Bahrain Commends Iraq's Preparations to Host Arab Summit, Reaffirms Support for Joint Arab Action
The Representative of Bahrain kingdom Fawzia Abdullah, on Wednesday praised Iraq's outstanding preparations to host the 34th regular session of the Arab League Summit, extending gratitude for the warm reception and generous hospitality.
The delegate said in her speech during the meeting of delegates and senior officials to prepare for the preparatory meeting of foreign ministers for the 34th regular session of the summit, attended by the correspondent of the Iraqi News Agency (INA):'Speaking at the meeting of delegates and senior officials in Baghdad, held in preparation for the foreign ministers' session, Abdullah said, 'We are pleased to express our sincere thanks to the Republic of Iraq for its gracious welcome and hospitality. We wish Iraq every success in leading the summit's proceedings in a way that strengthens joint Arab cooperation.'
She also commended the Arab League's General Secretariat for its role in coordinating the summit, affirming that 'During its presidency of the 33rd Arab Summit — under the guidance of His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa and the government of the Kingdom — Bahrain was committed to promoting Arab unity at all levels, based on its belief in solidarity as a cornerstone for safeguarding collective interests and addressing shared challenges.'
Abdullah noted that Bahrain had actively monitored the implementation of decisions from the previous summit, across political, economic, social, and developmental domains — including resolutions it had initiated.
She added that Bahrain had launched a database within the General Secretariat to document member states' implementation efforts, developed a digital platform to track summit-level decisions of the Arab League Council, and devised a comprehensive media strategy to highlight Arab achievements in this field.
Concluding her remarks, Abdullah reiterated 'Bahrain's profound appreciation for the efforts of the Secretary-General of the Arab League and the members of the General Secretariat, and their continued support throughout Bahrain's presidency of the summit.'
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Memri
6 hours ago
- Memri
Druze Revolts, Then And Now
Sultan Pasha Al-Atrash in exile in Saudi Arabia Exactly a century ago, what began as a dispute about local power in the Druze majority region of Southern Syria erupted into a long-lasting anti-imperialist revolt, one that would have a lasting regional impact. In July 2025, a different Druze revolt threatened to change the trajectory of political change in Syria and is already havening regional implications. The Druze, a relatively small and compact ethnic and religious minority found mostly in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, are once again in the spotlight. On July 21, 1925, Druze feudal leader Sultan Al-Atrash announced a revolt against the French Mandate in the Levant. French rule in Syria, part of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 between Britain and France, had already been rocky from the start. French efforts at modernizing and controlling Syria had also been characterized by a considerable amount of meddling and heavy-handed micromanaging. The powerful Al-Atrash family (the Turshan, plural of Atrash) had sent representatives to iron out differences with the French only to have them jailed as hostages in order to secure good behavior from the Druze. The French did not quite know who they were dealing with. Sultan Al-Atrash had lost a father to the Ottomans, been drafted into the Turkish Army and later had fought the French in past battles.[1] This was a warrior chief from among a warrior people. Jealous of his personal power and feudal privileges, the Great Syrian Revolt Al-Atrash ignited was not a parochial one but framed in the potent language of Syrian Arab Nationalism, anti-imperialism and freedom. His revolutionary manifesto (drafted by Damascus intellectuals) even called for the "application of the principles of the French Revolution and the Rights of Man." The humble Arab masses, what Al-Atrash dubbed "the patchers of cloaks" were especially inspired by this cause.[2] Despite many small victories and undoubted bravery, Al-Atrash would eventually lose the war to the French but become a legendary figure, even in the West (he was portrayed heroically in the December 1925 issue of The Atlantic, in an article written by a Revisionist Zionist).[3] While he may have lost on the battlefield, Al-Atrash's cause won politically, giving a tremendous boost to both Syrian patriotism and Arab Nationalism, a feat that would later earn him the praise of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Hafiz Al-Assad. And yet in 1946, 20 years after that nationalist revolt, the Al-Atrash clan fought fiercely against the newly independent Arab government in Damascus (under Presidents Shukri Al-Quwatli and Adib Shishakli) to maintain Druze rights and autonomy. The Druze, like the Alawites, and like the Christians of neighboring Lebanon, seemed to have had two quarreling factions within their ranks: those seeking unity with the greater whole – either with the state and/or the Arab nation – and those leaning towards greater autonomy, federalism, or separation.[4] Clipping of PLO Chief Yasser Arafat with an ailing Sultan Al-Atrash The Turshan still exist but they are not the leading political figures of the Syrian Druze today. As with other polities and individuals in Syria over the past 15 years, the Druze have had to maneuver and scheme in their relations with the state, with each other, with the Assad regime, during the brutal Syrian Civil War, and now with the new Syrian government headed by Islamist President Ahmed Al-Sharaa. There were Syrian Druze who fought against Assad and there were Syrian Druze who collaborated with and indeed held high military rank in the Assad regime army. A (pro-Al-Hijri) Druze fighter desecrating the tomb of Wahid Al-Balous (July 2025) Syria's most prominent Druze figures today represent the two sides of that historic Druze duality and ambivalence. 30-year-old Laith Al-Balous represents the more Syrian Arab nationalist Druze tendency, looking towards today's Damascus government. The Al-Balous (through Laith's father, Wahid Al-Balous, who was assassinated by the Assad regime in 2015) raised their own militia which fought against Jihadists and against aggressive Bedouin (Sunni Arab) neighbors but which also mostly leaned against the Assad regime.[5] Druze fighter posing with dead Syrian government troops (July 2025) The traditional Druze religious leadership, especially in the person of Venezuela-born 60-year-old Hikmat Al-Hijri (many Druze have ties with South America, especially Venezuela), leaned much more decisively towards the Assad regime through the years. Al-Hijri broke with the Assad regime only at the very end, and much more clearly represents the autonomy-seeking tendency among the Druze.[6] And although Al-Hijri's powerbase was initially religious, he is now very much a political player, with his own militia base and international ties (to the Israeli Druze).[7] Critics also accuse Al-Hijri of having recruited former Assad regime officers among the Syrian Druze and to be deeply involved in the Syrian drug trade across the border into Jordan. Both Al-Balous and Al-Hijri are connected, in different ways, in the recent violence in Syria's Druze majority Suwayda Governorate. One of the challenges the new government in Damascus faces is how to incorporate breakaway provinces back into a centrally-ruled Syria. This is a major problem with the Kurdish ruled Syrian Northeast and with Druze Suwayda.[8] Earlier this month, the Damascus government saw what seemed a golden opportunity to reincorporate Suwayda into Syria. The 1925 war was triggered by a dead cat belonging to a French officer. The ostensible trigger for the 2025 war was the stealing of a Druze vegetable truck at a pro-government Bedouin-run checkpoint. Both local events were, of course, intimately connected to larger questions of power and authority in Syria, a century ago under French military, today, under Syria's new Islamist rulers. Anti "Al-Hijri Gangs" propaganda on Twitter (July 2025) With the vegetable truck incident, tensions between Bedouin and Druze (which are nothing new) then exploded into outright conflict, with kidnappings and murders on both sides. Al-Hijri's men – already regarded suspiciously by Damascus because of the international ties, the Assad officer connection and the smuggling question – were prominent in fighting (and killing) their Bedouin rivals. Damascus saw the sending of troops as a way to solve several problems – restore order, extend state power, curtail (or maybe eliminate) a troublesome local potentate, perhaps also build up a more amenable local figure in Laith Al-Balous.[9] Infamous image of Druze cleric having his mustache clipped by government soldier (July 2025) But disaster struck. The Damascus units initially sent in had two major problems. They seem to have been made up of raw recruits and they were contaminated by open religious animus. Videos of government soldiers mocking the Druze including several showing government fighters forcibly shaving the mustaches of Druze elders peppered social media. Islamists called for "no Druze mustaches (shawarib) or baggy pants (the traditional Druze sherwal)." And if insults were not bad enough, government troops and the pro-government Bedouin militias committed many human rights abuses against Druze civilians (not just against Al-Hijri's fighters) while Al-Hijri's forces seem to not just ambushed government troops but also slaughtered civilian prisoners and taken hostages. All of this, the rhetoric, the videos, calls for revenge, calls to slaughter the Druze (not just "the criminal Al-Hijri") fed into larger regional and international narratives.[10] Enemies of the Ahmed Al-Sharaa government in Damascus, including Iran and its allies, Assad regime types, and the Syrian Kurds, wasted no time in highlighting the abuses, and there was plenty of real material to work with. Pro-Syrian government forces stand on image of Druze flag and Sultan Al-Atrash With its own Druze population, a valued part of the state of Israel's history and armed forces, rhetoric (and real violence) against the Syrian Druze and deeply ambivalent about Islamist rule in Damascus, the IDF intervened directly on the side of the Druze (meaning on the side of Al-Hijri).[11] Israel has long considered Southern Syria an area of deep strategic concern. Israel not only hit local government units and militias confronting Druze forces but spectacularly bombing the Syrian Defense Ministry in Damascus on live television. With the help of American mediation, Damascus tried to forge a de-escalation agreement with the Druze which may or may not last. Government troops pulled back which led to even worse violence which then seems to be leading to government forces returning to the region.[12] There are simultaneously community-generated efforts at vendetta and at peacebuilding happening between Druze and non-Druze. Anti-Druze, pro-government propaganda on Twitter (July 2025) Much blood has been spilt and hearts hardened, especially among the Syrian Sunni majority against the Druze. There is deep rage and fury on both sides. While pro-government voices seek to place all the blame on the mercurial Druze warlord Al-Hijri, the fact remains that many Druze (and some Christians) were slaughtered, raped or kidnapped by pro-government forces (whether Bedouin or uniformed government units) with no regard to political affiliation.[13] Syrian Bedouin Tribes Meet to Demand Disarming of Al-Hijri's militia (January 2025) Both sides are being portrayed as either victims or villains and both are portrayed too often, falsely, as uniform fronts.[14] There has been so much rhetoric and so much twisting, for political or ideological reasons, of the facts or exaggeration that it is important to make some general statements about the situation: 1) Tension and violence between Syrian Bedouin and Druze are not new. In addition, elements of both groups have connections with and are competitors in the lucrative smuggling (drugs and guns) business. They are not just in conflict because of religion or ethnicity. 2) There has been heightened anti-Druze tension for months in Syria.[15] In April 2025, there were bloodcurdling threats against Druze as a result of a suspicious video of a Druze man insulting the Prophet Muhammad which led to Syrian Sunni Muslim calls for violence against the Druze community as a whole.[16] 3) The March 2025 slaughter of Alawites by government forces on the Syrian Coast and the seeming subsequent impunity of those forces has heightened tensions with all ethnic and religious communities in the country across the board. The Druze, like the Kurds, and unlike the Christians, are armed and everyone is more leery of domination by Damascus after the March events. 4) Hikmat Al-Hijri is indeed a scheming, volatile figure who seeks to gain ultimate power within his community and is involved in all sorts of suspicious enterprises. But the indiscriminate slaughter of Druze by Bedouin/government forces seems to have boosted his popularity among Druze while Al-Balous's influence is greatly diminished in comparison. 5) The Syrian government has real ties with Syrian Bedouin which it has used and is using as a tool to project power. In this conflict, the Bedouin are not completely free actors but rather enthusiastic sub-contractors, pursuing their own vendettas and crimes (such as rape and looting) while broadly serving the political interests of the Damascus government, in a sense serving as the "bad cop" to the Syrian government's relative "good cop."[17] 6) The Damascus government – whatever President Al-Sharaa's real feelings on the matter – is itself not a free actor in this conflict either. Al-Sharaa is exquisitely aware of Qatari, and especially Turkish interests, in everything involving Syria, including the South. In a way, what happened with the Druze can be seen as a dry-run for a similar campaign to be directed against the Kurdish-led SDF in the country's Northeast, an issue of tremendous interest to the Erdogan regime. But Al-Sharaa seems to also be hampered by his own cadres, blunt and chaotic instruments who seem to be cruder and less disciplined than he would prefer.[18] Pro-Al-Hijri Propaganda on social media comparing him to Sultan Al-Atrash (July 2025) A century after Sultan Al-Atrash's heroism, the situation in Syria seems dire indeed, balancing on the edge of a knife. Any celebration marking the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925 and the great Druze warrior would ring extremely hollow today. A shaky ceasefire seems to be holding in Suwayda but what comes next?[19] The war-wrecked country's already frayed social fabric is again, deeply and severely wounded. *Alberto M. Fernandez is Vice President of MEMRI.
Shafaq News
a day ago
- Shafaq News
Israeli airstrike hits tribal fighters as Suwayda clashes resume
Shafaq News – Damascus An Israeli airstrike on Sunday targeted a gathering of Bedouin tribal fighters in Suwayda province, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported. استهدفت طائرة إسرائيلية مكان تجمع لمقاتلي العشائر قرب قرية عريقة في السويداء. — Arab-Military (@ashrafnsier) July 20, 2025 The strike coincided with renewed fighting between Druze groups and Bedouin factions, despite a declared ceasefire. According to the Observatory, tribal forces had launched an operation aimed at 'freeing detainees held by Druze armed groups.' Clashes also broke out in Rima Hazem, Areeqa, and Shahba, involving mortar fire and medium-caliber weapons. In Areeqa, several homes were set ablaze during the shelling, causing significant damage and raising concerns over a worsening humanitarian situation if the violence continues. #SOHR — المرصد السوري لحقوق الإنسان (@syriahr) July 20, 2025
Shafaq News
2 days ago
- Shafaq News
Iraq's Provincial Councils: Dysfunctional return deepens public disillusionment
Shafaq News Eighteen months after Iraq reinstated provincial councils through elections held in December 2023, what was intended as a milestone for local democratic renewal has instead descended into institutional paralysis. Across the country, these councils—originally designed to decentralize authority and improve service oversight—are now widely seen as symbols of political infighting, legal uncertainty, and eroded public trust. The councils' revival followed a decade-long suspension, but their comeback has been marred by opaque power arrangements and factional dominance. The result: a system that privileges political quotas over citizen representation, and where council decisions often reflect elite rivalry rather than local needs. From Oversight to Gridlock In the immediate aftermath of the 2023 elections, nearly every provincial council struggled to form a working majority or elect key leadership. In many cases, the absence of binding performance standards allowed dominant blocs to assert control through informal negotiations. Rather than functioning as local watchdogs or policy facilitators, councils became arenas of partisan competition. 'Provincial councils have turned into an empty loop that feeds corruption,' said independent MP Hussein al-Saabri. 'There's little effective governance, and public services are stagnant.' His concern is echoed by Babylon council member Hussein al-Dahmooshi, who attributed the dysfunction to Iraq's entrenched quota system. 'Any decision not backed by powerful blocs simply fails,' he noted, adding that independents are often marginalized. Former MP Mazen al-Faili warned that repeated institutional failures were accelerating the erosion of citizen trust: 'There's poor oversight from both the councils and Parliament. This has allowed corruption to take root.' Baghdad: Legal Battles and Power Struggles In Baghdad, months of internal discord have highlighted the legal ambiguity and partisan friction plaguing Iraq's largest provincial council. Early in 2025, the council voted to dismiss Governor Abdul-Muttalib al-Alawi on grounds of retirement eligibility—a justification the governor rejected. While the Administrative Court initially upheld his removal, the State of Law Coalition challenged the process, accusing the council chairman of overreach. Weeks later, the council moved to dismiss the chairman himself, Ammar al-Qaisi. That decision, too, was reversed by the court, deepening the governance stalemate. In July 2025, the Ishraqat Kanoon bloc expelled its only council representative, Hussein al-Khuzai, over alleged violations of party discipline. Separately, the National Resolution Coalition withdrew from the Baghdad Bloc, citing political deviation. Kirkuk: Fragile Balances Collapse In Kirkuk, ethnic and political tensions have destabilized the post-election landscape. In August 2024, a controversial session held in Baghdad—boycotted by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and several Arab lawmakers—resulted in the appointment of Ribwar Taha as governor and Mohammed Hafiz as council chairman. Though the Administrative Court upheld their appointments in early 2025, the session's legitimacy remained in dispute. A power-sharing pact, intended to balance Kirkuk's Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen constituencies, collapsed in May when two Arab council members withdrew from the ruling coalition, accusing partners of violating the agreement. Although they retained their seats, their withdrawal effectively ended any pretense of consensus governance. Saladin and Diyala: Court Rulings Ignored In Saladin, the appointment of former governor Ahmed Abdullah al-Jubouri (Abu Mazen) in February 2024 triggered a deadlock between provincial and federal authorities. Despite his amnesty, the Iraqi Presidency refused to issue a formal decree confirming his return due to prior convictions. Local tribal and political factions backed the council's decision, but the impasse remains unresolved. Further tensions arose when the council voted to dismiss its chairman, Adel al-Sumaidaie, replacing him with Ali al- Kareem. The Administrative Judiciary Court later invalidated al-Kareem's appointment, reinstating al- Sumaidaie. However, the conflict revealed a deeper institutional weakness: political blocs often ignore or delay implementing court decisions, undermining judicial authority. Diyala presents a similar picture. Repeated efforts to remove the council president have led to a cycle of court-mandated reinstatements, which the majority of council members have refused to honor. The result is near-total administrative paralysis and a growing perception that the rule of law is selectively applied. Dhi Qar, Najaf, and Al-Diwaniyah: Corruption Allegations and Resignations In Dhi Qar, the dismissal of Governor Murtadha al-Ibrahimi in early 2024 deepened long-standing internal divisions. Rival factions within the council have failed to agree on a successor, leaving key administrative and budgetary decisions in limbo. In Najaf, a senior council member resigned in April 2025 amid accusations of misconduct in awarding public contracts. In Al-Diwaniyah, citizen protests erupted over claims that council members colluded with contractors to inflate project costs. The backlash prompted a judicial investigation and the temporary suspension of several officials. Rooted in Quotas, Not Service Political analyst Nawal al-Mousawi traced the dysfunction back to the quota-based system used to distribute council seats and executive roles. 'Since their inception, these councils have operated under a partisan logic that undermines transparency,' she told Shafaq News. 'The conflicts are more about political positioning ahead of national elections than about public service.' Al-Mousawi also emphasized that the councils' return, after a ten-year suspension, has failed to bring lessons learned. 'Rather than reforming themselves, they've reverted to the same practices that led to their previous abolition. This illustrates how entrenched institutional stagnation has become.' A Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy At its core, the crisis in Iraq's provincial councils is not just administrative but democratic. Conceived as mechanisms for local oversight and citizen representation, the councils have instead become symbols of dysfunction. Voter turnout for the 2023 elections hovered around 41%, but more recent surveys indicate declining interest in the upcoming parliamentary elections—a reflection of deepening public disillusionment with both local and national governance. Outlook: Reform or Repetition? While some voices have called for a second suspension of the councils, others advocate sweeping reforms: revising electoral laws, imposing performance benchmarks, and limiting partisan appointments. Yet such reforms would require political will that has so far been lacking. In the meantime, many political blocs continue to use provincial councils as platforms for influence ahead of federal elections. Without decisive legislative or judicial intervention, Iraq risks repeating the cycle of failed decentralization—a trajectory that threatens not just local governance but the broader credibility of the country's democratic institutions. Comparatively, Iraq's experience mirrors failed decentralization efforts elsewhere in the region—such as Lebanon's paralyzed municipalities or Tunisia's reversed local empowerment experiment—underscoring that without safeguards, local governance can become a new arena for elite dysfunction rather than a remedy for centralization.
