Syria 2025 Is Iraq All Over Again

Newsweek

6 days ago

The al-Nusrah Front was removed from the U.S. terror list on July 7, 2025. Officially, it marked a shift. But under the surface, it looked a lot more like a pattern we've previously seen. America has been here before. We saw this exact playbook in Iraq: regime change, a rush to legitimize the replacement, sweeping sanctions relief, and a premature declaration of stability. It didn't work then. And it won't work now.
The backdrop to this sudden policy shift is the meteoric rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria's new president. Less than a year back, al-Sharaa was still going by his old name, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. For years, he led al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate. That group eventually rebranded as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and now holds real control over large parts of the country. His troops helped remove Bashar al-Assad. And now, he's being treated as a legitimate head of state by Washington.
Syrian Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa attended the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on April 11, 2025, in Antalya, Turkey.
Syrian Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa attended the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on April 11, 2025, in Antalya, Turkey.
Mert Gokhan Koc/ dia images via Getty Images
This normalization has come fast and without accountability. The Trump administration's May 2025 announcement in Riyadh, and subsequent executive order in June, lifting all sanctions on Syria and praising al-Sharaa as a "young, attractive guy. Tough guy. Strong past. Very strong past. Fighter," which was followed barely two months later by the formal Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) delisting of al-Nusrah. The timing is not subtle. It signals a strategic pivot: from isolation to partnership, from punishment to pragmatism.
But there's a problem. In March 2025, just four months ago, HTS-linked units participated in one of the worst sectarian atrocities of the post-Assad period. According to Reuters and Human Rights Watch, over 1,500 Alawite civilians were executed across Latakia and Tartus. Entire villages were emptied. Many were shot execution-style. These were not rogue factions. These were al-Sharaa's forces. The same man now photographed with American officials and heralded as Syria's transitional solution.
The echoes with Iraq are deafening. In 2003, dictator Saddam Hussein was removed. Sanctions were lifted. Investments flooded in. We declared victory. What followed was a maelstrom: insurgency, sectarian bloodshed, and the birth of ISIS. The root cause wasn't just the power vacuum. It was the premature legitimization of a post-conflict authority before institutions, accountability, or even basic national cohesion had been established.
Ahmed al-Sharaa did not simply inherit a war-torn state. He built it. Under his command, HTS didn't just fill a vacuum, they enforced it. Rivals were pushed out, sometimes violently. Dissent didn't last long. By the time they tightened their grip on Idlib, he'd already broken from al-Qaeda. But that break didn't change how he got there, or what people had to live under once he did.
The U.S. response has been to reward this transformation with recognition and relief. In May, the Treasury Department issued General License 25, authorizing nearly all commercial activity with the Syrian government. That includes trade, investment, and infrastructure projects, even involving ministers and deputies still under Global Magnitsky sanctions. The justification? Stabilization. The reality? Strategic amnesia. The sanctions weren't about Assad's name, they were about his actions. Unless al-Sharaa shows he's actually governing differently, lifting sanctions doesn't mark progress, it just hands a pass from one regime to the next.
U.S. officials said he's made promises: kick out foreign fighters, block ISIS from rebuilding, hold elections sometime in the next year and a half. These are good promises. But they're just that: promises. And they echo the same overconfidence we heard in Iraq. That local leaders would rise to the occasion. That militias would disarm. That money and markets would do the work of reconciliation.
In Syria, the danger is even more acute. The al-Nusrah delisting was not a technical correction. It was a signal. One that tells future armed groups that if they wait long enough, hold enough territory, and rebrand effectively, Washington will meet them at the negotiating table. This is a dangerous incentive structure. It rewards tactical patience, not ideological reform. And it invites a future where today's insurgents become tomorrow's presidents, without ever accounting for the violence that brought them there.
This is not a call for endless isolation. Engagement is necessary. But engagement must be disciplined. Sanctions relief should be conditional. Recognition should be phased. Aid should be tied to benchmarks: human rights, political pluralism, justice for victims.
Instead, we've sprinted past all of that. In just five months, we've gone from labeling HTS a terrorist organization to legitimizing its leader as Syria's future.
We must learn from Iraq. Not because history rhymes, but because this isn't rhyming, it's repeating.
Foreign policy isn't about optics. It's about outcomes. And unless we slow down, apply pressure strategically, and demand real accountability from our new "partners," Syria may not just mirror Iraq. It may surpass it in the scale of our regret.
Brett Erickson is the managing principal of Obsidian Risk Advisors. He serves on the advisory board of DePaul University School of Business and Loyola Law School-Center for Compliance Studies.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.