Unlike Congress, BJP has come down hard on terror

Indian Express

a day ago

Vivek Katju's jibe at Union minister Hardeep S Puri ('Mapping continuity and a shift', IE, June 21) is unbecoming of a seasoned diplomat and gratuitously seeks mischief. Katju twisted and misinterpreted Puri's use of the phrase 'theatre of the absurd'.
Puri, when asked about Operation Sindoor and India's bid to diplomatically isolate Pakistan in the aftermath of Pahalgam, said: 'It is a different ballgame now… Earlier, you allowed Pakistan to use terror as an instrument of state policy… You would take whatever they said at face value and have negotiations with them … The pre-Modi era of dealing with Pakistan was a theatre of the absurd. After the 26/11 (Mumbai attacks), did you retaliate? What did you do? The language used then was 'thoda sa hot pursuit ho gaya'. This time, it was not Balakot and just one strike. We went hundreds of kilometres inside and hit terror infrastructure… The beauty of the current situation lies in the message. In 22 minutes, we gave a befitting response.'
It is clear from context that Puri was referring to the widely held view that the UPA government's response to terrorist attacks in the 2000s, particularly 26/11, was weak to the point of being farcical. Katju's claim that Prime Minister Narendra Modi's earlier outreach to Pakistan was also a 'theatre of the absurd' is disingenuous and superficial. The political contexts are too far apart. It is also disingenuous to suggest that efforts to build bridges with Pakistan in the past, irrespective of the political party in power, can be treated alike.
It was in poor taste to suggest that an accomplished diplomat's remarks are careless merely because he is now a politician. To provide some much-needed context, 'Puri the politician' — to borrow Katju's words — has publicly stated that he joined the BJP because he agreed with its national security views.
Puri, before he was a minister, served in the IFS from 1974 to 2013, mostly under Congress-led governments. It is no secret that India's response to terrorism during that period was inadequate. Many civil servants, including myself, felt that India's handling of terrorism in the 1990s and 2000s — culminating in the horror of 26/11 — was at best insufficient, at worst an abdication of duty. The arguments for 'strategic restraint' were difficult to digest, not only for Puri but for many of us.
'Puri the politician' has emerged from the experiences of 'Puri the diplomat', who witnessed firsthand India's failure to prevent terror attacks or deter asymmetric warfare. A stellar professional, Puri defended India's interests and extracted what space he could for a strategically restrained India. But that does not mean he must endorse the defensive postures that defined that era.
Until 26/11, under the UPA, India faced at least seven major terror attacks: Delhi (October 2005 and September 2008), Mumbai (July 2006), Samjhauta Express (February 2007), Hyderabad (August 2007), Jaipur (May 2008), and Ahmedabad (July 2008). These were linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and ISI-backed groups, striking at the heart of our cities. More than 2,000 citizens were killed between 2005 and 2008 due to cross-border terrorism.
The 26/11 attacks shattered India's image as a secure nation. The response — widely documented — was incoherent. The then cabinet secretary, in his book, cited a fragmented security apparatus that failed to respond coherently. The then foreign secretary and later national security adviser concluded after 'sober reflection' that 'more was to be gained from not attacking Pakistan than from attacking it'. Yet, it is hard to see what was gained, or to credibly argue that any favourable developments were contingent on it.
To those on the outside, India appeared to be a soft state. Let us also not forget that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's foolhardy joint statement with then Pakistan prime minister Yusuf Raza Gilani at Sharm el-Sheikh in 2009 effectively shifted the Balochistan issue from a problem of Pakistan's own making to one allegedly fuelled by India in international eyes. It was against this litany of missteps that the minister underscored the Modi government's contrasting approach.
PM Modi came to office in 2014 with a vision of integrating South Asia into a cooperative space where trade was enhanced and regional problems were resolved collectively. This aligned with the 'Neighbourhood First' policy introduced by the UPA in 2008, demonstrating foreign policy continuity — a notable tradition in Indian statecraft. The aim was peace through reduced cross-border terror. The attempts to build ties with Pakistan stemmed from this logic. However, the Pathankot attack in January 2016 was the final straw, hardening the PM's stance on Pakistan. (It is also worth noting that the attack was planned before Modi's surprise trip to Pakistan — thus undermining the ironic significance that Katju wishes to confer on the trip.)
Since then, PM Modi's shift from conciliation to decisive action has been clear. The scale and publicity of the 2016 surgical strikes, the 2019 Balakot airstrike after Pulwama, and now the simultaneous destruction of terror targets deep inside Pakistan after Pahalgam all underline this transformation. Each action was measured, non-escalatory, and focused on terrorist infrastructure, while signalling growing costs to Pakistan's establishment. India has evolved from a nation fearful of unattended bags in public places to one where susceptible youth think twice before aligning with extremist outfits.
National security crises are ultimately a test of political mettle. Prime Minister Modi's actions show a leader making rational, resolute decisions in critical national security moments — unlike the UPA era, marked by weakness and incoherence. Puri's interview, in my view, was candid, engaging, and characteristically direct. To attempt to generate controversy here is to exaggerate beyond reason.
The writer is a former diplomat