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AllAfrica
16-07-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
Neither at war nor at peace in Singapore
In his inaugural Singapore Armed Forces Day message, Defense Minister Chan Chun Sing remarked, 'We are not at war, but neither are we at peace.' The defense chief's words captured a deeper truth: Strategic ambiguity in the Indo-Pacific has become a structural reality amid the return of a multipolar security order. As Singapore builds its fifth-generation Armed Forces – digitally networked, AI-integrated, and autonomous-capable – to address manpower constraints and enhance force multiplication, it must also contend with a more crowded Indo-Pacific theater comprised of old neighbors and distant new visitors. In this context, three shifts warrant closer attention. 1. New Indo-Pacific military balance Between May and June 2025, China deployed both its Liaoning and Shandong aircraft carrier groups beyond the First Island Chain, conducting more than 1,100 sorties over two weeks in the Philippine Sea. These operations, supported by Type 055 destroyers and logistics vessels, confirmed the People's Liberation Army-Navy's rising ability to sustain carrier-based operations in the Western Pacific within the Second Island Chain. The United Kingdom responded with its own signal. In mid-June, HMS Spey transited the Taiwan Strait en route to join Carrier Strike Group 25 (CSG25), whose flagship HMS Prince of Wales docked in Singapore days later. London called the transit lawful and routine; Beijing condemned it as a provocation. On the day HMS Spey transited, the PLA sent 74 aircraft toward Taiwan, with 61 of them crossing the median line in what Taipei described as an unprecedented incursion. Singapore welcomed HMS Prince of Wales with considerable fanfare. Photos and videos of the carrier docked at Marina Bay were widely shared, and officials highlighted the strength of bilateral defense ties. But the symbolism ran deeper. CSG25 will join Exercise Bersama Lima this September under the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA), alongside Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore. Originally established as a collective security arrangement for Malaysia and Singapore after Britain's East of Suez withdrawal, the FPDA's evolution could today be seen to reflect a broader rebalancing of China's presence in the region, thus complicating Singapore's fundamental interests of military non-entanglement with China. 2. Limits of defense diplomacy Economic ties with China are deep and still growing. Singapore remains China's largest foreign investor and strategic partner in projects like the Suzhou Industrial Park and Chongqing Connectivity Initiative. New areas of collaboration, including digital economy and green development, are also taking shape. Notably, SAF-PLA engagements have quietly expanded in recent years, adding nuance to the familiar framing that security ties are limited while economic ties flourish. Yet, Singapore's troops continue to train in Taiwan under Project Starlight – an arrangement maintained for over 40 years, as former Deputy Prime Minister and Senior Minister S. Jayakumar reflected in his book 'Diplomacy: A Singapore Experience.' This has been a point of tension with China, despite Singapore's unequivocal 'one-China policy.' Singapore remains the only Southeast Asian nation to acquire the American F-35 Joint Strike Fighter – unlike US treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines, which have opted to hedge with Sweden's Gripens and South Korea's FA-50s. Coincidentally, the UK has also announced an expansion of its F-35 fleet. Unlike Britain's F-35s, which support its NATO nuclear deterrent posture, Singapore's fleet has no such role yet it underscores deep interoperability with US platform architecture. Additionally, the SAF maintains rotational access agreements for US forces under the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding United States Use of Facilities in Singapore, the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement and the 2015 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. While access is also extended to international navies, the scale and frequency of US deployments – especially during heightened South China Sea and Taiwan Strait tensions – raises the perception that Singapore is de facto aligned with the US, even when it is not. This perception risk is not trivial. The precedent of Qatar is instructive. In June, Iran launched at least 14 ballistic missiles at the Al-Udeid air base, a US facility in Qatar, in retaliation for US strikes on Iran's Fordow nuclear facility. The Qatari Prime Minister later said it 'scarred' the relationship. Qatar was targeted not for what it did, but for what it hosted. In a future US-China conflict, could the distinction between hosting and aligning of military assets and facilities similarly blur in the eyes of great-power rivals? 3. Diffusion as deterrence As part of its 5G SAF evolution, Singapore's investments in AI-enabled platforms and unmanned systems go beyond addressing manpower constraints. They are designed to enhance the SAF's ability to project presence, monitor contested environments and sustain operations without unnecessarily placing personnel at risk. Take, for example, the SAF's use of digital twins – computer-generated simulation environments that replicate high-threat theatres and allow units to rehearse complex operations virtually. These simulations extend operational readiness across scenarios that may be too politically sensitive or physically hazardous to stage in real life. Paired with autonomous maritime patrols and remote sensing platforms, such tools are increasingly vital to maintaining forward situational awareness while minimizing exposure on the ground. Geographic diffusion is another critical dimension. While longstanding overseas training partnerships remain foundational, new options merit exploration. For instance, could Timor-Leste , soon to join ASEAN and cooperate with both Singapore and China under the Third Country Training Program, serve as neutral terrain for future SAF training, given its strategic proximity to Singapore and relatively low geopolitical baggage? Similarly, could Oman's Port Salalah, situated near key chokepoints in the Indian Ocean, offer a viable platform for naval exercises or maritime logistics access beyond the operational reach of the First and Second Island Chains? Deterrence through cohesion Concentration of force has long been a cornerstone of military doctrine, famously championed by Carl von Clausewitz as the path to achieving a decisive advantage. But in today's Indo-Pacific, where threats are more asymmetric, intentions more easily misread and escalation more automated than ever, the logic of strategic diffusion is gaining ground. For a point target like Singapore, diffusion buys time, creates space and preserves freedom of maneuver. Yet diffusion does not replace concentration; it relies on it. The ability to disperse assets and operate with agility across domains only works when anchored by cohesion. And for Singapore, that cohesion is Total Defense: The belief that an attack on one is met by all. On that basis, Singapore's ultimate deterrence rests on its people – mobilized psychologically, economically, socially and militarily. We saw this vividly during the Covid-19 crisis. As global systems buckled, Singapore activated its entire nation. Under the direction of the Multi-ministry Taskforce, then-Trade and Industry Minister Chan Chun Sing and team diversified supply lines, secured vaccine cold-chains, and built and repurposed facilities overnight. The SAF, public service and citizen-volunteers were mobilized into providing a single, unified response to the pandemic. It wasn't framed as Total Defense, but that's exactly what it was. And it worked. This is why partisan politics must never breach the water's edge; why national institutions must remain trusted; why Singaporeans must never become vessels for foreign agendas, wittingly or otherwise; and why we must not import the ideological suspicions that plague the civil-military-technological discourse elsewhere. This SAF Day, Singaporeans must remember: What truly matters is the will of a people who know what they stand for – and what gives them meaning. In a more crowded and contested Indo-Pacific, that shared sense of purpose remains the foundation of Singapore's defence posture, from which all else must flow. Marcus Loh is chairman of the Public Affairs Group at the Public Relations and Communications Association (PRCA) Asia Pacific. An MA candidate of the War Studies Department in King's College London, Loh also serves on the Executive Committee of SGTech's Digital Transformation Chapter, contributing to national conversations on AI, data infrastructure, and digital policy. A former president of the Institute of Public Relations of Singapore, he has played a longstanding role in shaping the relevance of strategic communication and public affairs in an evolving policy, technology and geoeconomic landscape.
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First Post
08-07-2025
- Politics
- First Post
‘Entirely unacceptable': Germany says Chinese military laser-attacked its security mission in Red Sea
Germany has said that Chinese military targeted a German aircraft with a laser while it was deployed in the Red Sea on a security mission. read more In this photo provided by the Australian Defense Force, the People's Liberation Army-Navy Jiangkai-class frigate Hengyang travels in the Torres Strait off Australia's coast, on February 11, 2025. AP Germany on Tuesday said that Chinese military targeted a German aircraft operating in the Red Sea area with a laser. In a post on X, German Foreign Office said that the Chinese vessel targeted the German ship during its deployment in the Red Sea as part of the European Union's (EU) Operation Aspides. Germany summoned Chinese Ambassador Shi Mingde and registered protest. The Chinese military employed a laser targeting a German aircraft in the EU operation #ASPIDES. Endangering German personnel & disrupting the operation is entirely unacceptable. The Chinese ambassador was summoned to the Federal Foreign Office today. — GermanForeignOffice (@GermanyDiplo) July 8, 2025 STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD This is a developing story. It will be updated as details emerge.
Sky News AU
16-06-2025
- Politics
- Sky News AU
Deputy PM refuses to say if Chinese warships targeted Australian cities
Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles has refused to say if Chinese warships were 'targeting our cities' when they carried out exercises off Australia's vast coast earlier this year. The Australian Defence Force revealed in February it was tracking two People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) frigates and a replenishment vessel in the Coral Sea, off Queensland. They passed within 150 nautical miles (278km) east of Sydney as they moved south and conducted live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea without notifying Canberra or air traffic controllers. The Albanese government has kept tight-lipped on what the Chinese flotilla's mission was, even amid fears AUKUS could be on the rocks, Australia trailing its allies in defence spending and warnings Beijing poses an 'imminent' threat to the region. Mr Marles, who is also defence minister, on Monday told News Corp's Defending Australia Summit the Chinese live-fire drills was 'very much not diplomacy or defensive diplomacy'. 'None of that provides strategic reassurance,' he said. Asked point blank if they were rehearsing strikes on Australian cities or onshore facilities, Mr Marles said he did know but would not confirm or deny. 'Look, I do know the answer to the question,' he said. 'I don't think it's appropriate or helpful for me in this situation to speculate about it for a range of reasons … and the most significant being what we did with the Chinese task group was to engage in an unprecedented level of surveillance on that task group. 'So we do know exactly what they were doing and exactly what they're rehearsing. 'For me to start talking about that obviously reveals our surveillance capabilities, which is why I'm reluctant to.' Mr Marles added the Chinese ships were 'very clear about what they were doing'. 'Perhaps I would say that I think I don't think there are any capabilities that were put on display there which are particular surprise,' he said. 'And we were also, as I say – being able to surveil that task group in the manner which we did also sends an important statement.' 'Great power contest' The Trump administration has been calling on Canberra to dramatically boost military spending amid concerns China could make a move on the democratically self-governed island of Taiwan by 2027. Aside from torching the decades-long status quo, a Chinese move on Taiwan would deal a major blow to the global supply of semiconductors – crucial components in modern tech – and massively disrupt vital trade routes. US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth earlier this month told Mr Marles that Australia's defence budget 'should' be 3.5 per cent of GDP 'as soon as possible' during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore. In a read out, the US Embassy said the two senior officials 'discussed aligning investment to the security environment in the Indo-Pacific, accelerating US force posture initiatives in Australia, advancing defence industrial base co-operation, and creating supply chain resilience'. Mr Hegseth also used his address at the conference to warn that Beijing posed an 'imminent' threat to the Indo-Pacific. 'Let me be clear, any attempt by Communist China to conquer Taiwan by force would result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world,' Mr Hegseth said. 'There's no reason to sugar-coat it. The threat China poses is real and it could be imminent. 'We hope not but certainly could be.' While the Albanese government has pushed back on boosting the ADF's budget, Mr Marles acknowledged at the Defending Australia Summit that China's military build-up was the 'most significant … that we have seen since the end of the Second World War'. 'And it shapes the region in which we live, and it means that Australia's geography today is more relevant to great power contest than it has been at any point since the end of the Second World War, arguably at any point in our history,' he said. 'In terms of our own defence capability needs, our risk is not so much the invasion of the continent. 'We are fortunate that we are an island nation surrounded by oceans, but on the other hand, we are deeply reliant on our sea lines of communication. 'The supply of the country – almost all of our liquid fuels are imported by sea but also through export revenues.' Mr Marles said Australia getting cut off from the world was 'our strategic risk'. 'It's the disruption of those sea lines,' he said. 'It's the coercion that could result because of the disruption of such sea routes. 'It is that, and the stability of the region in which we live. 'Because the defence of Australia is intimately connected with the peace and stability of the Pacific, the peace and stability of Southeast Asia, of Northeast Asia, of the Northeast Indian Ocean.' Originally published as Deputy PM refuses to say if Chinese warships targeted Australian cities
AllAfrica
28-02-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
China's live-fire flex shows Australia is no naval match
Over the past few days, the Australian media has been dominated by the activities of the Chinese navy's Task Group 107 as it has progressed south along the Australian coast and conducted a series of live-fire exercises. Much of the discussion has been rather breathless in nature, with accusations of 'gunboat diplomacy' being bandied around. The live-fire exercises have also dominated the Australian political debate. Amid all the accusations, the fact that these exercises are routine and entirely legal has gotten lost. The Australian government was correct to lodge a complaint with its Chinese counterpart when one of these exercises disrupted civilian aviation. But the overall response has been an extraordinary overreaction. There is no indication the Chinese vessels undertook any surface-to-air exercises, and it remains unclear whether the initial firings involved medium-caliber weapons or smaller arms. Either way, the facts suggest the disruption from the Chinese vessels was caused by inexperience or poor procedure, rather than some more nefarious purpose. This is not to suggest the People's Liberation Army-Navy's (PLA-N) deployment is unimportant, but as happens all too often, the Australian public debate is missing the wood for the trees. While a number of retired naval officers have publicly played down the significance of the live-fire exercises, these voices have generally been drowned out by the politicization of the issue. This highlights the failure of the Department of Defence to communicate effectively to the public. In other countries, including the United States, senior officers are given far more leeway to make public statements in matters within their purview. Had Vice Admiral Mark Hammond, the chief of navy, or Vice Admiral Justin Jones, the chief of Joint Operations, been empowered to explain how live-fire exercises are routine and are commonly carried out by Australian warships on deployment in our region, we may have avoided this unhelpful stoush. Maritime muscle The real significance of the activities of Task Group 107 is the way it has revealed the very different trajectories of the PLA-N and its Royal Australian Navy counterpart. The task group is made up of a Type 055 Renhai-class cruiser, a Type 054A Jiangkai II frigate and a Type 903 Fuchi-class replenishment ship. This is a powerful force that symbolizes the rapid development of the Chinese navy. The Renhai-class cruisers are acknowledged to be some of the most capable surface combatants currently in operation. They are 13,000 tonnes in size and are armed with 112 vertical-launch system (VLS) missile tubes. The Australian navy's premier surface warship, the Hobart-class destroyer, is just 7,000 tonnes and has 48 VLS missile cells. These are very crude metrics, but it would be foolhardy to assume Chinese technology is dramatically inferior to that of Australia or its allies. Similarly, China's Type 054A frigates are comparable to the general-purpose frigates that Australia is currently trying to acquire. Since 2020, China has commissioned eight Type 055 cruisers, adding to a fleet of more than 30 Type 52C and Type 52D destroyers and an even greater number of Type 054A frigates. This build-up vastly exceeds that of any other navy globally. Chinese shipyards are churning out the same combat power of the entire Royal Australian Navy every couple of years. Until recently, we have seen remarkably little of this naval capability in our region. A PLA-N task force operated off the northeast coast of Australia in 2022. Last year, a similar force was in the South Pacific. Most analysts expect to see more Chinese vessels in Australia's region over the coming years. One significant limitation on Chinese overseas deployments has been the PLA-N's small force of replenishment ships, which resupply naval vessels at sea. As the PLA-N's capabilities continue to grow and priorities shift, this appears to be changing. A recent US Department of Defence report noted that China was expected to build further replenishment ships 'to support its expanding long-duration combatant ship deployments.' Struggling to keep pace In response to the Chinese build-up, Australia is investing heavily to rebuild its navy. However, this process has been slow and beset by problems. Indeed, this week, the Defence Department revealed that the selection of the design for the new Australian frigate has been postponed into 2026. This leaves the navy with a limited fleet of just 10 surface combatants, the majority of which are small and ageing Anzac-class frigates. The arrival of the Chinese task group also sheds an unfavorable light on other recent decisions. The cuts to the Arafura-class offshore patrol vessel program make sense from some perspectives. But these ships would have provided additional options to persistently shadow foreign warships in Australian areas of interest. Similarly, the growing need of Australian ships to escort Chinese vessels in our region will place an increasing strain on Australian replenishment capability. At present, both of Australia's resupply ships are out of service. Additional capacity was also cut from the recent defence budget. The activities of the Chinese task force are not some aggressive move of gunboat diplomacy in our region. In many ways, this sensationalist messaging has distracted from a much bigger issue. The presence of Chinese naval ships in our region is going to be a fact of life. And due to failures from both sides of politics over the past 15 years, Australia's navy is ill-equipped to meet that challenge. Richard Dunley is senior lecturer in history and maritime strategy, UNSW Sydney This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
The Guardian
27-02-2025
- Politics
- The Guardian
Penny Wong accuses Coalition of ‘gunboat diplomacy' in Senate estimates as Chinese warships sail into Great Australian Bight
Three Chinese warships have sailed west into the Great Australian Bight, as Penny Wong accuses the Coalition of deliberately stirring controversy over live-fire drills that the flotilla conducted last week in the Tasman Sea. During a fractious Senate estimates hearing Thursday morning, the foreign affairs minister accused the shadow home affairs spokesperson, James Paterson, of ignoring national security in favour of spearheading a 'political attack' on the government. Wong condemned the politicisation of the issue domestically, saying some politicians 'seem to be insinuating' Australia was responsible for China not giving notice of its live fire drills last week. 'We now see gunboat diplomacy being added to the litany of war talk from the opposition,' she said. 'Such rhetoric does not make Australia safer.' But Paterson accused Anthony Albanese of contradicting the foreign affairs minister and defence officials, and questioned whether he was 'across the details'. 'It is in the public interest to understand why the prime minister has repeatedly inaccurately described the behaviour of a People's Liberation Army-Navy task group in our region.' Sign up for Guardian Australia's breaking news email Wong responded: 'You're not actually interested in the detail. If you were interested in how we are working to keep Australians safe, you would have asked for a briefing [sooner] than four days after the incident happened, but you're only interested in trying to invest in a political attack.' No warning was given ahead of time that the Chinese ships were live-firing in the sea on Friday; the first alert came from a Virgin flight that was warned by the Chinese ships over radio that a live-fire drill was already under way as it approached the ships' position. The plane was forced to divert its course mid-flight. The civilian pilot alerted AirServices Australia which issued a hazard alert over an 18-kilometre zone to a height of 45,000 feet. Over the weekend, 49 commercial flights were forced to divert around the Chinese vessels. Australia and New Zealand have raised the lack of warning with Chinese officials, saying it was disruptive to flights and potentially dangerous, while noting the drills were conducted in international waters and in accordance with international law. NZ navy frigate Te Kaha was monitoring the Chinese flotilla at the time of the first live-fire drill on Friday morning, but its alert did not reach Australia until an hour after the first warning from the civilian flight. In a statement, the NZ defence force said: 'HMNZS Te Kaha's primary focus when the live firing notification occurred was ensuring the safety of all vessels and aircraft in the area, including civilian ships and aircraft. 'Civilian aircraft and authorities were able to share information that enabled those aircraft to take appropriate action in response. 'The key point is that while these live fire activities are allowed under international law, the manner in which the task group notified its intentions did not meet best practice.' Sign up to Breaking News Australia Get the most important news as it breaks after newsletter promotion Australia has maintained that it is convention – also using the language of 'best practice' – to give between 12 and 48 hours' notice of a live-fire drill to allow for ships in the area to take evasive action, and for flights to be diverted ahead of time. Wong met with her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, in South Africa this week, and said she made it clear the conduct of the live-fire drills 'did not meet our expectations and was of deep concern'. New Zealand's foreign minister, Winston Peters, has also met with Wang. Currently in Beijing for bilateral talks, he told reporters he raised the lack of notice with his Chinese counterpart. 'I think it would be true to say that he took our concerns on board,' Peters said. 'This is a failure in [the NZ-China relationship] at this time, and we'd like to have it corrected in the future,' he said. 'That is something which we believe is under consideration.' On Thursday morning, the Chinese flotilla – the frigate Hengyang, the cruiser Zunyi, and a replenishment vessel Weishanhu – was about 500km west of Hobart, sailing into the Great Australian Bight. It is being monitored by two NZ navy ships and by P8-A Poseidon aircraft. The chief of the defence force, Adm David Johnston, said this week that it was possible that the three ships are accompanied by an undetected nuclear submarine. 'I don't know whether there is a submarine with them. It is possible: task groups occasionally do deploy with submarines, but not always. I can't be definitive on whether that's the case,' he told estimates on Wednesday.
