Lee Jae-myung foreign policy shift alienates allies, stirs rivals
with allies and raising questions about strategic priorities.
On June 6, South Korea observed Memorial Day – a solemn national holiday honoring those who died in military service, particularly during the Korean War (1950–1953). The day traditionally includes expressions of gratitude toward South Korean, US, and UN forces who defended the nation's democracy.
President Lee Jae-myung's first Memorial Day address, however, drew attention for what it
omitted. There was no mention of fallen Korean or allied troops. Nor was there any reference to North Korea or its military threat – a marked shift from former President Yoon Suk-yeol's speeches, which consistently warned against provocations from Pyongyang and emphasized defense readiness.
Instead, Lee focused his message on building a 'peaceful nation,' avoiding any acknowledgment of current North Korean threats.
Then, in a baffling departure from the day's solemn purpose, Lee used the occasion to
condemn Japanese colonial rule in the early 20th century. He vowed to eliminate a longstanding Korean saying: 'Three generations suffer for resisting colonial rule, while three generations thrive by collaborating with it' – a reference to the generational hardship faced by independence fighters, contrasted with the prosperity of collaborators.
'That expression must disappear forever,' Lee declared. 'And sacrifices made for the country must be properly rewarded.'
While Lee's message may appeal to national pride, his comments felt strikingly out of place. March 1, the anniversary of Korea's 1919 independence movement, is already a national
holiday devoted to honoring resistance against Japanese occupation. In fact, March 1 is one of only five designated national holidays in South Korea and carries even greater symbolic weight than Memorial Day. Whereas Memorial Day is solely a public holiday, March 1 holds dual status as both a national and public holiday. Prime Minister nominee Kim Min-seok. Photo: News1
Further underscoring his foreign policy shift, Lee appointed Kim Min-seok as prime minister. Kim is known for having been denied a US visa over his alleged involvement in the violent 1985 occupation of the American Cultural Center in Seoul – a student-led protest widely regarded as anti-American. (The US embassy later said the visa denial had been the result of administrative error.)
The appointment is widely seen as a clear signal that Lee's administration is willing to
deprioritize relations with the US in favor of a foreign policy more aligned with leftist views.
Lee's foreign policy leanings were already visible during the 2024 campaign. In March of that year, he said South Korea should not involve itself in the China–Taiwan conflict. 'Why does [the Yoon administration] harass China? Just say ' xie xie ' to China and ' xie xi e' to Taiwan,' he said, making a hand gesture of gratitude that drew laughter from the crowd.
His remarks were praised by Chinese commentators online, who called him 'the smartest and most intelligent politician' in South Korea and suggested his comments would help restore economic ties with China.
In South Korea, however, the response was more critical. The opposition People Power Party accused Lee of adopting a 'subservient' stance and failing to defend South Korea's national interests.
Lee's early actions signal a return to the leftist foreign policy framework of former presidentMoon Jae-in, characterized by engagement with North Korea and a more openly adversarial
stance toward both the US and Japan.
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