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Third World needs to ditch the 'Diplomacy of Non'

Third World needs to ditch the 'Diplomacy of Non'

AllAfrica07-05-2025
The first half of the Cold War period marked the emergence of an alternative diplomatic paradigm, one defined not by explicit ideological allegiance but by strategic detachment from the bipolar power struggle.
The principles of non-interference, non-intervention and non-alignment became the hallmarks of what could be termed the 'Diplomacy of Non.' However, this agenda was not a construct in itself but rather a counter-construct against Western hegemony and, more broadly, against any external imposition on newly independent states.
The roots of this approach were not solely based on anti-imperialist fears; they also reflected the sheer diversity of post-colonial nations, many of whom found it impossible to reach a consensus on political and economic models. Thereby, it received mutual recognition from democratic India to Communist China and many countries in between.
Despite the inherent differences among post-colonial states, this approach secured widespread acceptance. It provided a framework for newly established nations to navigate international affairs without being drawn into the Cold War binary.
The Bandung Conference of 1955 was a defining moment, where countries from Asia and Africa consolidated their commitment to non-alignment, reinforcing sovereignty as the bedrock of their international engagement. This consensus allowed weaker states to resist coercion, at least rhetorically, and to assert their right to self-determination in an era of geopolitical turbulence.
Yet, the most vocal champions of this vision, India and China, often contradicted their own advocacy. India, while positioning itself as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), engaged in interventions within its neighborhood, such as in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971 and Sri Lanka in the 1980s.
China, too, pursued interventionist policies, most notably in the Korean War and Vietnam. The contradiction lay in the fact that while both nations rhetorically upheld non-interference, they strategically wielded power in their respective regions.
The claims about neutrality could not survive their contradiction with realpolitik. Therefore, New Delhi itself aligned with the Soviet Union, while Beijing shifted towards Washington after a split with Moscow in the early 1970s.
By the second half of the Cold War, the general orientation of the post-colonial states that concealed their sympathy for the anti-Western Soviet Union by the rhetoric of non-alignment looked West. Suharto's Indonesia and Sadat's Egypt are clear examples.
These divisions undermined the 'third world' consensus, reaching a Western-dominated unipolar moment where most of the world embraced neo-liberal globalization, albeit with muted resentment.
On the other side, the victorious West exhausted its liberal rhetoric and took this acceptance as an unlimited mandate. The disillusionment with liberal interventionism grew in the aftermath of military invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Plus, the failure of the Arab uprisings and the strategic exposure faced later by successful democratic movements in Ukraine, Armenia, and lately Sudan revealed the vulnerabilities of any political transition.
Adding to that, the war in Gaza and the unshakable support from Biden's administration, along with the morally oriented European Union, eroded the credibility of liberal internationalism.
Eventually, the liberal consensus lost its relevance to realpolitik and its inherent contradictions, not to some authoritarian conspiracy, as Biden once claimed.
Even within the United States, segments of the political right lament the removal of figures like Iraq's Saddam Hussein and Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi with a growing appreciation for stability over chaos caused by elusive democratization.
Prominent MAGA figures today feel ideologically closer to Putin than the American liberal establishment. With Donald Trump openly dismissing democracy promotion and human rights as core tenets of US foreign policy, the moral justification for interference has faded.
His administration's rhetoric frequently ridicules concerns over women's rights in Afghanistan, political prisoners and other liberal values that once served as a cornerstone of Western diplomacy. This shift signals that the US is no longer willing to expend political or military capital on interventions cloaked in democratic ideals.
However, this does not imply that the US has adopted full military passivism. The ongoing military escalation in Yemen, along with provocative statements about taking over Canada and Greenland, suggests a turn towards a more overt realpolitik.
Rather than interventions framed in liberal discourse, future US military actions are likely to be driven by stark strategic calculations, untethered from normative justifications.
The US version of the 'Diplomacy of Non' will refrain from intervening, not generally but only in its global peers' sphere of influence. This can pave the way to better coexistence among great powers in a multipolar world, but it will not result in a 'global order.'
As global power dynamics shift, the 'Diplomacy of Non' cannot be sustainable. India has gradually positioned itself as a middle power, engaging in strategic partnerships and military alliances, while China has emerged as a global power with expanding economic and security footprints.
The very tenets of non-alignment that once shielded these nations from entanglement now appear less viable as they assume more proactive roles in global governance and regional security.
In this evolving environment, the old order has unraveled, dismantling both its fair and unfair rules. This presents both a challenge and an opportunity for emerging powers. The passive nature of the 'Diplomacy of Non', while historically useful, is no longer sufficient in an era of uncertainty.
A constructive agenda is needed, one that moves beyond mere resistance to Western dominance and towards proactive rule-making. This is now more urgent than ever since the West has lost its ideological consensus, which has been contorted enough that it is unlikely to come back soon.
If emerging powers wish to shape the new world order rather than merely react to it, they must lay down new rules that reflect contemporary geopolitical realities and push towards stability and development.
Islam Alhalawany is a Beijing-based international affairs researcher and policy consultant. He is a Chevening Scholar with a master's degree in development and international business from Queen Mary University of London.
Islam previously served as an assistant professor of practice and assistant dean for international collaborations at Jindal Global University in India. He worked as a senior research analyst at Standard & Poor's (S&P) in London and for the Egyptian government through research posts in Cabinet-affiliated think tanks.
His work has been published by renowned think tanks, including the Atlantic Council, The National Interest, the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore and IDSC.
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