avoid striking US bases in its proximity. Such an arrangement would both increase Iran's reliance on Russia and ward off the risk of a spat with the US. 'Russia can say it doesn't want escalation, but it is ready to help Iran and defend itself. That seems logical,' Ignatov said. It would also be an extension of what Liik calls Putin's policy of 'performative diplomacy' towards the United States while he pursues his own goals in Ukraine. 'Russia pretends to be helpful, it pretends to be engaged in diplomatic processes … while not actually giving in an inch on their maximalist demands and playing for time,' she said.
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First Post
23-06-2025
- Politics
- First Post
Calculated or cornered? Iran's dilemma after Trump's strikes
As Iran has vowed retaliation to US airstrikes on its nuclear sites, here are five options with Iran that range from kinetic action against US troops in the region to blocking the Strait of Hormuz and cyberattacks. There is also the possibility of Iran doubling down on the nuclear weapons programme. read more Iran is bound to respond after US airstrikes on its nuclear facilities over the weekend. Such attacks are expected to be multi-domain and not just military attacks. The United States on Saturday attacked the Iranian nuclear sites at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan . Even as the extent of the damage is not clear, what is clear is that the United States is now party to the Israel-Iran war and an Iranian retaliation is only a matter of time. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Iranian attacks against the United States are now 'inevitable' and 'will be swift and multi-layered based on the extent of damage caused by the US strikes', Ellie Geranmayeh, the Deputy Head of the Middle East and North Africa at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told Bloomberg. However, any Iranian retaliation would depend on the kind of escalation it can absorb and what capabilities remain — as Israel has taken down many Iranian missile launchers and weapons storage sites. Geranmayeh further said, 'Iran knows it cannot win this war, but wants to ensure that the US and Israel also lose.' Here are the many options that Iran may choose to respond to US strikes. Iranian retaliatory strikes on US troops The simplest way to respond would be to attack US interests in West Asia. Iran could do such attacks itself or tell its proxies to do such attacks. The United States has around 40,000 troops in 20 bases in the region. Major US bases are located in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). US soldiers in smaller numbers are also deployed in Syria and Iraq and experts say that these soldiers and their bases are the most vulnerable to any strikes. Iran may mount a calibrated response that may include strikes on US-linked infrastructure but not US troops themselves, Geranmayeh told Bloomberg. Any Iranian strikes on US soldiers and bases would carry the risk of escalating the conflict, so experts say that Iran could telegraph such strikes so as to minimise the damage and make way for an off-ramp for both sides. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Such a retaliation would be most likely, according to Bloomberg Economics Analyst Dina Esfandiary. With such a telegraphed retaliation, Iran would tell the United States where and what it will strike with the likely lack of US deaths allowing the Donald Trump administration to have an off-ramp and impress upon Israel that it must stop its attacks, which could effectively leading to a ceasefire for all parties, Bloomberg quoted Esfandiary as saying. Iranian cyber attacks Iran has well-known cyberattack capabilities and it is expected deploy them against the United States as part of the broader retaliation. The capabilities are such that, CyberAv3ngers, a group said to be linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), carries a $10 million reward. Strait of Hormuz Iran could block or disrupt the Strait of Hormuz. The consequence will be faced by the entire world and not just the United States and its allies. The waterway carries around 20 per cent of the world's all oil and gas supplies. Iran could mine the waterway and attacks ships passing through with boats and missiles. The blockage would mean that petroleum exporting nations dependent on the waterway would find their exports curtailed. Oil and gas prices are set to surge. If Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz, global oil prices could reach $120 a barrel and US inflation could surge to 5 per cent, according to JPMorgan Chase. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Iranian attacks on oil fields In a less likely option, Iran may also strike oil fields of oil-producing countries in the region, which are mainly US allies and partners. In 2019, Yemen's Houthis carried out drone and missile strikes on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities and temporarily took down around half of the kingdom's oil production. Iran may develop nuclear weapon Beside all these options, the ultimate retaliation may be the development of the nuclear bomb. Even as the United States struck three Iranian nuclear sites, the extent of the damage is not clear. There are also analyses that US strikes neither destroyed Iranian capabilities to enrich uranium completely nor stockpiles of near-weapons grade level uranium. With its back to the wall and conventional deterrence eroded, Iran may very well decide to develop a nuclear weapon.
