Secret US agenda behind India-Pakistan ceasefire
Gul alleges that this strategically significant facility is under de facto American operational control through a covert arrangement, with US aircraft regularly landing and taking off amid limited transparency.
He further claims that even senior Pakistani military officials are restricted from accessing certain operations at the base. These assertions have gained traction in the aftermath of India's Operation Sindoor, which targeted terrorist sites and strategic military infrastructure in Pakistan, including the Nur Khan air base.
The incident has reignited concerns over Pakistan's sovereignty, the extent and nature of America's military presence and Islamabad's evolving strategic alignments in the region.
Noor Khan air base holds immense strategic value due to its location near Islamabad and Rawalpindi—Pakistan's political and military command hubs. Situated close to the Pakistan Army's General Headquarters (GHQ) and the Strategic Plans Division, which manages the country's nuclear arsenal, the base serves as the core command for Pakistan's air mobility operations.
It houses key transport squadrons, including C-130s and CN-235s, and supports VVIP and strategic airlift missions. Its significance is further underscored by the regular presence of US military aircraft, particularly C-17 Globemasters and special operations units.
Reports indicate that certain sections of the base may be designated for exclusive US use, with limited access even for senior Pakistani officials. This consistent American footprint, combined with restricted oversight, lends credibility to Gul's assertion that the air base could be operating under US oversight for select classified missions.
The Noor Khan air base reportedly became a flashpoint during India's precision strike in Operation Sindoor, an event that dramatically escalated tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad.
Just hours before the strike, US Vice President J.D. Vance, in an interview with Fox News on May 9, 2025, publicly distanced Washington from the crisis, stating: 'We're not going to get involved in the middle of a war that's fundamentally none of our business, and has nothing to do with America's ability to control it.'
However, following India's targeting of the strategically sensitive Noor Khan air base, the United States acted swiftly behind the scenes to contain the fallout. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and senior US officials activated emergency diplomatic channels aimed at defusing the crisis.
However, the ceasefire that eventually took hold occurred only after Pakistan's Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) directly contacted his Indian counterpart, prompting a mutual agreement to halt further escalation.
This sequence of events, marked by Washington's initial public detachment and subsequent quiet intervention, likely underscores the concealed strategic importance the US attaches to military assets like Noor Khan air base.
Pakistan's readiness to grant the United States access to its military bases is deeply rooted in a decades-long tradition of strategic cooperation. During the Cold War, Pakistan permitted the US to conduct U-2 reconnaissance missions from Peshawar's Badaber Airbase in 1958.
This partnership deepened significantly during the War on Terror, when critical facilities—such as Shamsi, Shahbaz, Dalbandin, and Nur Khan air base—were used by US forces for drone strikes, intelligence gathering and logistical operations in Afghanistan. While less overt today, this military collaboration continues in more discreet and sophisticated forms.
A strong indicator of sustained US strategic engagement is the consistent flow of financial and multilateral support to Pakistan—even during times of heightened geopolitical tension. In May 2025, amid escalating conflict with India following Operation Sindoor, Pakistan secured a crucial US$1 billion disbursement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under its $7 billion Extended Fund Facility.
The release, widely believed to have been facilitated by US influence, was met with disapproval in India due to its timing during active hostilities, reinforcing the perception in New Delhi about Washington's long-standing geostrategic interests in Pakistan. Since 1958, Pakistan has received 24 IMF loan packages totaling around $34 billion, including a $1.3 billion tranche earlier in March 2025.
At the same time, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved an $800 million assistance package—comprising a $300 million program-based loan and a $500 million policy-based loan. This support came in addition to previous climate resilience financing, including a $500 million CDREP loan.
Despite Indian concerns about potential military diversion of the funds, these disbursements proceeded, signaling strong external backing. Furthermore, continuous US support for the maintenance and upgrade of Pakistan's F-16 fighter fleet continues to reflect a long-standing defense partnership between Rawalpindi and the Pentagon.
Despite its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US continues to view Pakistan as a vital component of its broader regional strategy. Facilities like Noor Khan air base—and possibly others—are believed to serve as forward-operating locations for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.
These bases may also be positioned for potential pre-emptive strikes targeting Iranian nuclear sites or remnants of transnational terrorist groups such as the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP).
Another key driver of US engagement is the strategic aim of preventing Pakistan from falling fully into China's orbit. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative, includes major infrastructure investments—such as highways, ports, and energy facilities—many of which have potential dual-use military applications.
It is likely that US ISR capabilities are actively monitoring these developments from strategic locations such as Noor Khan air base.
China's strategic partnership with Pakistan—embodied by flagship initiatives like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the prospective transfer of advanced platforms such as the J-35 fifth-generation stealth fighter jets—is driven primarily by Beijing's desire to counterbalance India's growing influence in South Asia.
Chinese diplomatic and military support is not anchored in Pakistan's intrinsic value but in its instrumental role as a strategic bulwark against India.
Yet, Beijing must tread carefully. The Pakistani military establishment has a well-documented history of hedging and duplicity in its external alignments. During the War on Terror, Pakistan secured billions in US assistance while simultaneously harboring elements of the Taliban and Haqqani terror network.
Today, the same military apparatus may be covertly cooperating with US strategic objectives—potentially to the detriment of Chinese interests.
For Beijing, these developments underscore the need to recognize the transactional instincts of Pakistan's military elite, who are adept at balancing rival patrons in pursuit of regime security and institutional gains. Even China's great strategist, Sun Tzu, might have cautioned against overreliance on such a volatile ally
The continued US support for Pakistan—evident in sustained financial aid, favorable IMF policies and recent symbolic gestures such as inviting Pakistan's Army chief General Asim Munir to the 250th US Army Day celebrations in Washington—reinforces the perception of the long-standing transactional defense ties between Rawalpindi and the Pentagon.
This support from the US strategic establishment remains strong despite Islamabad's role in fostering regional instability. Notably, Pakistan's 2025–26 federal budget included a nearly 20% increase in defense spending, raising the allocation to approximately 2.55 trillion rupees (~$9 billion), even as overall public expenditure was reduced by 7%.
Analysts argue that such a move would not have been possible without continued external backing—particularly from the US—through financial assistance and favorable multilateral mechanisms, including IMF disbursements.
For China, the lesson is clear: its strategic investment in Pakistan is conditional and instrumental. The possibility of betrayal exists, especially when dealing with a military establishment that has historically prioritized survival and advantage over ideological loyalty.
The Noor Khan air base, in this context, is not just a military asset—it is a symbol of Pakistan's enduring relevance to US strategy and a warning sign for Beijing.
Idress Aftab is a research analyst at the New Delhi-based Centre for Foreign Policy Research.
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