Not the right path to peace

Bangkok Post

5 hours ago

Not the right path to peace
Thai-Cambodian border tensions are close to boiling point after talks between the two sides failed to overcome the deep distrust between them, according to critics.
Despite Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra hailing a recent Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) meeting in Phnom Penh to defuse border tensions a success, critics insist the talks lacked what was needed for achieving a sustained peace.
The agenda was devoid of the central objective -- to try and resolve the Chong Bok dispute, along with three other border spats at the three ancient temple complexes of Ta Muen Thom, Ta Muen Toch, and Ta Kwai.
This is because Cambodia had announced before the JBC meeting that it would proceed with its threat to take the Chong Bok and three other disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, despite Thailand not accepting the court's jurisdiction.
It brought into question the effectiveness of the JBC as a primary bilateral mechanism for addressing technical and international legal matters related to border demarcation.
The doubt was raised as former foreign minister Surakiart Sathirathai slammed Cambodia for stoking tensions along the border to divert attention away from its own internal problems and exploit Thailand's political weakness.
"Cambodia always does this when it has internal problems -- economic trouble or upcoming elections. They stir up border tensions to create a nationalist distraction," he said.
He cited the dispute over the Preah Vihear temple area, where clashes between Thailand and Cambodia took place more than a decade ago. He warned that the current border row may follow the same trajectory, leading to an armed confrontation and international legal challenges.
The JBC session ended with the Senate vowing to convene a general debate to grill the government over its handling of the border issue.
Panitan Wattanayagorn, a noted international relations scholar, said three decades have passed since Thailand and Cambodia began efforts to resolve their recurring border tensions through various joint committees -- namely, the JBC, General Border Committee (GBC), and Regional Border Committee (RBC).
"Yet, peace remains elusive," he said in a Facebook post, with sporadic flare-ups and even military clashes resulting in casualties, closed border checkpoints, and diplomatic breakdowns.
Since 1995, both countries have tried to address border disputes via these multilateral platforms, but with mixed results. The JBC, established in 1997, was meant to delineate land boundaries. Meanwhile, the GBC and RBC, driven by military and defence ministries, were tasked with ensuring security and de-escalation.
However, despite these mechanisms, armed conflicts have erupted multiple times -- claiming hundreds of lives and prompting the burning of the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh in 2003. These incidents reflect a volatile and fragile bilateral relationship even after 75 years of formal diplomacy.
In 2000, both sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU 43) to facilitate joint boundary surveys. Critically, Clause 5 stipulated that neither party should unilaterally alter the environment in disputed border zones. However, this provision has reportedly been violated hundreds of times -- in nearly 30 locations -- particularly in military zones under Thailand's First and Second Army Regions.
Many of these incidents are perceived by Thai authorities as Cambodian encroachments, raising concerns about Thailand's sovereignty and long-term national security.
On June 14, Thailand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs convened a JBC meeting, emphasising dialogue to prevent future conflicts -- such as the recent May 28 skirmish.
However, critics argue that the JBC's mandate is too narrow and ill-suited for managing real-time military escalations or MOU violations. Unlike the JBC, the GBC and RBC have access to more precise military intelligence and classified political information that could highlight Cambodian incursions. But much of this information remains undisclosed due to its sensitive nature, especially in international arenas.
Cambodia's refusal to discuss these contested zones during the June 14 JBC meeting signals strategic deflection, according to Mr Panitan. Phnom Penh has instead pressed ahead with taking the matter to the ICJ, knowing full well Thailand does not recognise the court's jurisdiction on this issue.
Even if Thailand were to shift its stance, the ICJ lacks the authority to make definitive rulings on territorial ownership and would likely redirect both nations back to bilateral negotiations -- much like the 1962 ruling on the Preah Vihear temple.
Mr Panitan said that during the JBC meeting, the top priority should have been to persuade Cambodia to re-engage in the existing conflict-resolution framework -- respecting previously agreed rules and returning to the negotiating table.
This requires both positive and negative incentives. Cambodia must be discouraged from using force or leveraging international sympathies to isolate Thailand diplomatically. Simultaneously, incentives should make it more attractive for Cambodia to pursue peaceful negotiation.
The security expert also stressed a balanced strategy, which lies in applying both "carrots" (rewards) and "sticks" (pressure).
He added that joint drills should be conducted to demonstrate preparedness while seeking military alliances for modern weaponry and ammunition in case of escalation.
Thailand must proactively engage with the UN, Asean, and other stakeholders to counteract Cambodian lobbying and assert its position with clarity and confidence.
On economic levers, Mr Panitan said the temporary closure of informal or secondary border crossings could apply economic pressure. Many of these crossings are critical for Cambodian access to Thai markets and supplies. However, the Thai government must mitigate impacts on local businesses and civilians.
At the same time, MOU 43 should be amended or replaced altogether to reflect current realities and close loopholes that allow repeated violations.
"Importantly, Thailand must not be outmanoeuvred by Cambodia or domestic actors with shortsighted agendas. National leadership across all sectors must be firm yet diplomatic, peace-loving but not passive, and decisive when necessary," he said.
Mr Panitan concluded that the JBC, GBC, and RBC could remain part of the diplomatic architecture, but they are not the full answer. Only a mix of real strategic commitment, national unity, intelligent diplomacy, and carefully calibrated incentives will prevent the next border conflict -- and build a lasting peace between Thailand and Cambodia.
Backs are against the wall
The recent withdrawal of the Bhumjaithai Party from the coalition government has thrust the Paetongtarn Shinawatra administration into a precarious situation.
From a solid coalition with 332 House seats, the Pheu Thai Party-led government has suddenly become one with a slim majority. With Bhumjaithai's 69 seats gone, the government now commands just 261 votes in the 495-member House of Representatives -- a majority of about 13.
This raises serious questions about the government's stability, especially since public trust continues to erode following the controversial leaked phone call between Ms Paetongtarn and Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen.
The audio, widely shared online, has Ms Paetongtarn asking Hun Sen for help to stabilise her position as PM. In return, she was heard offering him anything he wanted.
Rather than stepping down or calling an election, Ms Paetongtarn has decided to stay in power by reshuffling the cabinet among parties left in the coalition. The eight ministerial positions vacated by Bhumjaithai will be divided among the remaining coalition partners.
The move has put the government into political survival mode, and Ms Paetongtarn and her government will find it harder to stay in power, according to Olarn Thinbangtieo, deputy dean of Burapha University's political science and law faculty.
When people lose trust in the prime minister, she loses the legitimacy to stay in office. She should have shown responsibility instead of reallocating the eight posts and turning a deaf ear to public criticism, he said.
Critics are set to hold a mass protest today to demand Ms Paetongtarn's resignation over the leaked audio clip and her handling of the ongoing border conflict with Cambodia.
From Pheu Thai's perspective, it would not be in the party's best interests if Ms Paetongtarn stepped down now. So the party is trying to stabilise the government by reallocating the vacant posts to strengthen its position, according to Mr Olarn.
However, the analyst said it is likely to prolong the government's term for only a little while and Ms Paetongtarn is expected to face several legal actions stemming from mismanagement of national affairs and the audio leak, which could see her suspended from performing her duties, he said.
Mr Olarn said Pheu Thai's loss may be the United Thai Nation (UTN) Party's gain, and this could be why the now second-biggest party in the coalition has chosen to stay put.
Some observers believe that UTN leader, Pirapan Salirathavibhaga, is waiting for an opportunity if a political accident befalls Pheu Thai.
In the event Ms Paetongtarn quits as prime minister, Mr Pirapan, who is a prime ministerial candidate, has a chance of replacing her should the UTN be able to mobilise sufficient support in parliament.
However, as things stand, the UTN's decision to support Ms Paetongtarn for now could also fuel public discontent and trigger widespread protests, he said.
Another reason why Pheu Thai needs to stay in power is that it is determined to go after its major rival, Bhumjaithai, and is believed to be seeking Bhumjaithai's dissolution, said the analyst.
Bhumjaithai faces allegations of colluding to manipulate the outcome of last year's Senate election, which is seen as a breach of democratic principles and justifies party disbandment.
A group of senators, or the "blue group" which is said to have close ties with Bhumjaithai, is also targeting Ms Paetongtarn by petitioning the Constitutional Court to rule whether she should be removed from office based on ethical violations related to the Hun Sen phone call.
"If Ms Paetongtarn ends up like former prime minister Srettha Thavisin, she may be forced to step aside and allow Mr Pirapan to replace her while Pheu Thai stays in power and goes after Bhumjaithai," Mr Olarn said.
Mr Srettha was removed by the Constitutional Court last year over his controversial appointment of Pichit Chuenban to the cabinet. Pichit was convicted of contempt of court for attempting to bribe Supreme Court officials in 2008 while representing former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in a controversial land case. The law forbids the appointment of cabinet ministers with a criminal background. A prime minister who approves such appointments is liable for legal action for an ethical violation.
Both Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai are in hot water, and which party survives may depend on which side the old power clique chooses to support, he said.
It is believed a House dissolution is not an option because a fresh election could benefit the main opposition People's Party (PP), which will likely gain more seats than before. It is something the old guard does not want to see happen.
"But staying in power will get harder by the day. The Paetongtarn administration may not last beyond the end of the year ... to ensure that Bhumjaithai is dissolved and Pheu Thai becomes the only choice of the old power block," he said.