Hindutva International: The Globalization of Hindu Politics Outside India
This month's episode of Beyond the Indus explores the rise of Hindu politics outside India, and how it is changing the dynamic of Hindu communities and diaspora worldwide. We speak to Biswas Baral, editor of The Kathmandu Post, on the revival of Hindu politics in Nepal and its impact on the pro-monarchy restoration movement. Then Dr. Edward Anderson, author of the book 'Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Diaspora,' charts the origins and evolution of organized Hindutva in the United Kingdom, its links to the RSS and the impact of Narendra Modi's BJP on the Indian diaspora.
For more in-depth analysis on South Asia, you can subscribe to the Beyond the Indus podcast on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or Google Podcasts.
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The Diplomat
17 hours ago
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Jaishankar's Singapore Visit: An Opportunity to Take Stock of India-Singapore Ties
Jaishankar's visit not only provided an opportunity to follow up on the action plan developed earlier but also to deliberate upon new avenues of cooperation between the two nations. As India and Singapore commemorate 60 years of their diplomatic relationship and 10 years of strategic partnership, Dr. S. Jaishankar, India's external affairs minister, paid a visit to the Lion City. Jaishankar's short but timely visit should be seen in continuation with Singaporean President Tharman Shanmugaratnam's five-day visit to India in mid-January 2025. During Tharman's visit, the two countries worked toward developing an action plan this year, as suggested by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his last visit to Singapore in September 2024, when India and Singapore elevated their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Jaishankar's visit not only provided an opportunity to follow up on the action plan developed earlier but also to deliberate upon new avenues of cooperation between the two nations, considering the challenges posed by U.S. President Donald Trump's tariff policies and the heightened tensions between the United States and China over semiconductors and critical minerals. Both India and Singapore are facing Trump's tariffs, but their situation is considered much better than peers such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea. The significance of the visit also lies in the fact that it will allow Singapore to find ways in which India can still work with ASEAN on the free trade agreement (FTA) front. According to the reports, India, unhappy with the sluggish pace of the review of the India-ASEAN FTA and a consistent negative balance of trade, is considering terminating the trade deal, which came into force in 2010. Singapore, as India's topmost trading partner in the ASEAN region and a hub for Indian services sector trade in the region, would want India to stick to the FTA. However, Singapore will also seek to explore avenues of enhancing bilateral trade and investment cooperation should India decide to walk out of the free trade agreement. Beyond a robust trade in goods, India and Singapore are working together in new areas such as semiconductors, digital cooperation, healthcare education, skill development, petrochemicals, sustainability, and maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) in the aerospace sector. Singapore's investment in India is a win-win scenario for both. While India is striving toward becoming a 'Vikshit Bharat' by 2047, its current infrastructural gap, high operational costs, land acquisition, and lack of skilled labor remain the hurdles that a developed country like Singapore can help it cross. Similarly, despite having all the above-mentioned resources, Singapore has a high cost of labor and services. As a result, investors in Singapore are looking abroad to invest. While China heavily dominates the Southeast Asian economy and there is high competition among ASEAN countries, given India's close ties with Singapore and cost-effective labor and service, New Delhi presents a viable option to Singapore. India desires to become a semiconductor hub. However, it currently faces a shortage of resources and professionals across the various verticals of the industry. The India Electronics and Semiconductor Association (IESA) had plans to send some of its workforce to Singapore for semiconductor training. The signing of an MoU between the Skill Development & Technical Education Department, Odisha, and the ITE Education Services (ITEES), Singapore, during the Singapore president's visit, has enabled the two countries to train a large portion of the Indian workforce in the country itself. Similarly, Singapore dominates the MRO sector, while India aspires to become a global hub for MRO. India's MRO market is currently valued at $1.7 billion, projected to grow to $4 billion by 2031. While the Indian government has introduced reforms for simplified tax structures and is collaborating with companies like Airbus and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, high operational costs, infrastructure gaps, skill shortages, and regulatory bottlenecks present challenges to India's vision. Therefore, collaborating with Singapore will help New Delhi fulfill its aspiration. While the Indian government has been working to strengthen ties with Southeast Asian countries, many Indian states – to fulfil their individual goals – are also trying to reach out to Southeast Asian countries. Tharman's visit to Odisha followed the visit of Odisha's chief minister to Singapore. Notably, Singapore is the official partner in Odisha's flagship biennial investors summit Utkarsh Odisha (Make in Odisha Conclave-2025). Like Odisha, other Indian states are also trying to lure investments from Southeast Asian countries by reaching out to them, reflecting the success of Indian paradiplomacy. For instance, in early 2025, Assam's IT and Science and Technology Minister Keshab Mahanta visited Thailand to promote the Assam 2.0 Investment and Infrastructure Summit and invited Thai businesses and investors. Additionally, Singapore is already developing a satellite city around Guwahati – the capital of Assam. Last year, in January 2025, during the Tamil Nadu Global Investors Meet, Singapore laid out its plan to invest $5 billion in infrastructure, technology, sustainability and data centers. Furthermore, Singapore and Tamil Nadu are establishing a green corridor from Tuticorin in Tamil Nadu to Singapore. Despite all the opportunities and initiatives, as Tarun Das – an Indian industrialist who was recently conferred honorary citizenship by Singapore – pointed out, there remains a 'communication gap between India and Singapore with two very different systems and processes.' Due to the arduous land and registration process, high tax on construction, and complex paperwork, among other factors, mid-size Singaporean companies are still uncomfortable setting up businesses in India. Das suggested that India can offer 'townships' to Singapore, similar to the ones offered to Japan and South Korea. These townships are industrial zones providing a streamlined environment for companies to initiate and expand their operations in India, reducing administrative hurdles. The India-Singapore partnership offers promising potential, particularly in the context of challenges and vulnerabilities thrown open in the regional context. Jaishankar's visit will help address some of these while opening a pathway for further consultations.
The Diplomat
19 hours ago
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A Kashmir Diary: War Ravaged Families Await Relief as Statehood Remains Elusive
While common Kashmiris wait for statehood that will empower the Omar Abdullah government they elected, families affected by the recent India-Pakistan war languish. Tanveer stands in front of his house, destroyed by Pakistani shelling, at Ramgahi village, Salamabad, close to the Line of Control. SRINAGAR, KASHMIR — An azure sky seems to embrace the virgin swathes of the Himalayas as one treks down steep slopes in Salamabad in Kashmir, close to the Line of Control that cleaves the region between India and Pakistan. The air is salubrious and the natural surroundings stun, explaining why a handful of families settled at Ramgahi, a village in the secluded foothills. But the region's warring history precludes yearning for romanticism. When India and Pakistan went to war in May, the border villagers were the first casualties. Their homes being reduced to rubble inflamed the nation's mood, but already they have been forgotten by the rest of India. Given Kashmir's dual power structure, led by the chief minister and a New Delhi-nominated lieutenant governor, locals are not sure who to approach for redress — a bafflement most Kashmiris share. Tanveer, a villager who returned to Ramgahi to search for his possessions in the collapsed mounds of concrete, says he received only 6,500 Indian rupees ($75) as compensation. Pointing to the dusty remains of his house, he complains that the administration strangely categorized it as 'partly damaged,' which entitles him to minimum relief. If his petition for the enhanced compensation earmarked for fully damaged houses were approved, he would get 130,000 rupees ($1,514), still woefully insufficient to shift the debris or procure raw materials for rebuilding. 'On the night of the shelling on May 6-7, we hid behind makeshift bunkers we had erected ourselves. For three weeks, we lived in rented rooms in Uri, exhausting all our savings, before the officials accommodated us at Uri Trade Centre quarters,' Tanveer recounts. According to him, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah had promised a sum of 1 million rupees ($11,647) to those whose houses had been obliterated, 'but it is not clear who calls the shots.' Despite the National Conference led by Abdullah storming to power in last year's provincial elections, with his coalition securing 49 of Jammu and Kashmir's 90 seats, New Delhi is unwilling to hand over executive powers to him, or restore statehood. Jammu and Kashmir was downgraded into a Union Territory in August 2019 when its semi-autonomous status was revoked. Abdullah has so far shown restraint and political pragmatism in trying to engage constructively with New Delhi and negotiate a meaningful federal arrangement for Kashmir. His lack of bellicosity has provoked some of his own colleagues who point to the gradual dilution of Kashmir's political goalposts from demanding a plebiscite to demanding statehood. While their lamentation is valid, and shared by the people in general, they have not been able to articulate what a head-on confrontation with New Delhi should look like given its iron-fist control. They accuse Abdullah of repudiating his election mandate, which they frame as a mandate to 'restore Kashmir's special status.' While it is true that common Kashmiris are aghast at the loss of autonomy, the claim that they voted in last year's elections hoping the National Conference would bring back that special status is misleading. The historic turnout was triggered by the need to preclude BJP-aligned parties from securing power. In an interview with The Diplomat, ahead of the elections, Abdullah told this reporter that the path to reclaim Article 370, which guaranteed Kashmir special status, is arduous. 'Something that took the BJP decades to roll out is not going to be undone by us in five years,' he said. Nevertheless, the pressure for quick-fix solutions is mounting. Sameer Ahmed Naik, whose family has been displaced since the India-Pakistan standoff, is one of the Kashmiris upset with the local government. His wife, Zeenat Begum, was injured in the legs and chest when intense shelling by Pakistani armed forces rocked their village, Naupora. 'Initially we got a lump sum payment of 30,000 rupees ($349) to compensate for hospitalization charges. But now we are abandoned, bearing medical costs of our own, at roughly 10,000 rupees ($116) per month. Where is the chief minister and his council?' Naik asked as his two children stared glumly. Naik said that although his house is destroyed, he is still getting electricity bills amounting to 1,500 rupees ($17) every month. Commenting on the inability of the National Conference (NC) to help their case, eminent historian and political scientist Siddiq Wahid said what was desirable was 'private consultations between the NC and the People's Democratic Party [PDP] at what the Union Territory's government's priorities ought to be politically and in civic administration.' 'From the outside it appears that no such consultations were held,' he told this reporter. 'Meanwhile, the PDP's tactic, from the get go, has been to attack the NC rather than to contemplate political unity in the interests of the Union Territory.' But Waheed Parra, leader of the PDP whose popularity among all sections of Kashmiris is soaring, says it was the National Conference's pugnacious power play that hollowed out opposition unity in Kashmir. 'They (NC) suo moto declared candidates [for Parliamentary elections] and lobbied to keep the PDP out of the Opposition's I.N.D.I.A. alliance,' Parra says. According to him, 'No two Kashmiri have reason to fight today. We lost everything, our constitution and our history. The path ahead is self-preservation and resistance democratically.' Jammu and Kashmir witnessed historic democratic participation in the provincial elections held in September 2024 — with turnout at 63.88 percent. Prominent politician and fifth-time legislator from Kulgam constituency, M.Y. Tarigami, feels the Narendra Modi government is wasting a big opportunity to strengthen the political process. 'The BJP-government at the center seems to be more concerned in disarming the elected provincial government further. Despite repeated assurances, uncertainty regarding restoration of full statehood continues. The perception is widespread here in J&K that the present BJP regime is more focused on implementing its Hindutva agenda than restoration of constitutional and democratic rights of the people,' he told The Diplomat. Tensions between India and Pakistan flared up following a terrorist attack on tourists on April 22 at Baisaran, at the periphery of the Pahalgam meadow, roughly 90 kilometers south of Srinagar, Kashmir's capital. Twenty-six tourists, all men, were killed after being segregated on the basis of religion. Adil Hussain Shah, a pony guide, was the only Muslim to die. He sacrificed his life saving tourists. The Resistance Front, an off-shoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a U.N.-designated terrorist group operating from Pakistani soil, claimed responsibility for the attack but later retracted that claim. India on May 7 launched Operation Sindoor, a missile raid, targeting what it said were terrorist launchpads in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. On May 10, after intense aerial offensives that alarmed the international community, the two countries agreed to a ceasefire. India's television channels whipped up a nationalistic frenzy, circulating theories of local facilitation of terrorists. Sketches of three suspected perpetrators were flashed relentlessly on TV screens, including of Aadil Thoker, a local Kashmiri. The National Investigative Agency of India later said the sketches were misleading and that there was no local involvement. But by this time there had been a series of targeted attacks against Kashmiris, with the Association of Protection of Civil Rights reporting 184 incidents against Muslims and Kashmiris. The security agencies were also accused of punitive actions against people unrelated to the terrorist attack. Houses of at least ten alleged militants were razed, and youths randomly detained under the Public Safety Act, an anti-terror law that allows incarceration without trial for up to two years. This reporter unsuccessfully tried contacting the family members of Aadil. His house at Guri Thukarpora in Anantnag district of South Kashmir was demolished arbitrarily by the authorities. Villagers claimed there was an unspoken ban on talking to media. A neighbor of Adil, requesting that his name not be published, said his two brothers, Zahid Thoker and Arsalan Thoker, have been detained at the Joint Interrogation Center in Anantnag. 'We don't know if Aadil ever joined the militant ranks. It is a police theory. He disappeared in 2018… not sure if he is alive,' the neighbor sighed. Th neighbor underscored the counterproductive nature of police coercion. 'This has been an Ikhwan (renegade) village, avowedly pro-India even when militancy raged in the 1990s. Punitive actions will only alienate the people,' he warned. This is a stark reminder why the provincial government's involvement in overseeing law and order is indispensable. It is elected representatives who can ensure a semblance of democratic norm in the state's interaction with civilians. At New Colony in Naushera village, the family members of a man named Shahnawaz are still perplexed at his detention. It was around midnight that the police barged into the quiet, sparse settlements of Naushera, and apprehended Shahnawaz. By the time his father, Ashraf Nengroo, a retired employee with the Wildlife Protection Department, reached the neighborhood police station, Shahnwaz had been sent away to Kot Bhalwal jail in the adjoining Jammu region, 200 kilometers away. Shahnwaz, under psychological care for the past few years and largely immobile, has been charged under the draconian PSA. Nengroo says a likely trigger could be Shahnwaz's alleged involvement in a stone-pelting incident years ago. 'Why apprehend him now?' he asks. Nengroo reached out to opposition leader Iltija Mufti and local legislator Bashir Veeri of the NC, who 'were kind and raised our case, but there was no respite.' Nengroo is among those who would be happy if the provincial government were empowered. The Modi government maintains it will gradually restore Jammu and Kashmir's statehood. Any sign of that is elusive. Yet, sources close to Abdullah say he is confident New Delhi will eventually relent, restoring statehood as early as August. That may be true in the face of unabated infiltrations in the Poonch, Rajouri pockets which pose a security challenge. Sources say there is also articulation of international concern — though not pressure — about the volatile situation in Kashmir, which New Delhi does not gloss over.
The Diplomat
a day ago
- The Diplomat
Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Diaspora: An Interview with Dr. Edward Anderson
This is the transcript of an interview conducted for the July episode of 'Beyond the Indus,' The Diplomat's South Asia-focused podcast. Tushar Shetty (Interviewer): We're pleased to be joined by Dr. Edward Anderson, Senior Fellow at SOAS* and Assistant Professor at Northumbria University*. His research focuses on the Indian diaspora, transnational politics, Hindutva, and Hindu nationalism, as well as British histories of migration, ethnicity, and multiculturalism. His latest book, Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Diaspora, is a fascinating deep dive into these topics, charting the origin and evolution of Hindutva in the British Indian diaspora and examining the organizational aspects of Hindutva-leaning groups. Edward, welcome to Beyond the Indus, and thank you for joining the podcast. Edward Anderson: Thank you so much. It's lovely to talk to you. Tushar Shetty: Edward, I was reading your book on Hindu nationalism and the Indian diaspora, and what I found interesting was that it begins in an unusual place—not in India or the UK, but rather in Nairobi, Kenya, where the RSS actually set up its first overseas shakha* (branch) before India was even an independent country. Could you take us through the origins of transnational Hindutva in East Africa and how it spread to the UK and internationally? Edward Anderson: You're absolutely right. Hindu nationalism outside of India first established itself through the Sangh* in East Africa, specifically in Kenya. It's worth providing some historical context to explain how this happened. While Hindutva only became politically powerful toward the end of the 20th century and into the 21st century, Hindu nationalism and Hindutva ideology have origins that go much earlier—to the early 20th century or even the late 19th century in some ways. As for why it established itself in East Africa, there had been, since the end of the 19th century and early 20th century onward, a substantial population of Indian people in East Africa. East Africa at this time was part of the British Empire—the countries I'm talking about are mainly Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. These parts of East Africa started to see growth in Indian communities, partly as a response to the British colonial state encouraging Indians to move over to work in various parts of the economy. Initially, they were brought over to help construct the Uganda Railway, bringing laborers and skilled workers from India. They were also given certain rights to set up businesses and trading rights, many of which were denied to the local African population. Some people were given positions within the colonial bureaucracy as well. From the outset, the Asian population of East Africa had a relatively privileged position in society and a segregated position as well. They kept to themselves, had their own communities, and lived in particular parts of towns—often parts that had been allocated to them by the British. They maintained quite a close connection with the homeland, with India, which was a short hop over the ocean. The east of Africa and the west of India have been connected via maritime trading routes for hundreds of years. In the mid-1940s, there's a legendary story of a fellow moving over to work in a school who was an RSS member in India. When he arrived in Kenya, he established the first shakhas*, the first branches of the RSS—the leading and most powerful Hindu nationalist organization. He set up the first shakha*, and from that point onward, it became quite popular. Many children were sent there by their parents as a place to socialize with other people from the same community and to learn about Hindu culture and Indian culture in various ways, developing a sense of cultural pride and assertiveness. From that point onward, it started to establish itself through branches of the Sangh* that were set up in other parts of the world. In the historical narrative, during the 1960s and 1970s, after the African countries I mentioned started gaining independence, they were keen to coerce, persuade, or even expel the Asian population in East Africa. Most famously and notoriously, there was Idi Amin's* expulsion of the Asians in 1972. At this point, many East African Asians moved to Britain—often they had British passports by virtue of being citizens of the British Empire—and to other places as well. This is when we start to see the real establishment of Hindu nationalist organizations in the UK, around the exact time when East African Asians were moving over in the 1960s. Tushar Shetty: That community of East African Indians has produced many interesting people who have ascended quite high in both UK and US politics. I believe Kash Patel* and Zoran Mamdani*, who is the mayor incumbent* of New York City, Priti Patel*, who was former Home Secretary in the UK—is Rishi Sunak* part of that East African Indian diaspora as well? Edward Anderson: Yes, you're absolutely right. This is a community that has produced incredibly interesting and successful people in all sorts of areas, and as you've identified, from all parts of the political spectrum as well. In the UK, Rishi Sunak*, the first non-white Prime Minister of the UK and leader of the Conservative Party, and also two subsequent Home Secretaries, Priti Patel* and then Suella Braverman*—all of these people have roots in East Africa. Tushar Shetty: This is a pretty well-educated, well-established community that also brought some Hindutva ideas to the UK. To what extent has the Indian community been receptive to what we would call Hindutva ideology, considering that political Hindutva didn't really take off in India itself until the late 1980s? What was the attraction to these ideas and organizations? Edward Anderson: It's an interesting question. First, it's important to note that there is a kind of received wisdom that the Indian diaspora is highly predisposed toward Hindutva ideology and very sympathetic to the RSS and Narendra Modi*. This has emerged particularly from dramatic political rallies that Modi has participated in that have taken place in London, New York, Texas, Sydney, and various other parts of the world. While it's certainly the case that there is sympathy for Hindutva, there's also a very strong tradition that resists that—a strong liberal, leftist, and socialist tradition. You've already alluded to that when mentioning a few of those names earlier. There's a very diverse range of perspectives in the diaspora, and it's really important not to essentialize, not to generalize, and not to be reductive. That being said, there are certain things that the Hindu nationalist movement and organizations have done that have attempted to cater to the diaspora in certain ways. They provide people with a sense of belonging and pride—people who might be marginalized by society around them more broadly. This is quite unusual and departs significantly from Hindu nationalism in India. The whole point of Hindu nationalism in India is that it's a majoritarian ideology relating to an ostensible majority community, an overwhelming majority community depending on how it's enumerated. Whereas in the diaspora, this is an ideology that appeals to quite a small minority—in fact, a minority that is significantly smaller than the Muslim minority in Britain and the US. That dynamic is notable, particularly in the context of the war on terror and Islamophobia in the West. There's clearly a way for Hindutva and certain Hindu nationalist mobilizations and ideas to engage with that tension and politics as well. Tushar Shetty: What's interesting when I was going through your book was the organizational aspect of this. Could you give us an overview of how Hindutva-leaning groups are organized in the UK and elsewhere – what sections of the diaspora do they cater to, how are they financed, what services do they provide and what role do they play in the community? And to what extent does their messaging and culture differ from the Sangh Parivar* in India? Edward Anderson: That's a really good set of questions with a lot in it, and it's hard to give a short answer. Just like in India, Hindutva groups in the diaspora are extremely heterogeneous. There's a bewildering plethora of different groups, and it feels like there are new ones being set up every year. While some groups might function in one way and reach out to a particular demographic, others might be very different. Even the type of Hindutva that they espouse—the tone and messaging—might differ drastically. In terms of which sections of the diaspora they cater to, one answer would be 'all.' Hindutva is a majoritarian ideology and needs to create an ostensibly monolithic and unified majority community to fulfil its ambitions. In this sense, Hindutva can be all-encompassing. We often hear the term 'Dharmic religions' being used in efforts to incorporate Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs into the fold, although this can be highly contentious. On one hand, they try to cater to many people, but on the other hand, there are clearly specific focuses. I've already mentioned a notable concentration of East African Asians. Reflecting the demography of East African Asians, there's quite a striking proportion of middle and upper-caste Gujarati Hindus. Another area of focus has been younger generations, which relates to another part of your question about the roles these groups play. These groups are eager to provide a service to the diaspora, particularly second and third generations and their parents, by positioning themselves as a place where they can convey particular versions of Hindu culture, history, and spirituality to people who are dislocated from that and living in another part of the world where they're not necessarily surrounded by it. They function by having classes—language classes, for instance. There's a very pedagogical role that these groups often play. There's a wide range of them as well. I'm referring quite broadly to the Sangh*, but there are also diasporic branches of the VHP* (Vishva Hindu Parishad). The more political side is reflected in the Overseas Friends of the BJP*. There are also various student groups and charities. The other interesting thing is that in the diaspora—and this is something I discuss in relation to an idea called 'Neo-Hindutva,' which I wrote about initially about 10 years ago and pursue further in this book—Neo-Hindutva is a term I've used to explain the way Hindutva has evolved and entered into spaces well beyond the Sangh Parivar*. We see completely new groups that operate and distance themselves from both the ideology of Hindutva and the organizational structures of the Sangh Parivar*. Yet when we look at them closely, we can identify them as Hindutva in ideology, even though they're functioning more in a multicultural context. Tushar Shetty: I recall reading about the HSS* (Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh) in the UK, which is quite similar to the RSS, but I think you noted that they claim to just be influenced by them and not have direct links. To what extent are these Hindu advocacy groups linked to or influenced by the RSS and its affiliates – are they just Sangh Parivar* subsidiaries abroad, or do they have their own independent agenda or presence? We're seeing a wider rise of Hindu advocacy groups gaining ground in places like the US and Canada, e.g. The Hindu American Foundation* comes to mind. Are all these groups linked to the RSS, or are they just a natural consequence of diaspora mobilization, similar to other immigrant communities in the Anglosphere? Edward Anderson: This is an important question and one I try to delve into in depth in the book. The overseas equivalent or wing of the RSS in the diaspora is called the HSS*, the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh*. Originally in East Africa, it was called the Bharatiya Swayamsevak Sangh*. This group does try to occasionally distance itself from the main RSS in India. They often talk about being inspired by or having ideological commonality with the RSS without being structurally connected. That being said, if you look at the organizations side by side, it's very clear that they are deeply connected. Full-time workers of the RSS in India—Pracharaks*—are sent abroad and work in various communities outside India to facilitate coordination. The Supreme Leader, the Sarsanghchalak* of the RSS, Mohan Bhagwat*, was present in Britain in 2016 for the 50th anniversary celebrations of the HSS* in the UK. We can see RSS leaders traveling across the diaspora, so there are clearly institutional connections. That being said, these groups are vernacularized—they do evolve in slightly different directions. They're not carbon copies of what we see in India in various ways. They also rely to some extent on organic, local volunteers and dynamic local leaders who are heavily invested in what they do. So there is a degree of separateness as well, even though there are clearly institutional links. These institutional links are something that many of these groups have been quite keen to obfuscate, not least because these are registered non-profits in the US and registered charities in Britain. The connection with political organizations is something that's quite contested and has been discussed and debated in various settings over quite a long period of time. Tushar Shetty: Do you think this is substantially different from the way other communities mobilize? We have different examples of this—I'm thinking of AIPAC* in the US, which advocates for Israeli interests, even though it's not necessarily connected to Israel directly in terms of donations, and is supported by the American Jewish community. We have Sikhs in Canada and the US who have strong political networks because of community connections. Is this mobilization or growth of Hindu-focused organizations substantially different from that, or is it just following a familiar pattern? Edward Anderson: I think there are some levels of similarity and other levels of distinctiveness. I wouldn't say that you can reduce all motivations of ethnic minority communities or diasporic communities to being all the same—there is real distinctiveness there, and it's important to study different groups and individuals on their own terms. That being said, there are certainly connections and links, not just across different communities but also across time. I'm a historian, although I work on topics that go almost right up to the present day. If you look at the political identities that were being formed and long-distance activism that was being conducted by Indians in Britain in the very early 20th century—people campaigning against the British Empire, seeking independence from Britain, people considered freedom fighters, including interestingly a founding father of Hindutva, Savarkar*, who was a student in London in the very early part of the 20th century—we can see a longer theme where there are similarities across different groups. But the sorts of connections and ways of doing politics have definitely been different in different parts of the world, in the US and Canada. As you say, there's a diversity of political perspectives among South Asian diasporas. Sometimes, in the case of some Sikh and Khalistani* activists, they come up in very heated and highly contested ways with other sections of the broader South Asian diaspora. Tushar Shetty: Mobilization in any community tends to be disruptive to politics – I wonder how these groups have impacted local politics in the UK and elsewhere. Do they wield enough power to influence legislation and foreign policy, and how do other communities respond to this? We've talked about Khalistani* groups reacting to certain aspects of Hindu nationalism emanating from India, and we also saw the riots in Leicester. I'd be grateful if you could talk about that for our listeners, and if there are other instances of negative fallout or reactions to Hindu politics in the Indian diaspora. Edward Anderson: Let me first address the Leicester tensions. What we saw in Leicester in August and September 2022 was rather unprecedented and extremely upsetting scenes of tension and violence between Hindu and Muslim communities in the city. Leicester is a city in the Midlands in the middle of the UK that saw a very large influx of Asians, particularly South Asian people, in the 1960s and 1970s. It's one of the most diverse parts of the country, with nearly 45% of people identifying in the census as Asian, nearly 20% of the city being Hindu, and nearly 25% being Muslim. It's a very multicultural city that has seen various difficulties over the years, but multiculturalism is often identified as one of the great successes of the city and has enabled it to be economically successful. Tensions between communities have been present, and this reached a head in the summer of 2022. Various triggers have been suggested for what happened, but one might have been a cricket match between India and Pakistan. Following this, tensions spilled over into violence. We saw on social media videos of people walking through parts of the city shouting 'Pakistan Murdabad*' (death to Pakistan) and chanting 'Jai Shri Ram*'—a religious chant often associated with Hindutva. Subsequently, there were retaliations, including a flag being pulled down from a Hindu temple. There was a lot of rumor spreading and social media misinformation. Certain extremist elements, including the far right, were clearly stirring things up. We have evidence suggesting that a large amount of social media interaction on this matter originated in the Indian subcontinent, with hashtags like 'Hindus under attack' being spread in tens and hundreds of thousands of tweets. The flames were clearly being fanned from various parts of the world. This was a moment of considerable tension, and a lot of work has been done subsequently to try to build bridges between communities. While I said it was unprecedented, the unprecedented nature was in its scale and visibility and the reaction to it, but there have been tensions previously. If you go back three decades to 1992, one of the most pivotal moments for Indian democracy was the demolition of the Babri Masjid* by Hindu extremists. This led to significant outbreaks of violence and many deaths between Hindus and Muslims in various parts of India. There are reports from 1992 and 1993 showing that communal tensions had also found their way to Britain and other parts of the diaspora. There were reports of attacks on both Hindu and Muslim places of worship, and suggestions that opportunistic right-wing groups were also stirring things up. These tensions have existed for quite a long time. As well as tensions, there is also a lot of solidarity and groups working together—a lot of good relationships as well. Regarding the impact on UK politics, there has definitely been a concerted effort to influence legislation and be a force of lobbying. This comes back to your previous question about AIPAC*. What we can definitely identify is a desire to replicate the kind of level of influence that certain other communities have, notably the level of influence of certain elements of the Israeli lobby. It's not just a desire to replicate or mimic that but to form alliances as well. This is explored in depth in a new book called Hostile Homelands by Azad Essa*. There's definitely an effort to do advocacy and influence members of parliament, and we've seen this happen in numerous settings. One of the most dramatic was in 2019, when the Labour Party was still being led by Jeremy Corbyn*, who has been quite critical of Modi, has been a strong advocate for Dalit* rights, and has spoken out on the Kashmir issue and human rights issues in Kashmir. This led to an enormous backlash and resistance, with an effort by the Overseas Friends of the BJP* to campaign against the Labour Party in 48 constituencies. This was quite unusual—for the Overseas Friends of the BJP* to campaign specifically on a UK election and try to ensure that someone they framed as being anti-Indian and anti-Hindu would not get into office. There's definitely a level of influence going on there. The extent to which that influence has reaped rewards is a moot point—it's hard to identify necessarily. Tushar Shetty: How is Modi utilizing the Indian diaspora to advance some of his or India's foreign policy goals? Post-2014, do you think Modi's personal popularity has changed the dynamics of the Indian diaspora's politics and contributed to the rise of Hindutva ideas? Perhaps more controversially, could Modi's popularity in the diaspora have any impact on domestic politics in India, either indirectly through media coverage or perhaps directly through campaign contributions? Edward Anderson: This is an important question, certainly one that people have discussed perhaps more than any other aspect of diasporic Hindu nationalism. What we've definitely seen is the BJP being more proactive since 2014—and before that as well—in engaging the diaspora, perhaps much more dynamically than any of their rivals. The rewards they seem to be reaping perhaps reflect that. In 2014, after the election, Modi embarked upon a series of international visits—diplomatic visits, but also visits in which the diaspora featured quite heavily. The first and most striking was him filling out Madison Square Garden, a venue that usually has sports superstars and rock stars on its stage. This was a rock star-type event that the diaspora were extremely excited about in the US. In the following year, we saw a similar event with even more people—maybe 50,000 or 60,000—filling much of Wembley Stadium in west London, England's national football stadium. These were really dramatic scenes, and all of these were livestreamed back to India, which I think is crucial. What you're seeing is the diaspora being engaged with and maybe thanked for their influence and the way they can promote the BJP, Modi, and India more broadly. But what those rallies do is provide really powerful images for media back in India, both via social media—which Hindu nationalists have been very adept at using—and also via mainstream media, which has been very sympathetic to the BJP in recent years. They provide striking images that reflect popularity abroad or try to instill this idea of popularity abroad, which might be influential. The diaspora is still looked up to in many ways for their success and often enhanced levels of cultural, political, and economic capital. While the diaspora might not actually be voting—Indians who take citizenship of another country lose their Indian citizenship, as there's no dual nationality—even NRIs* (Non-Resident Indians) who still have Indian citizenship very often don't vote because it's logistically very complicated. The majority of the Indian diaspora don't vote, and unlike other countries, there's no distance voting option yet. The influence they might have in terms of PR influence or ability to influence people on the ground in India is possibly considered much greater than people who just turn up and vote. Modi has definitely been a key figure—he has inspired people, there's that charisma, assertiveness, and feeling of strength that has been conveyed. The diaspora participate in lots of aspects of that rallying around the individual. One of the early campaigns was 'Chai pe Charcha*' (discussions over tea), in which support for Modi was promoted. These took place across India but also in the diaspora. The diaspora have also been involved via the Overseas Friends of the BJP*, doing car rallies, driving around in different contexts, and even turning up for particular protests. When the BBC released its very controversial two-part Modi documentary, which was banned in India, members of the Indian diaspora went outside BBC headquarters in London and protested against that. There are lots of ways in which support for Modi has been manifested, and he is clearly an important figure. One caveat to add is that there have been surveys that push against the idea of universal support. A survey conducted by the Platform for Indian Democracy* at the end of 2023 suggested that more people of Indian origin in Britain had a negative view than a positive view of Modi and the BJP, particularly among younger generations. Yes, there is hero worship for Modi, like there is among many Indians. There's also a significant proportion of members of the Indian diaspora who would turn up when he comes overseas not to support him but to protest against him. Tushar Shetty: Before we end, I want to ask you—you're a historian, and I was reading recently Lee Kuan Yew's* autobiography, where he talked about the changing dynamics in the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia in response to the unification of the People's Republic of China. He discussed how the Malayan Communist Party* attracted many more recruits from the Chinese diaspora, not necessarily due to a flare-up of Communist ideology, but because there was a flare-up of nationalist pride. In that light, to what extent do you think the popularity of Modi and the rise of India as a global power has propelled these Hindutva ideas among the diaspora? Is this just a natural inclination toward Hindutva ideas, or is it also a response to the perceived rise of India in the global arena? Edward Anderson: I certainly wouldn't ever say anything's natural. I think there are always ways of explaining and understanding how things happen. There's not an innate predisposition to any particular sort of politics or identity. What the book discusses is the much longer picture that goes back to the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. There's a long backstory to the institutional establishment of Hindu nationalism and the ideological inculcation of Hindu nationalism among the Indian diaspora. This goes back a long time, clearly to a period long predating Modi and the 21st century saffronization of India—the 'New India' in which Hindu nationalism and Hindutva have had an impact on almost all aspects of society. But definitely, something different has happened over the last decade or so, and part of that is due to a new level of confidence. Previously, people inclined toward Hindutva might have been more reticent, maybe even secretive about it, less keen to show their cards. But the election of Modi since 2014 has completely changed that. There has been a renewed level of assertiveness and confidence. People are much less shy to discuss that aspect of their politics. Another big difference is that the world is so much more interconnected than it was. The experience of being a member of a diaspora in 2025 is significantly different from what it must have been like in the 1960s or 1970s. I'm not suggesting that in the 1960s or 1970s there was no connection with the subcontinent—that's obviously not the case. There was communication and interaction, but today you're instantly connected and almost constantly connected via social media and a device in your pocket to what's going on in other parts of the world. You're living a transnational life. Those levels of influence—whether it's important news stories, memes, viral YouTube videos, or the latest speech of a political leader—that's all coming to you directly, and you're participating in that directly. That's a phenomenon that has shifted in a very big way over the last decade or so, and I think that, as much as anything else, has had a big impact on the politics of the diaspora. Tushar Shetty: To those who want to read more, I would definitely recommend Edward's book, Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Diaspora. Is this available in India? Edward Anderson: Yes, it was published by Penguin and is available in India. It's published in the US by Oxford University Press and in the UK by Hurst. Tushar Shetty: Fantastic. Edward, thank you so much again for joining the podcast. Edward Anderson: Thanks, it's been great talking to you. Note: Names and terms marked with asterisks have been corrected from the original transcript based on context and standard spellings.*
