
The future of American soft power
https://arab.news/n6fuw
Power is the ability to get others to do what you want. That can be accomplished by coercion ('sticks'), payment ('carrots') and attraction ('honey'). The first two methods are forms of hard power, whereas attraction is soft power. Soft power grows out of a country's culture, its political values and its foreign policies. In the short term, hard power usually trumps soft power. But over the long term, soft power often prevails. Joseph Stalin once mockingly asked, 'How many divisions does the Pope have?' But the papacy continues today, while Stalin's Soviet Union is long gone.
When you are attractive, you can economize on carrots and sticks. If allies see you as benign and trustworthy, they are more likely to be open to persuasion and follow your lead. If they see you as an unreliable bully, they are more likely to drag their feet and reduce their interdependence when they can. Cold War Europe is a good example. A Norwegian historian described Europe as divided into a Soviet and an American empire. But there was a crucial difference: the American side was 'an empire by invitation.' That became clear when the Soviets had to deploy troops to Budapest in 1956 and to Prague in 1968. In contrast, NATO has not only survived but voluntarily increased its membership.
A proper understanding of power must include both its hard and soft aspects. Niccolo Machiavelli said it was better for a prince to be feared than to be loved. But it is best to be both. Because soft power is rarely sufficient by itself, and because its effects take longer to realize, political leaders are often tempted to resort to the hard power of coercion or payment. When wielded alone, however, hard power can involve higher costs than when it is combined with the soft power of attraction. The Berlin Wall did not succumb to an artillery barrage; it was felled by hammers and bulldozers wielded by people who had lost faith in communism and were drawn to Western values.
If allies see you as benign and trustworthy, they are more likely to be open to persuasion and follow your lead
Joseph S. Nye Jr.
After the Second World War, the US was by far the most powerful country and it attempted to enshrine its values in what became known as 'the liberal international order' — a framework comprising the UN, the Bretton Woods economic institutions and other multilateral bodies. Of course, the US did not always live up to its liberal values and Cold War bipolarity limited this order to only half the world's people. But the postwar system would have looked very different if the Axis powers had won the Second World War and imposed their values.
While prior US presidents have violated aspects of the liberal order, Donald Trump is the first to reject the idea that soft power has any value in foreign policy. Among his first actions upon returning to office was to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement and the World Health Organization, despite the obvious threats that climate change and pandemics pose.
The effects of a US administration surrendering soft power are all too predictable. Coercing democratic allies like Denmark or Canada weakens trust in our alliances. Threatening Panama reawakens fears of imperialism throughout Latin America. Crippling the US Agency for International Development — created by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 — undercuts our reputation for benevolence. Silencing Voice of America is a gift to authoritarian rivals. Slapping tariffs on friends makes us appear unreliable. Trying to chill free speech at home undermines our credibility. This list could go on.
Trump has defined China as America's great challenge and China itself has been investing in soft power since 2007, when then-President Hu Jintao told the Communist Party of China that the country needed to make itself more attractive to others. But China has long faced two major obstacles in this respect. First, it maintains territorial disputes with multiple neighbors. Second, the party insists on maintaining tight control over civil society. The costs of such policies have been confirmed by public opinion polls that ask people around the world which countries they find attractive. But one can only wonder what these surveys will show in future years if Trump keeps undercutting American soft power.
Will America's cultural soft power survive a downturn in the government's soft power over the next four years?
Joseph S. Nye Jr.
To be sure, American soft power has had its ups and downs over the years. The US was unpopular in many countries during the Vietnam and Iraq wars. But soft power derives from a country's society and culture, as well as from government actions. Even during the Vietnam War, when crowds marched through streets around the world to protest US policies, they sang the American civil rights anthem 'We Shall Overcome.' An open society that allows protest can be a soft power asset. But will America's cultural soft power survive a downturn in the government's soft power over the next four years?
American democracy is likely to survive four years of Trump. The country has a resilient political culture and a federal constitution that encourages checks and balances. There is a reasonable chance that Democrats will regain control of the House of Representatives in the 2026 midterm elections. Moreover, civil society remains strong and the courts independent. Many organizations have launched lawsuits to challenge Trump's actions and markets have signaled dissatisfaction with Trump's economic policies.
American soft power recovered after low points in the Vietnam and Iraq wars, as well as from a dip in Trump's first term. But once trust is lost, it is not easily restored. After the invasion of Ukraine, Russia lost most of what soft power it had, but China is striving to fill any gaps that Trump creates. The way Chinese President Xi Jinping tells it, the East is rising over the West. If Trump thinks he can compete with China while weakening trust among American allies, asserting imperial aspirations, destroying USAID, silencing Voice of America, challenging laws at home and withdrawing from UN agencies, he is likely to fail. Restoring what he has destroyed will not be impossible, but it will be costly.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
Hashtags

Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles


Arab News
7 hours ago
- Arab News
Alliance reveals UK defense ambitions extend beyond Europe
One of the key drivers of the UK Strategic Defense Review released earlier this month is the military threat from Russia, especially following its invasion of Ukraine. However, London's focus extends well beyond Europe, including to the Asia-Pacific region with the new AUKUS alliance. One of the key announcements in the defense review is that the UK will build up to a dozen new submarines within the new AUKUS alliance with Australia and the US. This highlights the importance of the new alliance to London — it is perceived by some senior UK policymakers as potentially the most significant development since the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement, with the US given the future potential to develop and deliver cutting-edge capabilities, and help revitalize the UK defense industrial base. Yet, AUKUS may be about to hit a US political iceberg. The Trump team announced, only days after the UK defense review, that it has launched an AUKUS probe led by the Pentagon. Both the UK and Australian governments have declared optimism that Trump officials will, ultimately, 'green light' next steps with the nascent alliance, which was created in 2021 under the Biden administration. Moreover, at the G7 last week, US President Donald Trump gave credence to this. Speaking with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Trump said that London, Canberra, and Washington are 'very long-time partners and allies and friends.' AUKUS may be about to hit a US political iceberg Andrew Hammond Yet, uncertainty still remains — potential cancelation, or revising the terms of AUKUS, which may cause delay, are plausible. This is not least because US Defense Undersecretary for Policy Elbridge Colby, who is heading the US review, last year criticized the submarine element of the agreement, asserting that for the US 'it would be crazy to have fewer SSNs (nuclear-powered attack submarines) in the right place and time.' What Colby, who admits to being 'skeptical' about AUKUS, refers to here is the first pillar of the deal, which is centered around providing Australia with SSNs. Currently, Australia only has diesel-electric submarines, and one ultimate goal of AUKUS is for a fleet of new SSNs to be developed by London and Canberra utilizing UK design blueprints with US technology to spur military interoperability between the three. In the interim, existing US and UK SSNs will rotate to Australia while a new nuclear submarine base is being built in Perth that is scheduled to be operational by around 2027. Canberra also plans to buy at least three, and possibly up to five, second-hand so-called Virginia-class SSNs from the US from 2032. Under the terms of the AUKUS deal, Australia has already begun paying the US. This includes around $500 million given to Washington in February, which is a down payment of a bigger $2 billion in 2025. Colby's comments from last year indicate that the lens he will use for the AUKUS review is whether the deal undermines the ability of the US defense industry to meet the nation's military needs. Part of the wider context here is production delays for the Virginia-class submarines, and cost overruns of billions of dollars. These supply challenges are one reason Colby has queried AUKUS, especially given potential future war scenarios in which Washington might need more submarines, fast. It is not just Trump, but also other key figures, such as US Ambassador to the UK Warren Stephens, who have indicated support for AUKUS. Last month, Stephens said Washington is 'proud to stand alongside Britain and Australia, two of our closest allies, as we deepen our collaboration to respond to a changing world.' However, the submarine supply challenge is not the only one that may complicate the deal. In addition, US and UK export controls on sensitive technologies between the three nations has slowed work to develop next generation technologies in wider, so-called pillar-two areas, including development of hypersonic missiles and quantum computing. In this context, outright cancelation of AUKUS by the Trump team is an option that cannot be ruled out. Such an outcome would frustrate not only the UK, but also Australia, which terminated a deal to buy diesel-powered submarines from France when it signed up to the alliance in 2021. Scott Morrison, prime minister at the time, took a big diplomatic hit from this. A wider range of nations may also be keen to join Andrew Hammond However, cancelation appears the least likely option. What may be more likely is a revision of the deal's wider terms so these are more weighted in favor of Washington. For instance, the Trump team could seek to pressure Australia to boost its military spending, which is around 2 percent of gross domestic product, with an intent to raise this to about 2.4 percent by 2033-2034. While this 2 percent figure is higher than some countries in the NATO alliance, it is much less than the US, while the UK has committed to reaching 2.5 percent of GDP by 2027. If the AUKUS alliance does survive, there are a wider range of nations that may also be keen to join as full or associate members in coming years. This includes New Zealand, Canada, Japan, and South Korea. Take the example of Canada, which two former UK prime ministers, Boris Johnson and Liz Truss, have previously backed for AUKUS membership 'to strengthen the West's collective defenses.' Johnson has even said that Canada is the 'most obvious next candidate,' and previous prime minister Justin Trudeau said that he held 'excellent conversations' with London, Washington, and Canberra over joining the alliance. Taken together, if Trump does not scrap AUKUS, the project could assume significant new momentum. While expansion of the alliance is unlikely in the immediate term, collaboration with a range of Western allies in the Asia-Pacific and Americas is possible into the 2030s.


Arab News
8 hours ago
- Arab News
Germany and the balance of power in Europe
The 2025 NATO Summit, which took place in The Hague last week, brought together representatives of all 32 member nations of the alliance. Top of the agenda was an agreement to increase national security expenditure, with a target for each country to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense by 2035. The shift comes as Germany embarks on its biggest military rearmament since the Second World War, signaling its intent to assume a more assertive role within NATO and across Europe. Given that a highly militarized Germany twice brought the world to war, this latest iteration has drawn great interest. It also follows repeated criticism from US President Donald Trump, who has long accused European allies of relying too heavily for their security on Washington, which he argues bears a disproportionate share of NATO's military burden. In 2024, the US spent $935 billion on defense, more than double the combined total of all other NATO members. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this imbalance became clear, as Europe was exposed as being critically reliant on the US for its security. No country reflects the shift toward increased military investment more clearly than Germany. Under the leadership of Chancellor Friedrich Merz, it has embraced rearmament with a boldness unseen since the end of the Second World War. For much of the second half of the 20th century, Germany was characterized by its rejection of military might as an instrument of state power. Under the auspices of the European project, a reunified Germany sought to establish its role through multilateral diplomacy, economic stability and the rule of law. Its military, the Bundeswehr, remained fragmented and poorly equipped, with a defense budget that rarely exceeded 1.1 percent of GDP. Strict controls were placed on arms exports and strategic leadership was largely left to the country's NATO allies, led by the US. This was the established trend in postwar Germany. Even the faintest hint of rearmament was met with public resistance, shaped by memories of the nation's painful past. The Bundeswehr, established in 1955, was intentionally built with no projection of offensive power. For decades, as Germany became Europe's economic powerhouse, its security policies remained largely reactive and rooted within NATO's strategic architecture. However, those days now seem to be firmly behind it, with Berlin emerging as a prominent defense hub for Europe. This year, the Merz government passed a defense budget worth 2.4 percent of GDP, the highest level of military expenditure in Germany's postwar history, and announced long-term aspirations to raise it to 5 percent. At the transatlantic level, Germany's evolving strategy reflects growing uncertainty about Washington's role in NATO. Zaid M. Belbagi The goal is to ramp up annual defense spending from €95 billion ($111 billion) in 2025 to €162 billion by 2029. To enable this shift, Berlin has introduced legal changes allowing it to bypass its constitutional debt brake, a departure from a long-standing tradition of fiscal restraint. The transformation goes beyond budgets and legislation. Merz has pledged to build the Bundeswehr into 'the strongest conventional army in Europe' by 2031. The plan includes an expansion of its active forces from 182,000 troops to 203,000 by 2031, with a long-term target of 240,000. The military's role is expanding beyond Germany's borders as well. In May, Berlin announced that an armored brigade would be permanently stationed in Lithuania, the first long-term deployment of a German force beyond its own borders since the Second World War. This shift aims to support NATO's eastern flank amid growing concerns about Russian aggression. Modernization is proceeding at a rapid pace. Under a new rearmament directive issued by Chief of Defense Gen. Carsten Breuer, the Bundeswehr is acquiring advanced weapons and equipment, including air defense and precision-strike capabilities, space assets, advanced electronic warfare tools and munitions reserves. The procurement program includes Patriot missile systems, Eurofighter and F-35 fighter jets, Leopard 2 tanks, PzH 2000 howitzers and sophisticated military drones. This shift by Germany marks a pivotal moment for NATO and for Europe: the emergence of a post-American mindset in defense policy, with Berlin increasingly taking on responsibilities long championed by the US. At the transatlantic level, Germany's evolving strategy also reflects growing uncertainty about Washington's role in NATO, especially amid the decisions of Trump and his administration during his second term. The result is a more assertive and autonomous German military posture, one that is reshaping the security architecture of Europe. For the Middle East and North Africa, the rearmament of Germany and the revitalization of its defense industry present significant opportunities for deeper cooperation. The country has long been a key supplier of advanced machinery, equipment, motor vehicles and military aircraft components across the region. Amid the ongoing tensions between Iran, Israel and the US, Middle Eastern nations might increasingly look to Berlin as a vital partner, one whose expanding defense capabilities and industrial expertise could help shape their own security and military strategies for years to come.


Asharq Al-Awsat
11 hours ago
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Germany Seeks Israeli Partnership on Cyberdefense, Plans 'Cyber Dome'
Germany is aiming to establish a joint German-Israeli cyber research center and deepen collaboration between the two countries' intelligence and security agencies, German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt said on Sunday. Germany is among Israel's closest allies in Europe, and Berlin has increasingly looked to draw upon Israel's defense expertise as it boosts its military capabilities and contributions to NATO in the face of perceived growing threats from Russia and China. "Military defense alone is not sufficient for this turning point in security. A significant upgrade in civil defense is also essential to strengthen our overall defensive capabilities," Dobrindt said during a visit to Israel, as reported by Germany's Bild newspaper, Reuters reported. Dobrindt, who was appointed by new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz last month, arrived in Israel on Saturday. According to the Bild report, Dobrindt outlined a five-point plan aimed at establishing what he called a "Cyber Dome" for Germany, as part of its cyberdefense strategy. Earlier on Sunday, Bavarian Prime Minister Markus Soeder called for the acquisition of 2,000 interceptor missiles to equip Germany with an "Iron Dome" system similar to Israel's short-range missile defense technology.