
Japan's railgun strikes at China's hypersonic shadow
This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that Japan has fitted the test warship JS Asuka with a prototype electromagnetic railgun, marking a significant step toward deploying this advanced weapon system, as confirmed by recent online photos.
In June, observers spotted the railgun – similar to a previous land-based prototype developed by the Japanese Ministry of Defense's Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) – in port with its protective shroud removed, revealing internal work underway. Maritime testing is expected before the end of July.
Japan's progress contrasts with the US Navy's discontinued efforts in the early 2020s following sustained technical setbacks. The 6,200-ton Asuka accommodates containerized power systems to manage the energy demands of the railgun, which reportedly propels projectiles at Mach 6.5 using five megajoules of charge.
ATLA aims to reduce power requirements while improving barrel longevity beyond the current 120-round lifespan. The initiative aligns with future deployment plans aboard 13DDX destroyers and Maya-class vessels to bolster defenses against hypersonic threats.
Officials at the DSEI Japan 2025 defense and security equipment international forum cited continued collaboration with US counterparts and noted growing interest from France, Germany, China and Turkey in similar technologies.
Japan's railgun ambitions reflect a strategic pivot to cost-effective, rapid-fire capabilities amid intensifying regional competition.
Asia Times previously noted that the railgun's cost-effective ability to engage lower-tier threats helps reduce dependency on high-value interceptors, enabling sustained defenses against saturation missile attacks.
Underscoring China's growing missile capabilities, Maki Nakagawa notes in a March 2025 article for the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals (JINF) that China has expanded five conventional brigades equipped with DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and CJ-10/100 cruise missiles capable of striking Japan. Nakagawa highlights that the DF-17's unpredictable trajectory and the CJ-100's low-altitude, supersonic profile challenge Japan's ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems.
She adds that satellite imagery has confirmed construction at brigade-size facilities since 2018, with the 655th Brigade converted to a DF-17 unit in 2024. She states that the DF-26 intermediate-range missile, now fielded by four nuclear-capable brigades, has replaced older DF-21A units.
Japan currently employs a two-tier missile defense system, with Aegis-equipped destroyers providing midcourse interception and Patriot batteries handling terminal defense.
However, Kyodo News reported in October 2022 that Japan had only 60% of the necessary interceptor missiles for its Aegis and Patriot systems to counter threats from North Korea and China. To address the shortfall, Stars and Stripes reported in February 2025 that Japan purchased 150 SM-6 missiles worth USD 900 million from the US.
Naval News reported in April 2025 that Japan proposed co-producing SM-6 interceptors for Aegis destroyers during talks with the United States, expanding on an earlier agreement to co-produce Patriot PAC-3 missiles.
Yet, SM-6 production remains uncertain. Naval News reported in June 2025 that the US Navy's FY2026 missile procurement depended on passing a Republican-led reconciliation budget bill. The report said a funding shortfall in the proposed $817.4 million budget would trigger a contract breach, halting production after only 10 units. It added that disruption would jeopardize foreign orders from Japan, Australia, and South Korea. The bill, which had originated in the House of Representatives, passed the Senate on Tuesday.
The report warned that such a scenario would undercut allied deterrence and expose vulnerabilities in integrated air and missile defense architectures.
Former US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) director John Hill, cited by TWZ in February 2022, said that while the SM-6 is the only US interceptor theoretically capable of defeating hypersonic missiles, its capability remains 'nascent.'
Meanwhile, the successor Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) program faces delays. Defense News reported in March 2025 that the GPI, initially scheduled for deployment by 2032, now faces a three-year delay due to early program down-selection and reduced funding, pushing delivery to at least 2035.
Andreas Schmidt, writing in Military Review in 2024, added that most hypersonic threats fly at altitudes between 20 and 60 kilometers above the reach of traditional surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and below the coverage of exo-atmospheric interceptors like the SM-3. He argued that terminal defense systems such as Patriot are better suited for intercepting hypersonics in their terminal phase, where the weapons slow below Mach 5 and become more predictable.
However, even Patriot systems face production bottlenecks. Reuters reported in July 2024 that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) could take years to scale up PAC-3 production due to a shortage of missile seekers supplied by Boeing. Although the report said Boeing aimed to increase output by 30% by building new production lines in the US, those lines were not expected to be operational until 2027.
Guy McCardle noted in a November 2024 SOFREP article that the limited number of Patriot interceptors per battery and their high cost – $3.7 million per missile with a production lead time of nearly 20 months – constrain their operational use. He emphasized that PAC-3 missiles must be deployed strategically to maximize their effectiveness against saturation attacks.
Given the limitations of SM-6 and Patriot systems, Japan's railgun may alleviate concerns over magazine depth and cost. Japan's Aegis warships – including four Kongo-class, two Atago-class, and two Maya-class destroyers – each carries 90 to 96 vertical launch system (VLS) cells. Yet, these may prove insufficient during a saturation attack involving hypersonic, cruise, and ballistic missiles, alongside kamikaze drones.
A railgun, integrated onto these platforms or future Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEVs), could significantly enhance magazine capacity.
According to a 2021 conference paper by Shreyas Maitreya and others, a 450-millimeter railgun projectile costs around $25,000, compared with missiles priced between $500,000 and $1.5 million. Unlike missiles, they note railgun rounds are inert and pose no risk of accidental detonation, easing transport and storage constraints.
Nevertheless, ATLA equipment policy division principal director Kazumi Ito acknowledged in a June 2025 National Defense Magazine article that the railgun project still faces considerable technical challenges. In the same piece, Stew Magnuson notes unresolved issues including barrel wear, energy supply, heat dissipation and development of a high-speed targeting system.
Despite these hurdles, Japan's push to operationalize railgun technology reflects a pragmatic response to a regional threat environment shaped by hypersonic proliferation, interceptor shortages and constrained missile defense capacity.
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AllAfrica
2 days ago
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Japan's railgun strikes at China's hypersonic shadow
Japan's prototype ship-mounted railgun marks a bold step toward fast, affordable missile defense as it works to fill crucial gaps revealed by China's hypersonic weapons and limited interceptor supplies. This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that Japan has fitted the test warship JS Asuka with a prototype electromagnetic railgun, marking a significant step toward deploying this advanced weapon system, as confirmed by recent online photos. In June, observers spotted the railgun – similar to a previous land-based prototype developed by the Japanese Ministry of Defense's Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) – in port with its protective shroud removed, revealing internal work underway. Maritime testing is expected before the end of July. Japan's progress contrasts with the US Navy's discontinued efforts in the early 2020s following sustained technical setbacks. The 6,200-ton Asuka accommodates containerized power systems to manage the energy demands of the railgun, which reportedly propels projectiles at Mach 6.5 using five megajoules of charge. ATLA aims to reduce power requirements while improving barrel longevity beyond the current 120-round lifespan. The initiative aligns with future deployment plans aboard 13DDX destroyers and Maya-class vessels to bolster defenses against hypersonic threats. Officials at the DSEI Japan 2025 defense and security equipment international forum cited continued collaboration with US counterparts and noted growing interest from France, Germany, China and Turkey in similar technologies. Japan's railgun ambitions reflect a strategic pivot to cost-effective, rapid-fire capabilities amid intensifying regional competition. Asia Times previously noted that the railgun's cost-effective ability to engage lower-tier threats helps reduce dependency on high-value interceptors, enabling sustained defenses against saturation missile attacks. Underscoring China's growing missile capabilities, Maki Nakagawa notes in a March 2025 article for the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals (JINF) that China has expanded five conventional brigades equipped with DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and CJ-10/100 cruise missiles capable of striking Japan. Nakagawa highlights that the DF-17's unpredictable trajectory and the CJ-100's low-altitude, supersonic profile challenge Japan's ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. She adds that satellite imagery has confirmed construction at brigade-size facilities since 2018, with the 655th Brigade converted to a DF-17 unit in 2024. She states that the DF-26 intermediate-range missile, now fielded by four nuclear-capable brigades, has replaced older DF-21A units. Japan currently employs a two-tier missile defense system, with Aegis-equipped destroyers providing midcourse interception and Patriot batteries handling terminal defense. However, Kyodo News reported in October 2022 that Japan had only 60% of the necessary interceptor missiles for its Aegis and Patriot systems to counter threats from North Korea and China. To address the shortfall, Stars and Stripes reported in February 2025 that Japan purchased 150 SM-6 missiles worth USD 900 million from the US. Naval News reported in April 2025 that Japan proposed co-producing SM-6 interceptors for Aegis destroyers during talks with the United States, expanding on an earlier agreement to co-produce Patriot PAC-3 missiles. Yet, SM-6 production remains uncertain. Naval News reported in June 2025 that the US Navy's FY2026 missile procurement depended on passing a Republican-led reconciliation budget bill. The report said a funding shortfall in the proposed $817.4 million budget would trigger a contract breach, halting production after only 10 units. It added that disruption would jeopardize foreign orders from Japan, Australia, and South Korea. The bill, which had originated in the House of Representatives, passed the Senate on Tuesday. The report warned that such a scenario would undercut allied deterrence and expose vulnerabilities in integrated air and missile defense architectures. Former US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) director John Hill, cited by TWZ in February 2022, said that while the SM-6 is the only US interceptor theoretically capable of defeating hypersonic missiles, its capability remains 'nascent.' Meanwhile, the successor Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) program faces delays. Defense News reported in March 2025 that the GPI, initially scheduled for deployment by 2032, now faces a three-year delay due to early program down-selection and reduced funding, pushing delivery to at least 2035. Andreas Schmidt, writing in Military Review in 2024, added that most hypersonic threats fly at altitudes between 20 and 60 kilometers above the reach of traditional surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and below the coverage of exo-atmospheric interceptors like the SM-3. He argued that terminal defense systems such as Patriot are better suited for intercepting hypersonics in their terminal phase, where the weapons slow below Mach 5 and become more predictable. However, even Patriot systems face production bottlenecks. Reuters reported in July 2024 that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) could take years to scale up PAC-3 production due to a shortage of missile seekers supplied by Boeing. Although the report said Boeing aimed to increase output by 30% by building new production lines in the US, those lines were not expected to be operational until 2027. Guy McCardle noted in a November 2024 SOFREP article that the limited number of Patriot interceptors per battery and their high cost – $3.7 million per missile with a production lead time of nearly 20 months – constrain their operational use. He emphasized that PAC-3 missiles must be deployed strategically to maximize their effectiveness against saturation attacks. Given the limitations of SM-6 and Patriot systems, Japan's railgun may alleviate concerns over magazine depth and cost. Japan's Aegis warships – including four Kongo-class, two Atago-class, and two Maya-class destroyers – each carries 90 to 96 vertical launch system (VLS) cells. Yet, these may prove insufficient during a saturation attack involving hypersonic, cruise, and ballistic missiles, alongside kamikaze drones. A railgun, integrated onto these platforms or future Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEVs), could significantly enhance magazine capacity. According to a 2021 conference paper by Shreyas Maitreya and others, a 450-millimeter railgun projectile costs around $25,000, compared with missiles priced between $500,000 and $1.5 million. Unlike missiles, they note railgun rounds are inert and pose no risk of accidental detonation, easing transport and storage constraints. Nevertheless, ATLA equipment policy division principal director Kazumi Ito acknowledged in a June 2025 National Defense Magazine article that the railgun project still faces considerable technical challenges. In the same piece, Stew Magnuson notes unresolved issues including barrel wear, energy supply, heat dissipation and development of a high-speed targeting system. Despite these hurdles, Japan's push to operationalize railgun technology reflects a pragmatic response to a regional threat environment shaped by hypersonic proliferation, interceptor shortages and constrained missile defense capacity.


AllAfrica
4 days ago
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US builds next-generation bunker buster with China in mind
After blasting Iran's nuke bunkers with 13-ton bombs, the US is racing to build a smarter, sleeker penetrator for the next war, possibly with China. This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that in the wake of the US Air Force's first combat use of the 13,000-kilogram GBU-57/B massive ordnance penetrator during the June strikes on Iran's Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities under Operation Midnight Hammer, the US Department of Defense has accelerated efforts to develop a successor: the next generation penetrator (NGP). The strikes, which involved 14 MOPs delivered exclusively by B-2 bombers, underscored both the weapon's precision and its operational limitations, particularly in light of the B-21 Raider's reduced payload capacity. A February 2024 US Air Force contracting notice outlines NGP requirements, including sub-9,900-kilogram warheads capable of precision strikes with a circular error probable of within 2.2 meters. Notably, the NGP may feature standoff capability via propulsion systems, improved void-sensing or embedded fuzing technologies, and enhanced or scalable terminal effects. The push for a successor, spurred by lessons from past MOP development and growing global interest in deeply buried facilities, targets adversaries beyond Iran, including North Korea, China, and Russia. The US Air Force aims to receive initial prototypes within two years of contract award, though a complete operational deployment timeline remains unspecified, according to the same February 2024 USAF notice. The future NGP is likely to form part of the Long Range Strike system, alongside platforms like the B-21 and the AGM-181A Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missile, making it a critical asset for penetrating hardened targets. This need to address hardened targets more effectively, highlighted by possible limitations in the Iran strikes, may have prompted the US to fast-track NGP development, especially with peer adversaries like China in mind. Multiple media outlets cited a leaked US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report stating that US strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities failed to destroy the core of the program and merely set it back by months. Du Wenlong noted in the South China Morning Post that Iran's Fordow site lies 80 meters underground, 30 meters deeper than the GBU-57's stated penetration capability, raising doubts as to whether the strike hit critical infrastructure. Song Zhongping said in the same article that although the US dropped 14 bombs, satellite imagery showed six craters, suggesting two bombs may have been aimed at each target, possibly to reinforce penetration. He added that while some infrastructure may have been damaged, complete elimination is implausible. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth downplayed the DIA report's findings, calling them 'preliminary,' and noting that the report itself states battle damage assessment takes weeks to complete. Hegseth said the report was not coordinated with the intelligence community and suffers from low confidence due to information gaps. These Iranian lessons could foreshadow far more complex strike dilemmas in a potential conflict with China. In a November 2024 RAND report, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and others at RAND noted that if initial US strikes on China's maritime and surface assets fail, the US may need to launch long-range conventional attacks against China's buried inland facilities. Beauchamp-Mustafaga and others wrote that command-and-control nodes and missile storage sites are essential to sustaining People's Liberation Army (PLA) operations. Satellite imagery cited by Newsweek in May 2025 shows a 1,500-acre site dubbed 'Beijing Military City' near Qinglonghu, southwest of the capital, with deep pits believed to house hardened bunkers capable of sheltering China's leadership in a nuclear war. Hans Kristensen and others wrote in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in March 2025 that China built over 320 underground missile silos between 2021 and 2025 at Yumen in Gansu, Hami in Xinjiang, and Ordos in Inner Mongolia, significantly expanding its nuclear deterrent capabilities. They stated these silos, with standardized layouts, are designed for solid-fuel DF-41 ICBMs with potential launch-on-warning capability, supported by hardened command infrastructure and possibly nearby underground storage. They also noted continued DF-5B silo construction, reinforcing survivability through dual platforms. Furthermore, Greg Weaver argued in an April 2025 Atlantic Council report that standoff capability is essential for enhancing US aircraft survivability when striking mainland China. He noted that China's advanced air defenses and long-range missiles pose serious threats to forward-deployed US aircraft, making it vital to use standoff delivery systems that launch from outside the range of Chinese defenses. Yet even with advanced penetrators and standoff options, strikes on the Chinese mainland carry severe risks. In a 2021 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs article, Brian McLean argued that while some strategists believe China can differentiate between conventional and nuclear attacks, hitting leadership bunkers or missile forces might be mistaken for a decapitation or disarmament attempt. He warned that even conventional strikes affecting China's nuclear posture or regime stability could provoke a nuclear response, especially if China perceives its second-strike capability as compromised. As the US weighs options beyond tactical reach, the broader question of deterrence comes into play. McLean said the best way to avoid escalation may be a strategy of deterrence by denial, convincing China not to attack Taiwan in the first place. However, Chen Xi wrote in a September 2022 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that deterrence by denial hinges on forward-deployed forces and regional basing, both of which are increasingly vulnerable to China's growing missile capabilities and anti-access/area denial systems. Chen cautioned that this posture could fuel perceptions of encirclement or US intent to strike first, raising escalation risks. He also pointed to practical limitations, including the difficulty of dispersing assets across allied territories, uncertain host-nation support, and ambiguous defense commitments that may weaken US credibility.


AllAfrica
23-06-2025
- AllAfrica
North Korea overtakes Iran as Russia's partner of choice
North Korea is no longer just supplying Russia with manpower and missiles. It is embedding itself deep within Russia's war economy, sending thousands of workers to the heart of its drone industry and reshaping the balance of power in Eurasia. This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that 25,000 North Korean workers are being sent to Russia's Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan to assist with the manufacturing of Shahed drones, part of a deal reportedly brokered during Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu's visit to Pyongyang. Satellite imagery reveals new dormitory construction at the Alabuga site, indicating Russia's intention to increase drone production from 2,000 to 5,000 units per month. Ukrainian intelligence chief Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov confirmed this development, citing the growing cooperation between Russia and North Korea and warning of the strategic implications for both Ukraine and South Korea. He added that some North Korean workers may be contracted into the Russian defense service. The Alabuga plant, repeatedly targeted by Ukrainian strikes, remains a critical node in Russia's standoff strike capability, particularly amid high attrition from its war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia is reportedly assisting North Korea in enhancing the accuracy of KN-23 missiles, long-range air-to-air munitions, and submarine-launched systems. The transfer of labor and technology underscores tightening bilateral military ties as both regimes confront isolation and intensifying global scrutiny. Russia may be shifting its partnership of convenience from Iran to North Korea. As Iran falters under Israeli and US airstrikes and unfulfilled Russian arms deals, North Korea pulls ahead, embedding itself in Russia's war machine and Far Eastern strategy. While Russia and Iran have a long history of distrust and conflict, their mutual disdain for the Western-dominated international order, autocratic governments and heavily sanctioned economies in the aftermath of the former's invasion of Ukraine has placed them in the same boat. Iran has sought to make itself indispensable to Russia's war effort by supplying Shahed drones, tactical gear, and artillery in exchange for revenue and to avoid diplomatic isolation. It may have also sought Russian investment in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Yet as Russia transitioned to a war economy and began producing Shahed drones locally, Iran's leverage may have declined, undercutting the latter's efforts to extract security guarantees or financial backing from the former. Furthermore, while Iran has consistently requested advanced Russian equipment, such as Su-35 fighter jets, these deliveries have not yet materialized, as Russia may need those fighters more urgently in its conflict with Ukraine. In October 2024, Israel destroyed Iran's prized S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers, leaving the latter exposed to current air attacks. While Iran has downplayed the need to purchase the more advanced S-400 from Russia, citing the superior capabilities of its domestic systems, this could be a cover-up for Russia's refusal to provide such systems for the same reason it has withheld Su-35 fighters. However, Israeli strikes on Iran present mixed implications for Russia. For one, while such strikes may have undermined Russia as a credible partner, strikes on Iranian oil and gas infrastructure may have eliminated Iran as a competitor to Russian energy exports. Yet, these gains may be short-lived. Israel admits that its strikes are not sufficient to destroy Iran's nuclear program and that the goal is to pressure Iran back into negotiations. Furthermore, it is unknown how Iran would respond in the aftermath. A nuclear-armed Iran may ultimately undermine Russia's influence. Russia may have less leverage over a nuclear-armed Iran, potentially triggering a Middle East nuclear arms race, with Saudi Arabia stressing that it will develop nuclear weapons if Iran gets the bomb. Despite that possible long-term setback, Israeli strikes may distract the US from Ukraine, drawing attention and resources away from confronting Russia. It also allows Russia to point out US 'double standards,' with the US distancing itself from Israeli combat operations in Gaza while supporting Israeli strikes on Iran that have caused civilian casualties. As Iran buckles under sustained Israeli and now US strikes, North Korea is stepping into the breach, presenting an entirely different set of nuances. North Korea and Russia share deep ties dating back to the Korean War, and the former's nuclear arsenal arguably makes it a safer long-term investment for the latter. North Korea has deepened its role in Russia's war effort, providing matériel and manpower while reaping combat insights, hard currency, and access to advanced systems. North Korea's interest in supporting Russia in Ukraine may be to reduce its overdependence on China, its main political and economic lifeline, to maintain strategic autonomy and regime survival. These aims may clash with China's goal of maintaining stability in the Korean Peninsula. Arguably, North Korean missile tests pose a threat to China just as much as they are to Japan and South Korea, prompting China to threaten to scale down political and economic ties with North Korea. To those ends, North Korea is actively developing nuclear delivery systems with possible Russian assistance, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that could reach the US mainland and nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) that ensure a second-strike capability. While a belligerent North Korea serves China and Russia's mutual interest of undermining the Western-dominated international order, it remains uncertain whether this wartime alignment will evolve into a lasting partnership once the guns fall silent in Ukraine. Despite Russia being heavily sanctioned, it still seeks to resume trade with the US, raising doubts about the long-term growth of Russia-North Korea relations. However, beyond the Russia-Ukraine War, Russia may use North Korea as leverage against China's growing presence, economic influence, and territorial ambitions in the Russian Far East, strengthening economic, political, and military ties to form a buffer state. In turn, North Korea maintains its autonomy by balancing ties between Russia and China, with its nuclear arsenal providing a strategic backstop against regime change. With Iran sidelined and China's shadow growing, North Korea is fast becoming Russia's most dangerous and dependable ally, fueling its war machine, fortifying its eastern flank, and tilting Eurasia's strategic balance in Russia's favor.